Riigi ja ühiskonna suhte roll välispoliitika kujundamise protsessis by Groeneveld, Maria
M
A
R
IA
 G
R
O
E
N
E
V
E
L
D
 
T
he role of the state and society relationship in the foreign policy m
aking process
Tartu 2012
ISSN 1736–4205 
ISBN 978–9949–32–174–2
DISSERTATIONES 
RERUM 
POLITICARUM 
UNIVERSITATIS 
TARTUENSIS
7
MARIA GROENEVELD
The role of the state and 
society relationship 
in the foreign policy making process
DISSERTATIONES RERUM POLITICARUM  
UNIVERSITATIS TARTUENSIS 
7  
   
 DISSERTATIONES RERUM POLITICARUM  
UNIVERSITATIS TARTUENSIS 
7 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
MARIA GROENEVELD 
 
The role of the state and  
society relationship  
in the foreign policy making process 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    
 
 
 Institute of Government and Politics, Faculty of Social Sciences and Education, 
University of Tartu, Estonia 
 
Dissertation was accepted for the commencement of the degree of Doctor of 
Philosophy (in Political Science) on 1 November 2012 by the Council of the 
Faculty of Social Sciences and Education, University of Tartu. 
 
Supervisors: Prof. Andres Kasekamp, University of Tartu, Estonia 
 Dr. Alexander Astrov, Central European University, 
Hungary 
 
Opponent:  Prof. Hiski Haukkala, University of Tampere, Finland 
 
Commencement: 3 December 2012 
 
Publication of this thesis is granted by the Institute of Government and Politics, 
University of Tartu and by the Doctoral School of Behavioural, Social and 
Health Sciences created under the auspices of the European Union Social Fund.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
ISSN 1736–4205 
ISBN 978–9949–32–174–2 (print)  
ISBN 978–9949–32–175–9 (pdf) 
 
 
Copyright: Maria Groeneveld, 2012 
 
University of Tartu Press 
www.tyk.ee 
Order No 559 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS  ..........................................................................  8 
INTRODUCTION ..........................................................................................  9 
CHAPTER 1. STATE AND SOCIETY RELATIONSHIP  
IN CONSTRUCTIVISM  ...............................................................................  16 
1.1. Rationalist approaches of International Relations  .............................  16 
1.2. Constructivist approach of International Relations  ...........................  19 
1.2.1. Systemic constructivism  .........................................................  22 
1.2.2. Societal constructivism  ...........................................................  24 
1.2.3. The state and society relationship  ...........................................  26 
1.3. Methodology  .....................................................................................  31 
1.3.1. Case selection  .........................................................................  32 
1.3.2. Data collection and sampling texts  .........................................  34 
1.3.3. Analysing the data  ..................................................................  35 
CHAPTER 2. ESTONIA’S FOREIGN POLICY DECISION IN 
AUTUMN 1939  ............................................................................................  37 
2.1. Introduction  .......................................................................................  37 
2.2. Estonia’s foreign policy in 1939  .......................................................  37 
2.2.1. Demands  .................................................................................  39 
2.2.2. Government’s decision on demands  .......................................  40 
2.2.3. Balancing the threat  ................................................................  42 
2.3. How-possible?  ...................................................................................  44 
CHAPTER 3 DOMINANT SOCIETAL DISCOURSES  
IN ESTONIA  .................................................................................................  48 
3.1. The emergence, development and interaction between the main 
dominant discourses  .........................................................................  48 
3.1.1. Introduction  ............................................................................  48 
3.1.2. Understandings on the state and society relationship  .............  53 
3.2. Radical-nationalist discourse  .............................................................  55 
3.2.1. Strong societal support for the Veterans’ idea of a strong 
president  ................................................................................  58 
3.3. Collectivist-nationalist discourse  ......................................................  61 
3.3.1. The development of the discourse into state discourse ...........  61 
3.3.2. Characteristics of the discourse  ..............................................  65 
3.4. Liberal individualism  ........................................................................  68 
3.5. Conclusion  .........................................................................................  71 
CHAPTER 4. THE DECISION-MAKING PROCESS IN ESTONIA IN 
AUTUMN 1939  ............................................................................................  73 
4.1. Social construction of the decision-maker  ........................................  74 
4.1.1.  President Päts as the primary decision-maker  .......................  74 
4.1.2.  State design  ...........................................................................  75 
6 
4.1.3.  Understandings of the decision-making and state and 
society relationship  ................................................................  79 
4.1.4. Conclusion  ..............................................................................  83 
4.2. Institutional practices  ........................................................................  84 
4.3. Decision-making process in 1939  .....................................................  88 
4.3.1. Decision-making in 1939  ........................................................  88 
4.3.2. Conclusion  ..............................................................................  92 
4.4. Conclusion of the case study  .............................................................  92 
4.4.1. How-possible reversed  ...........................................................  93 
CHAPTER 5. FINLAND’S FOREIGN POLICY DECISION  
IN 1939  ..........................................................................................................  95 
5.1. Introduction  .......................................................................................  95 
5.1.1. Finland’s foreign policy in 1939  ............................................  96 
5.1.2. Demands  .................................................................................  97 
5.1.3. Policy after receiving the demands  .........................................  99 
5.1.4. Increasing external pressures  ..................................................  100 
5.2. How was Finland’s foreign policy behaviour possible?  ....................  102 
CHAPTER 6. FINLAND’S SOCIETAL DISCOURSES  .............................  105 
6.1. The emergence, development and interaction between the main 
dominant discourses in Finland  ........................................................  105 
6.2. Constitutional-Conciliation debate  ....................................................  106 
6.2.1. Introduction  ............................................................................  106 
6.2.2. Constitutional discourse  .........................................................  108 
6.2.3. Conciliation side  .....................................................................  113 
6.2.4. Conclusion  ..............................................................................  116 
6.3. White and Red Finland  ......................................................................   116 
6.3.1. Introduction  ............................................................................  116 
6.3.2. White Finland  .........................................................................  117 
6.3.3. Red Finland  ............................................................................  121 
6.3.4. Conclusion  ..............................................................................  123 
6.4. Radical-nationalism and the lawfulness front  ...................................  123 
6.4.1. Radical-nationalism  ................................................................  123 
6.4.2. Academic Karelia Society  ......................................................  124 
6.4.3. Lapua movement  ....................................................................  127 
6.4.4. Lawfulness front  .....................................................................  128 
6.5. Conclusion  .........................................................................................  129 
CHAPTER 7. DECISION-MAKING PROCESS IN FINLAND  
IN AUTUMN 1939  .......................................................................................  132 
7.1. Social construction of the decision-maker  ........................................  132 
7.1.1. Foreign minister Erkko as the primary decision-maker  .........  133 
7.1.2. Introduction  ............................................................................  134 
7.1.3. The decision-maker’s understanding of the dominant societal 
discourses  ..............................................................................  135 
7.1.4. Erkko’s understandings on foreign policy  ..............................  137 
7 
7.1.5. Erkko’s policy line in autumn 1939 ........................................  140 
7.1.6. Conclusion  ..............................................................................  143 
7.2. Domestic discourses and interactions between them regarding the 
decision-making in autumn 1939  .....................................................  144 
7.2.1. Understandings in the government  .........................................  144 
7.2.2. Radical-nationalist discourse  ..................................................  146 
7.2.3. Conciliation discourse  ............................................................  147 
7.2.4. Unanimity  ...............................................................................  148 
7.3. Societal understandings and pressures  ..............................................  151 
7.3.1. Societal understandings and initiatives  ...................................  152 
7.3.2. State and society relationship – who influenced whom? .........  155 
7.3.3. Conclusion  ..............................................................................  156 
7.4. Conclusion of the case study  .............................................................  158 
CONCLUSIONS  ...........................................................................................  160 
BIBLIOGRAPHY  .........................................................................................  171 
SUMMARY IN ESTONIAN  ........................................................................  183 
CURRICULUM VITAE  ...............................................................................  189 
 
 
 
 
8 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
 
“Begin at the beginning and go on till you come to the end: then stop” 
(Lewis Carroll)  
 
The process of writing a PhD dissertation does have a clear beginning, and in 
many cases an end, but everything in between is not as straightforward and it 
may not be that easy to recognise the end. So, I express my gratitude to my 
supervisors, colleagues, family, friends and institutions, whose support made 
this journey and reaching the endpoint of it possible and much easier. My deep 
gratitude belongs to my supervisor Dr. Alexander Astrov, from Central Euro-
pean University, who supported me throughout the whole process, from the 
moment of coming up with a vague research idea, to the very end of submitting 
the final version. I would like to thank him for his thorough comments, en-
couragement, endless patience, flexibility and willingness to assist me in spite 
of being separated by a number of countries. I am also deeply grateful to my 
supervisor Professor Andres Kasekamp from University of Tartu for his con-
structive feedback and encouragement, his guidance regarding the case studies, 
and advice on how to prioritize in the late stage of writing, which was crucial 
for me prior submitting. I would like to thank Dr. Jan Erk from University of 
Leiden whose advice and comments were of invaluable help in the early stage 
of my research in setting and refining my puzzle and the framework for the  
thesis. I would like to thank my opponent Professor Hiski Haukkala from Uni-
versity of Tampere for his detailed and constructive comments and criticism on 
the dissertation. 
I would like to thank the Archimedes Foundation and the Doctoral School of 
Behavioral and Health Sciences for their financial support that enabled me to do 
research at the University of Leiden, conduct research visits and attend confer-
ences to present my research. Special thanks to Katre Sakala and Kristel Vits 
from the Doctoral School for their help and advice on many occasions. Col-
leagues and friends from the University of Tartu, Central European University, 
the University of Leiden and the VU University Amsterdam, thank you for your 
constructive feedback and support. A special word of gratitude belongs to my 
friend and colleague Katerina Svickova for her thorough comments and insights 
on my dissertation in its several stages and for her countless motivation boosts. 
I also thank my friend and colleague Siniša Vuković for his support and co-
operation. 
I would like to thank my friends for their encouragement and support. While 
writing this dissertation I have been living in several countries in two conti-
nents, where I did not have access to relevant books or materials. Therefore, 
heartfelt thank you for my friends and family who ordered books for me and 
carried them between different countries. My parents and the rest of my family, 
thank you for being there for me. My dear husband, Caspar Groeneveld, thank 
you so much for your support, encouragement, countless proof-reading of this 
dissertation and your sense of humour throughout this. Dank je voor alles. 
9 
INTRODUCTION 
Puzzle and research question 
This dissertation explores a state’s foreign policy making process under high 
external constraints, focusing on the role of the state and society relationship 
within this process. History has shown that states in an asymmetrical conflict 
situation, hence facing a state with higher material capabilities, often follow the 
logic of the international system and comply with the power actor’s demands. 
However, history also provides examples where even during a crude power 
situation, such as a World War, states sometimes choose an alternative action, 
such as resisting either politically or militarily or simply ignoring the situation. 
There are cases where several states with similarly limited power capabilities, 
facing the same aggressor, chose different foreign policy actions. For example, 
in 1956, when popular uprisings took place both in communist Poland and in 
Hungary, the former made a deal with the Soviet Union whereas the latter de-
cided to resist. In World War II, the Netherlands, which had a historical tradi-
tion of neutrality and relatively low military capabilities, responded to German 
military aggression with military resistance and fought for five days, whereas 
Czechoslovakia, with relatively high military capabilities, capitulated without 
firing a shot. In the autumn of 1939, the Soviet Union presented Estonia, Latvia, 
Lithuania and Finland with demands on mutual non-aggression pacts that also 
included Soviet military bases on the territories of particular states, all of which 
had the potential to severely undermine their declared neutrality and put them 
into the Soviet Union’s sphere of influence. Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania 
signed the demands within a few days, which kept them away from the war in 
1939, but led them to gradually lose their independence over the summer of 
1940. Finland did not agree to the Soviet demands and as a result ended up 
waging a war with the Soviet Union in 1939–1940. The abovementioned ex-
amples raise some questions, the first of which is where the differences between 
these decisions come from. Since states in these examples were all states with 
arguably limited capabilities under an acute foreign policy crisis situation, and 
as a result faced similar systemic constraints, how could they develop such dif-
ferent preferences in their foreign policy making? 
One illustrative pair of cases of this puzzle, and the one the current disser-
tation will focus on, is that of Estonia and Finland in autumn 1939 with regard 
to their response to the demands of the Soviet Union. These two neighbouring 
countries received demands from the Soviet Union in late September (Estonia) 
and early October (Finland) 1939, justified by the Soviets with their own stra-
tegic security concerns within the volatile international situation of the freshly 
begun war. The demands entailed mutual non-aggression pacts and included 
Soviet military bases on the territories of these states. In the case of Finland, the 
demands also comprised territorial concessions. Estonia signed the demands 
five days after their presentation by the Soviets. Finland’s negotiations with the 
Soviets lasted over a month, as Finland did not agree to the demands. The talks 
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broke off in mid-November and on 30 November 1939 the Soviet Union at-
tacked Finland, which started off the Winter War of 1939–1940. 
In both cases, there was a clear power disparity with the aggressor, a context 
of international crisis and the events of the recent destruction of Poland and 
Czechoslovakia. Both countries had declared neutrality at the beginning of the 
war and neither of them had signed military agreements with a powerful state. 
Hence, where did the differences in the foreign policy making of these two 
states come from? The vast literature on the foreign and defence policy of Esto-
nia and Finland in autumn 1939 offers a wide array of possibilities1. One promi-
nent approach focuses on the logic of the international system, consequently on 
external factors and constraints: the volatility of the international system, Soviet 
intentions and security concerns, interests of the big powers and a disparity in 
military capabilities between the aggressor and the weaker state. In case of Es-
tonia, some works focus on the international system and external constraints, 
such as the security interests of the Great Powers, the context of large-scale war 
and the limited military options of Estonia (see for example Medijainen 2000a, 
2000b; Arumäe 2006; Myllyniemi 1977). In case of Finland, the scholars fo-
cusing on external constraints, writing mainly in the 1950s to 1970s, argue that 
Finland failed to recognise the depth of systemic constraints, as the strategic 
security needs of the Soviet Union had to be accommodated. This approach 
blames the Finnish decision-makers to for their failure to accommodate the se-
curity needs of the Soviet Union and deems their understandings of the situation 
unrealistic and inflexible (Paasikivi 1958, 1986c; Kirby 1979; Vital 1971b). It 
has been argued that the country’s top leadership undermined the Soviet secu-
rity needs and believed the Soviets to be bluffing (Paasikivi 1958, 1986c; Ja-
kobson 1961).  
In addition, some authors pay attention to the previous foreign policy orien-
tation and choices as factors leading to this particular behaviour. In case of Es-
tonia some authors bring out the Estonian German orientation as an important 
factor (for example Warma 1993, 1960, 1955; also Ilmjärv 2004a, 2004b, 
2004c; Parming 1979). In case of Finland, for example Soikkanen (1983) fo-
cuses on the role of Finland’s domestic politics in shaping its foreign policy 
priorities. Another cause for the particular decisions is seen in the domestic 
politics of these two countries. In case of Estonia, for example Ilmjärv (2004a, 
2004b, 2004c, 2004d) argues that it was the nature of the political regime, con-
sidered authoritarian, that should be seen as one of the main causes, as it al-
lowed for the isolated political choices (such as non-mobilisation) and the for-
eign policy orientation, and effectively abandoned the neutrality policy (also see 
Parming 1979). In case of Finland the angle is a bit different, but it is often ar-
gued that the overall political scene supported the government’s policy, and 
therefore, that the government’s space of manoeuvring was limited (Soikkanen 
                                                     
1  The current paragraph gives a brief overview of some of the debates on these two cases. 
The gap in this dissertation is defined in terms of theory, not in terms of historical research 
on these cases.  
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1983; Jakobson 1961, Ylikangas 1986). In both cases the personal characteris-
tics, preferences and sympathies have been listed by some authors as important 
factors. In case of Estonia see for example Turtola 2003, 2008 and his reading 
of Estonian decision-makers’ personal characteristics and sympathies to explain 
the Estonian foreign policy behaviour in autumn 1939. In case of Finland, many 
authors in the 1950s-1970s mention the optimism or unrealistic attitudes of 
Finland’s foreign minister as a factor in the decision-making process (Paasikivi 
1958, 1986c; Tanner 1957; Jakobson 1961; Kirby 1979; Vital 1971b).  
In both cases, there is also a focus on the role of society in these two coun-
tries. In the case of Estonia, it has been argued that the connection between the 
state and society was, due to the authoritarian state regime, weak or lacking (see 
Parming 1979; Ilmjärv 2004a, 2004b). In the case of Finland, the notion of so-
ciety is usually part of different explanations of Finland’s foreign policy be-
haviour. The scholars focusing on external constraints, who argue for the failure 
of Finnish politicians to acknowledge these constraints, still point out that un-
derstandings of these politicians “echoed the feelings of the nation” (Kirby 
1979, 122; see also Paasikivi 1958, 1986c). The full support of the parliament 
and the society as a whole for the government’s policy has been emphasised in 
most studies on Finland’s behaviour in autumn 1939. It is sometimes also pre-
sented in the framework of domestic constraints, as the government knew that 
society would support it as long as it would not agree with the demands. As 
Ylikangas has put it, a different decision would have required a different gov-
ernment, different political elites and a different society (Ylikangas 1986). 
Within this understanding, the historical experiences Finland had with Russia 
have been emphasised (for example Jakobson 1961) and in more recent litera-
ture, the question of public opinion has been explored in more detail (Ahto 
1989). 
To sum up, the external constraints dominated the decision-making in  
autumn 1939 for Estonia and did not dominate in case of Finland. Reasons have 
been found, among others, in the material capacities of the countries, in the in-
ternational system and interests of the Great Powers, in the nature of political 
regimes, in the competence/incompetence of the top leadership of these coun-
tries and in personal characteristics of the decision-makers. In both cases, the 
question of the link between the state and society has been brought out as well. 
Next, the international relations theories in regard to the puzzle of this disserta-
tion will be discussed.  
The theoretical approaches of International Relations (IR) see the state’s 
preference formation in different terms. The rationalist approaches, such as 
realism, neorealism, liberalism, neoliberalism and institutionalism, focus mainly 
on material factors and states as rational actors attempting to maximize their 
power when explaining a state’s foreign policy behaviour. For realism, as ar-
gued by Morgenthau, states must act “on the international scene […] in power-
political terms” (Morgenthau 1950, 836). According to neorealism, one of the 
most prominent IR theories, in the anarchic international world the state’s pref-
erences are linked to the notion of ensuring its survival, which this theory as-
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sumes to be the main goal of every state. The main defining characteristic of a 
state for neorealists is its position in the international arena, defined by its mate-
rial capabilities, and therefore they neglect domestic factors in their analysis 
(Waltz 1979). Waltz stated: “To say that a country acts in its national interest, 
means that, having examined its security requirements, it tries to meet them” 
(Waltz 1979, 134). Realist approaches mainly focus on so called power states, 
while for those states that do not belong to this category they allow limited 
room for manoeuvring in terms of their preference formation on foreign policy 
actions. Survival is particularly problematic for a weak or small state2 in a for-
eign policy crisis situation when threatened by a power state. Weaker states in 
this situation have only two options: either to balance or to bandwagon (Walt 
1987). This logic would imply that a state in an asymmetrical conflict situation 
would assess the situation based on its limited capabilities. In the pursuit of its 
main goal, which is to survive, it would choose to agree with the demands of the 
power state in order to avoid even worse consequences. Vital argues that a 
small state “may be sure of retaining identity and autonomy [...] only so long as 
its capacity for autonomous action is not put to the test. Conflict with a great 
power is, ultimately, a conflict over autonomy. [...] The aim of the minor power 
must therefore be to avoid such conflict” (Vital 1971a, 27). Liberal approaches 
go beyond a state’s capabilities and focus on the state’s intentions and prefer-
ences. Liberalism argues that actors are more concerned with absolute gains and 
not relative gains, as realist approaches would assume. Nevertheless, both lib-
eral and realist approaches see states as rational unitary actors, hence value-
maximizers, whose interests are “determined by the state’s position in the inter-
national political system” (Smith 2000b, 382). Rationalist approaches would 
assume that within an asymmetrical conflict situation the preference formation 
of the weaker state will be dominated by external pressures, hence by the logic 
of the international system. These approaches do not provide sufficient expla-
nation on why a state under acute external constraints would decide to go 
against the power current.  
Therefore, the current study suggests that this kind of behaviour could be 
better explained by looking through constructivist lenses, the approach of IR 
                                                     
2  The current study uses the terms “small”, “weak” and “minor” actors/states interchange-
ably. In the field of IR there are several definitions of the concept of “small states” and one 
of the debated questions is whether this concept can be defined by arbitrarily setting the 
limits for certain characteristics of the state, for example population size (for definitions 
based on certain measurable characteristics such as size, population, economic development 
and military capabilities see East 1973, Crowards 2002) or whether the concept is relevant 
only when a small state is referred to as “small” in relation to a greater one (see Bjøl 1971). 
The third concept argues that it is the self-perception of the state and its leaders that matters; 
if people perceive their state as small, it should be considered a small state (see Hey 2003). 
Since the current research project is interested in asymmetrical conflicts and the self-
understanding of the state, the relativity and perceptions concepts will be used – it is the 
relationship between any two states, based on the perceptions of each other and of the self – 
that distinguishes a big state from a small state. For recent studies on small states, see Maass 
2009, Kassimeris 2009 and Ingebritsen, Neumann, Gstöhl and Beyer 2006.   
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that sees the world as socially constructed by shared social ideas, identities, 
norms and practices (Wendt 1999). Constructivists explain the state preference 
formation focusing on its identities and interests, or as Alexander Wendt puts it: 
“[i]dentities are the basis of interests” (Wendt 1992, 398). According to Jutta 
Weldes, constructivism “allows us to examine the intersubjectively constituted 
identities and interests of the states and the intersubjective meanings out of 
which they are produced” (Weldes 1996, 280). When looking through con-
structivist lenses, it seems that the reason why some states might choose to be-
have in opposition to the rationalist understanding under very crude power con-
ditions might not be because they are ignorant of the international political cli-
mate or because they are somehow suicidal and do not want to survive. The 
answer might lie either in what is meant with ‘survival’ for the state in question, 
and/or in the presence of domestic, societal pressures, besides the external pres-
sures, that influence the decision-making process.  
Furthermore, the questions on where these differences in decisions by states 
facing similar high systemic constraints come from point to the logical in- 
ference that the question why they decided to resist or not would give an incom-
plete answer. Why-questions are incomplete, because “[t]hey generally take as 
unproblematic the possibility that a particular decision or course of action could 
happen” (Doty 1993, 298). While why-questions focus on why a certain out-
come was acquired, how-possible questions explain how this particular course 
of action became “common-sensible” for the decision-makers, so that they came 
to “understand its national interest in one particular way, rather than in some 
other way” (Weldes 1996, 284). Hence, this research project will attempt to 
provide a possible explanation to this puzzle by answering the how-possible 
question: how does the relationship between the state and society make a state’s 
foreign policy practices either thinkable or unthinkable under high systemic 
constraints?  
While focusing on the state and society relationship, the dissertation will 
follow and build on the theoretical framework developed by constructivist Ted 
Hopf3 on the relations of domestic identities and foreign policy decision- 
making. Hopf’s societal constructivism focuses on how domestic under-
standings influence states’ foreign policy actions: the self-perceptions of the 
society influence the decision-makers’ understandings on other states and 
subsequently the foreign policy decision-making. Hopf argues that “[s]ocietal 
constructivism concentrates on the domestic identity relationships between a 
state and its society and how these stand with regard to other states in the 
world” (Hopf 2009, 295). For Hopf domestic identities make a certain 
understanding of the outside world possible and others impossible (Hopf 2009). 
The dissertation will follow Hopf’s approach that domestic discourse influences 
a state’s foreign policy decisions. It will also follow Hopf’s argument that the 
state and society operate within the same social cognitive structure, hence the 
decision-maker’s understandings are embedded in the societal understandings 
                                                     
3  See: Hopf 2002, 2005, 2009, 2010. 
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(Hopf 2002). However, it will part from Hopf’s approach on how this state and 
society relationship is constructed and how this construction influences the 
decision-making. For Hopf, the assumption that the state, hence the decision-
maker, and the society operate within the same social cognitive structure, leads 
to a uniform domestic construction. To be able to argue this, Hopf brackets the 
tensions between different societal discourses, focusing on the dominant state 
discourse. Subsequently, he also rejects the tensions and debates at the moment 
of decision-making, as in his opinion the decision-maker is in most cases 
presented with one option, based on the dominant discourse. This dissertation 
aims to problematize the question of decision-making and argues that the 
relationship of the state and society is over-simplified in Hopf’s approach. It 
will be argued that if there are different dominant discourses based on 
conflicting state identities, the decision-maker does not have coherent given 
practices at his disposal, but needs to mediate the tensions between the different 
discourses. The decision-maker has to process the constraints and pressures 
coming from the carriers of other discourses, such as opposition politicians, 
pressure groups and media. However, this process does not happen in a vacuum 
of objectiveness: how the decision-maker is socialised within these societal 
discourses also matters. Therefore, the dissertation will explore the main 
discourses present in the society, but in addition will explore the social 
construction of the decision-maker. It will be further argued that the decision-
maker makes the decision based on his interpretation of the domestic and 
external situation, which in turn is based on his understandings of the state and 
society relationship and his own social construction. 
To answer the research question, the theoretical framework built on Hopf’s 
approach on the relation of social identities and foreign policy will be applied to 
two cases: the foreign policy decisions of Finland and those of Estonia in au-
tumn 1939 regarding the demands of the Soviet Union. The case selection was 
based on the idea that the aim of the study was to explore situations where re-
sistance would be, within the understanding of rational calculations of material 
capabilities, particularly problematic. Therefore, the context of a freshly started 
war would provide a good background context. Secondly, for the purpose of the 
study, an appropriate case study would be a small state in an asymmetrical con-
flict situation with no obvious military alliances with a power state. This was 
the case for both Finland and Estonia. By exploring the state actions from the 
period where the realist power theory seemed to hold, I will also address the 
criticism of constructivism that it mainly deals with ‘good’ or ‘ethical’ norms 
and issues such as “imposing a stigma on the use of nuclear or chemical weap-
ons” (Checkel 1998, 339) and explore its suitability for explaining the ‘realist 
home base period’: World War II.  
In terms of the case studies, the dissertation will limit its focus to the events 
and decisions made in autumn 1939 in reaction to the Soviet demands, and not, 
in the case of Finland, on the period of the Winter War, or in the case of Estonia 
to the events after signing the agreements or developments in 1940. The focus 
of this dissertation is on a how-possible question: how this decision became 
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possible for the decision-makers. Therefore, it will not assess the decisions of 
Finland and Estonia in terms of right or wrong behaviour. It will also not en-
gage in a discussion on what might have happened in case of a different behav-
iour, what should have been done differently, or whether any other course of 
action would have led to any other outcome. The focus and choices of the dis-
sertation will be further explained in the Chapter 1. 
The dissertation comprises seven parts: the first part (Chapter 1) will lay out 
the theoretical and methodological foundations of the study. The dissertation 
will follow the constructivist approach, in particular the theoretical framework 
developed by the constructivist Ted Hopf on the relations of domestic identities 
and foreign policy decision-making. The study is focused on a specific foreign 
policy decision and centred on a ‘how-possible’ question: how this course of 
action became commonsensical for the decision-makers. Hence, its close focus 
lies on the immediate decision-maker and the discourse he carries. Therefore, 
the study will first explore the dominant discourses existing in the society, but it 
will differ from Hopf’s approach in that it will separately explore the social 
construction of the decision-maker. It will further argue that the decision-maker 
makes the decision based on his interpretation of the domestic and external 
situation, which in turn is based on his own reading of societal discourses. 
Therefore, exploring how the decision-maker is socialised within the societal 
discourses is necessary to answer the research question as it shows how he  
interpreted the external/domestic constraints in this particular situation and how 
this translated into a particular course of action/decision. 
The two empirical case studies both consist of three parts. The first parts 
(Chapter 2 in the case of Estonia and Chapter 5 in the case of Finland) will  
explore the foreign policy decisions in question focusing on the systemic pres-
sures and showing the different reactions of these two states to similar systemic 
pressures. The second parts (Chapter 3 in the case of Estonia and Chapter 6 in 
the case of Finland) will analyse the dominant domestic discourses in the 
respective states: their emergence, development and interactions as it is argued 
that domestic discourses influenced how the situation was understood by the 
society and the decision-makers. The third parts (Chapter 4 in the case of 
Estonia and Chapter 7 in the case of Finland) of the empirical case studies 
discuss the influence of the domestic discourses on the decision-making process 
in autumn 1939. First, the social construction of the primary decision-maker is 
analysed, and it is argued that it is he who by processing the on-going tensions 
between the domestic discourses must balance between external and internal 
pressures. Secondly, it is shown how the decision-makers’ understanding on the 
external and domestic spheres translated into the foreign policy decision. 
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CHAPTER 1. 
STATE AND SOCIETY RELATIONSHIP  
IN CONSTRUCTIVISM 
The aim of this chapter is to lay down the theoretical framework of the disserta-
tion. First, the rationalist approaches and their shortcomings in explaining the 
puzzle the dissertation aims to tackle will be briefly discussed. Next, the con-
structivist approach to international relations, the framework this dissertation 
will follow, will be explored4. Then, the chapter will focus on different 
constructivist approaches with regard to their focus on domestic and systemic 
factors in explaining the states’ preference formation, focusing on the systemic 
approach as presented by Alexander Wendt and the societal approach developed 
by Ted Hopf. The next part will discuss the state and society relationship within 
Hopf’s approach. The last part of the chapter will explain the research design of 
the dissertation. 
1.1. Rationalist approaches of International Relations 
Rationalist approaches, such as realism, neorealism, (neo)liberalism and institu-
tionalism, see states as rational goal-maximizing actors. These approaches focus 
principally on material factors and either bracket the ideational factors or see the 
interests and identities of the states largely as fixed and given5. Therefore, “the 
actors, in the context of these models, merely enact (or fail to) a prior script” 
(Ruggie 1998, 876). There are distinct differences between the approaches, for 
example in their approach to conflict and cooperation and in their understanding 
of state preferences. The realists, neorealists in particular, assume that what 
states do is primarily determined by material capabilities, as Mearsheimer ar-
gues, “the distribution of material capabilities among states is the key factor for 
                                                     
4  The current dissertation will not concern itself in the “the paradigm battle of the ‘isms’” 
(Finnemore and Sikkink 2001, 404), in the sense that it will not argue that one particular IR 
paradigm explains the international world better than the other ones. It rather follows the 
argument of Fearon and Wendt, who provide for the option to see rationalism and construc-
tivism as analytical tools, which “do not in themselves force the researcher to make 
ontological or empirical commitments.” However, as they do differ in their understanding of 
society: “rationalism from the ‘bottom-up’ and constructivism from the ‘top-down’ […] they 
tend in practice to ask somewhat different questions and so bring different aspects of social 
life into focus” (Fearon and Wendt 2002, 53). Hence, this chapter will explain why construc-
tivist lenses would be well-suited for tackling the puzzle the dissertation is interested in. 
5  Adler building on Caporaso: “Realism, neorealism, game theory and strategic studies, 
along with neoliberal institutional approaches, share a rationalist approach to states, which 
they all view as ‘conscious goal-seeking agents pursuing their interests within an external 
environment characterised by anarchy and the power of other states. The paradigmatic 
question is how states pursue their goals given the constraints under which they operate. 
When goals are interdependent, the question assumes a strategic form: How can one state 
achieve what it wants, given the preferences and capacities of others?’” (Caporaso 1992, 
605, cited in Adler 1997, 348).  
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understanding world politics” (Mearsheimer 1994/1995, 91; also see Waltz 
1979). If the realists assume that what states do is primarily determined by 
strategic considerations – what they can get or what they know – then liberal 
theory gives more attention to a state’s intentions (for the liberal approach see 
for example Milner 1997; Moravcsik 1997). Moravcsik has stated, “what states 
want is the primary determinant of what they do” (Moravcsik 1997, 521–522). 
For liberal theorists it is the configuration of state preferences that matters most 
in world politics (Moravcsik 1997, 513). Nevertheless, within the focus of this 
dissertation, it is more important to explore how these approaches are similar, 
that is, in their metatheoretical approach, which is rationalism. Hence, this sec-
tion will focus on the limitations of the rationalist approach in explaining the 
puzzle of the dissertation. Although rationalists assume that states’ choices are 
based on their interests, the main criticism towards their treatment of interests is 
that they see them as exogenous. For example, they see them as given (Waltz 
1979) or through the lenses of material capabilities and factors (see for example 
Moravcsik 1997 and Krasner 1988). Neorealists mostly focus on external fac-
tors that constrain the state’s behaviour and as states are seen as rational value-
maximizers, their behaviour is analysed within the framework of these external 
constraints. Hence, neorealism argues that within the asymmetrical conflict 
situation that the current dissertation is interested in, the foreign policy deci-
sion-making of a state with lesser capabilities will be governed by the logic of 
the international system, hence the preference formation will be dominated by 
external pressures. Handel argued that “[d]omestic determinants of foreign pol-
icy are less salient in weak states. The international system leaves them less 
room for choice in the decision-making process. Their smaller margin of error 
and hence greater preoccupation with survival makes the essential interests of 
weak states less ambiguous. Kenneth Waltz’s ‘third image’ is therefore a most 
relevant level of analysis” (Handel 1990, 3). According to neorealist under-
standing6, when a state’s physical survival is at stake, this concern will over-
shadow all others in forming a state’s behaviour. The state will aim to balance 
the threat, if possible with external help. The state’s decision-making is exten-
sively influenced by the state’s relative military and economic power; in a con-
flict between two states where one has relatively higher military capabilities, the 
weaker one must focus on solving the conflict by all means, as any conflict is a 
conflict over autonomy for that state. Also, an increase in systemic pressures 
should have a constraining effect on the state’s foreign policy manoeuvring 
space. Therefore, an increase of the external threat or failure in balancing the 
threat should influence and change a state’s foreign policy behaviour (Telhami 
2002). Another assumption of realist approaches, in the light of the question the 
                                                     
6  It has been pointed out, for example by Telhami 2002 and Telhami and Barnett 2002, that 
although Kenneth Waltz has always stated that neorealist theory is not a theory of foreign 
policy, “many scholars of foreign policy employed his work as if all state interests can be 
derived from the relative position of the state in international politics [...] Although they did 
not in principle exclude domestic sources of interests, in practice many assumed that inter-
national politics holds a monopoly on the state’s interests” (Telhami and Barnett 2002, 2). 
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current dissertation aims to tackle, is that realism “deals with the perennial con-
ditions that attend the conduct of statecraft, not with the specific conditions that 
confront the statesman” (Tucker 1961, 463). Although neoliberals do give at-
tention to norms and ideas, they treat them as enabling actors to maximize ac-
tors’ material capabilities (Checkel 1998, 327). 
The following examples illustrate the shortcomings of rationalist approaches 
in fully explaining the decision-making process of the states under high sys-
temic pressures, both in cases where they decide to go against the power current 
and where they do not. David Vital, who in general saw small states preference 
formation under limited realist conditions (see introduction of this dissertation 
(Vital 1971a and Vital 1971b), ends up explaining the behaviour of Czechoslo-
vakia during the Munich crisis by arguing that its behaviour was founded on 
dominant ideas of the decision-makers. Vital argues that the decision to capitu-
late was not based on military capabilities and rational calculations of the power 
disparity between Germany and Czechoslovakia, as realist theory would com-
monly suggest. Vice versa, he suggests that if it would have been rationally 
calculated, Czechoslovakia should have chosen to resist, since it had relatively 
high military and economic capabilities and although it had lost France as its 
ally, it had a possibility to bandwagon against Germany and Western countries 
as the Soviet Union had suggested backing it. Vital’s conclusion is that Czecho-
slovakian foreign policy was not determined by its material capabilities, but by 
the framework of dominant ideas that the decision-makers had about the state 
and its foreign policy. These ideas held that “Czechoslovakia must be linked to 
the West; Czechoslovakia must not fight alone; Czechoslovakia must not enter 
into an relationship with the Soviet Union unaccompanied by France; Czech-
slovakia must preserve its reputation” (Vital 1971b). Therefore, Vital concludes 
that Czechoslovakia’s decision was based on a set of ideas about the identity 
and foreign policy of Czechoslovakia, which were “employed together as a 
system of rules for political conduct” (Vital 1971b, 52). Hence, focusing on 
domestic understandings and norms and pressures deriving from these factors is 
necessary to better explain the decision-making process even under high sys-
temic constraints. 
The prominent realist Henry Kissinger provides another example when he 
explains the behaviour of the Hungarian government in 1956. Kissinger argues 
that Imre Nagy’s decisions were not a result of his failure to recognize the ex-
ternal constraints, but because of the immense domestic pressures. He states that 
Nagy “could not have failed to understand the import of the Soviet warnings, or 
of the changes he was himself fostering,” but could not control the domestic 
pressures, when being “caught between the fury of his people and the implaca-
bility of his communist allies, was riding a tide he could neither control nor 
direct” (Kissinger 1994, 556–561). As a result of the domestic pressures, Hun-
gary withdrew from the Warsaw pact, declared neutrality and asked the United 
Nations to recognize it. An important aspect here is that the kind of domestic 
constraints the decision-maker faced are unexplainable by a rationalist account, 
as within the existing state system people could not pressure the government 
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with for example election or poll results. In the case of Hungary in 1956, the 
constraints related to remaining in power for the decision-maker strongly de-
pended on its relations with the Soviet Union. Therefore, the dissertation sug-
gests that in order to explain state’s foreign policy decision-making under acute 
external pressures, its domestic ideational factors, such as domestic under-
standings and ideas must be explored. Hence, the dissertation will follow the 
constructivist approach in order to explain how the foreign policy decisions in 
Finland and Estonia in 1939 became possible.7 
1.2. Constructivist approach of International Relations 
The constructivist approach of International Relations sees the world as socially 
constructed by shared social ideas, identities, norms and practices8. This school 
argues that an outcome cannot be explained only by studying the power 
distribution, but that “[o]ne will need to know about the culture, norms, institu-
tions, procedures, rules, and social practices that constitute the actors and the 
structures alike” (Hopf 1998, 173). Constructivists “are not interested in how 
things are but in how they became what they are” (Adler 2002, 101). Hence, the 
focus of the constructivist question-setting is not on why something happened, 
but rather on how-possible questions. While why-questions focus on “why a 
particular outcome was obtained”, how-possible questions explain “how the 
subjects, objects and interpretive dispositions were socially constructed in such 
a way that certain practices were made possible” (Doty 1993, 298). Construc-
tivists see the international world as consisting of both ideational and material 
factors and identities as not only individual but also collective. As summed up 
by Guzzini, constructivism “is epistemologically about the social construction 
of knowledge, and ontologically about the construction of social reality” (em-
phases original) (Guzzini 2000, 160). Constructivism concerns itself with social 
facts, such as marriage, human rights, money or Christmas, that exist only be-
cause of human agreement (Searle 1995, 1). To understand how these social 
facts change and the impact of this change on political life is central to the con-
structivist approach (Finnemore and Sikkink 2001, 393). Constructivism does 
not argue that the material world does not matter, but “suggests that material 
forces must be understood through the social concepts that define their meaning 
for human life” (Hurd 2008, 301). The ideas that constructivism focuses on are 
not only the ideas held by individual people, but include intersubjective and 
institutionalised ideas (Hurd 2008). Historical contextualizing has an important 
                                                     
7  This dissertation will not discuss the foreign policy analysis literature, which could have 
been one alternative or additional course to take, since the puzzle from its beginning has 
centred around the international relations metatheories, particularly on the shortcomings of 
rationalism in explaining the puzzle and constructivism in offering possibilities to under-
stand it.  
8  For different categorizations and types of constructivism see for example Ruggie 1998, 
Hopf 1998, Hopf 2002, Adler 1997, Adler 2002, Finnemore and Sikkink 2001.  
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role to play in constructivism, since “constructivism has history ‘built in’ as part 
of theories. Historicity, therefore, shows up as part of the contexts that make 
possible social reality, the path-dependent processes involving structural and 
agent change, and the mechanisms involved in the explanation of change” 
(Adler 2002, 102).  
Constructivists explain the state preference formation by focusing on its 
identities and interests, or as Alexander Wendt puts it: “Identities are the basis 
of interests” (Wendt 1992, 398). Hurd argues that “what distinguishes a specifi-
cally constructivist story on interests is that the influences on interest formation 
are social” (Hurd 2008 303, emphasis original). Constructivism “treats identity 
as an empirical question to be theorized within a historical context” (Hopf 1998, 
175). Constructivist lenses enable us to see why people have collective under-
standings of certain norms and values, and can help to explain where the inter-
ests come from (Adler 2002, 102). According to Weldes, constructivism “al-
lows us to examine the intersubjectively constituted identities and interests of 
the states and the intersubjective meanings out of which they are produced” 
(Weldes 1996, 280). Constructivism does not focus on rational bargaining or 
capabilities, but on social communication and the subsequent meaning of bar-
gaining and capabilities (Adler 2002, 102). For constructivism, extensive mili-
tary capabilities per se do not make a state a threat to its neighbours; it is the 
social context that gives meaning to that material capability. In an example pro-
vided by Wendt, for the United States, the fact that Britain and North Korea 
have nuclear weapons does not mean that these countries are considered equally 
threatening, as the meaning of possessing these weapons is interpreted through 
the relationship the US has with these respective countries. “500 British nuclear 
weapons are less threatening to the United States than 5 North Korean nuclear 
weapons”, because of the perception the US has of these countries: “the British 
are friends and the North Koreans are not” (Wendt 1995, 73).  
The current dissertation is concerned with the process of a state’s foreign 
policy preference formation and the role the state and society relationship plays 
in this process. The particular interest of the dissertation is to study this state 
and society relationship under very crude power conditions and to understand 
whether and how the domestic discourses influence the state’s foreign policy 
decision-making while their physical survival is at stake, since there is a threat 
of invasion or of a large-scale war. The dissertation does not argue that only 
ideational factors matter or that ideational factors always a priori dominate over 
material factors, but claims that ideational factors matter even during the most 
acute external pressures, because we never fully see these pressures objectively, 
but through the social construction of the external threat. How domestic under-
standings influence the understandings of the external threat is well-illustrated 
by the case, explained in Mercer 2010, on the evaluation of American and Is-
raeli intelligence services on whether Iran may get nuclear weapons. “The Is-
raelis believed that the Iranians might acquire nuclear weapons in two years and 
the Americans expected it to take five to ten years. Both groups relied on the 
same knowledge base and frequently consulted each other. The difference was 
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over analysis and assessment, not information” (Mercer 2010, 19). When asked 
to explain the difference, the US representative stated “sometimes what the Is-
raelis will do – and I think that perhaps because it’s a more existential issue for 
them, they will give you the worst-case assessment” (cited in Mercer 2010, 19). 
This suggests that domestic understandings of both Self and Other do influence 
the way the risk is perceived, which subsequently influences the state’s foreign 
policy making process. 
Therefore, the dissertation aims to show that even in a situation with acute 
international pressures, domestic understandings are needed to fully explain the 
state’s foreign policy decision-making. Furthermore, with this approach the 
study also addresses the criticism towards constructivism that it is mainly con-
cerned with ‘good’ norms or issues, or as Mearsheimer saw it, being a theory of 
global peace that aims to transform the power-maximizing states of realism to 
states that would prioritize the international interests over national ones 
(Mearsheimer 1994/1995, 38–39)9. A large part of constructivist scholarship 
deals with issues that rose to prominence after the 1990s: ‘good’ norms such as 
control over certain weapons, environmental norms, sanctions against apartheid 
or the end of the Cold War (Checkel 1998). However, the world was also so-
cially constructed during the World Wars, the Armenian genocide and the 
Yugoslav wars. Therefore, as Adler argues, “constructivism is a set of paradig-
matic lenses through which we observe all socially constructed reality, ‘good’ 
and ‘bad’” (Adler 1997, 336). Hence, the current dissertation is aimed at ex-
ploring the suitability of constructivism for explaining the realist home base 
period: World War II. 
The chapter will next discuss different constructivist approaches with regard 
to their focus on domestic and systemic factors in explaining the states’ pre-
ference formation. It will be shown that a state’s preference formation happens 
both on a systemic and a domestic level. Next, the theoretical framework that 
the current dissertation follows and builds on, the societal constructivism as 
developed by constructivist Ted Hopf, will be discussed. The dissertation will 
follow Hopf’s approach on the relation between formative discourses and  
foreign policy decision, but it will disagree with Hopf in respect of how the 
state and society relationship is constructed and its impact on the state’s foreign 
policy making process. The empirical part of the dissertation will focus on the 
foreign policy decision-making of a state with limited material capabilities 
under acute systemic pressures. Therefore, this angle of high external 
constraints will guide the discussion while exploring the different approaches in 
constructivist preference formation. 
                                                     
9  Mearsheimer labelled early constructivists, such as Wendt and Ruggie, critical theorists 
(Mearsheimer 1994/1995). 
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1.2.1. Systemic constructivism 
Constructivists explain the state preference formation by focusing on its 
identities and interests. In contrast to non-constructivist studies, constructivism 
does not argue that certain levels of analysis, such as the domestic or the sys-
temic, must be seen as the essential starting point or focus of the empirical 
analysis. As argued by Hurd, “the co-constitution of actors and structures means 
there is no impetus in constructivism for a zero-sum debate over ‘which’ level 
provides the most leverage over puzzles. There is no point in constructivist 
research to arguments over whether, for instance, domestic politics ‘matters’ or 
not in international relations” (Hurd 2008, 306). Nevertheless, constructivists 
differ on their focus regarding domestic and systemic factors in the process of 
social construction. Systemic constructivism, developed and most prominently 
represented by Alexander Wendt10, focuses on the systemic identities and brack-
ets the domestic ones (Wendt 1992, 1999). Wendt treats states as unitary actors, 
arguing that “States are people too” (Wendt 1999, 194)11. Wendt explains the 
international world only through the inter-state interactions and thus explicitly 
brackets the domestic factors within his theory stating that it is aimed at ex-
plaining the “logic of anarchy” and therefore focuses on the international sys-
tem (Wendt 1992, 1999). Wendt’s systemic theory assumes that the domestic 
and systemic levels can be analysed separately as there is a boundary between 
these systems (Wendt 1999, 13). Wendt acknowledges that social construction 
also happens on the domestic level and therefore that this level must be consid-
ered in case someone is interested in the complete identity formation of the 
state. He states that society influences the identity formation, since “when states 
interact they do so with their societies conceptually ‘in tow’”, (Wendt 1999, 
201) and “states are internally related to societies over which they rarely have 
complete control” (Wendt 1999, 222–223, also 210–211). However, he does not 
include the domestic identities in his account. Instead, he argues that there are 
reasons to assume that systemic theorizing “can be studied relatively autono-
mously from other units and levels of analysis in world politics” (Wendt 1999, 
14). He also refers to Waltz stating that “structural theorizing is likely to yield a 
high rate of explanatory return” because “Structure confronts actors as an ob-
jective social fact that constrains and enables action in systematic ways, and as 
such should generate distinct patterns” (Wendt 1999, 184).  
Wendt’s approach has been criticised by other constructivists for treating the 
state as a black box, ignoring the aspect that states do not go into the interna-
tional arena “with a blank slate”, but with their own understandings of the world 
and their place in it, which is rooted in “domestic political and cultural con-
                                                     
10  See also Reus-Smit 1997, Frederking 2003.  
11  Wendt argues that it is very common not only in academia but also in everyday context 
to treat states as people “as they had the same kinds of intentional properties that we attribute 
to each other” through talking about them as having “legitimate” actions, beliefs and 
interests (Wendt 1999, 195). More on Wendt’s discussion on state ‘personhood’, see Wendt 
2004. Wendt on collective identities see also Wendt 1994. 
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texts” (Weldes 1996, 280), and for rejecting the aspect that domestic processes 
also can influence identity and interests “independently” of intrastate interac-
tions (Copeland 2000, 203).12 As a result, Wendt’s approach is incomplete, 
since “the problem of identity formation is constantly seen from the perspective 
of the state and never as a problem each state and each statesman has to grapple 
with” (Ringmar 1997, 283). Therefore, the early constructivism was criticised 
for being “weak on the microlevel” as it failed to “explore systematically how 
norms connect with agents” (Checkel 1998, 342). 
In terms of explaining a state’s preference formation under acute external 
constraints, Wendt emphasizes the constraints that material capabilities have on 
the outcomes of the actors’ behaviour, stating that “militarily weak states typi-
cally cannot conquer powerful ones, powerful states typically can conquer weak 
states”, and therefore “the distribution of capabilities has independent effects on 
outcomes. If a weak state attempts to conquer a strong state it will encounter 
these effects” (Wendt 1999, 110). This once again does not tell anything about 
whether this state would take this action, or in case it would, how it can be ex-
plained. However, he does assume that a state’s actions will be to some extent 
determined by the material capabilities as “composition of material capabilities 
at any given moment help define the possibilities of our action” (Wendt 1999, 
113). Nonetheless, “[w]e can ignore those effects, like the Balinese marching 
into Dutch machine guns or the Polish cavalry charging German tanks, but we 
do so at our own risk” (Wendt 1999, 113). His understanding here is that a weak 
actor can “march” into a power actor’s “guns”, but is not likely to, as the urge to 
survive physically is its pre-given interest (Wendt 1999, 112).  
Therefore, Wendt’s approach offers a limited explanation of the international 
world, as in addition of ignoring domestic factors, he also treats main state in-
terests as given13 and attributes fixed roles for state relationships (Wendt 1999). 
Hopf argues that this is typical for all systemic theories, in that they simplify 
and “make a priori assumptions about the nature of its units and their interac-
tions that may do so much violence to empirical reality as to cast doubt on the 
utility of the project” (Hopf 2002, 268). Since Wendt built his theory with the 
purpose to explain the increase of cooperation in the international world, he 
mainly focuses on outcomes, and not on what is socially possible. Thus, in 
terms of this dissertation’s puzzle, Wendt’s framework is not suitable as it 
leaves us in the dark on the domestic part of the story, which as the examples of 
Czechoslovakia 1938 and Hungary 1956 pointed out, has a role to play in ex-
plaining the state’s foreign policy decision-making. Therefore, the current study 
will focus on the societal constructivism that explores the domestic under-
standings and their impact on foreign policy decision-making. 
                                                     
12  For critical discussions on Wendt’s approach see Guzzini and Leander (eds.) 2006, Doty 
2000, Smith 2000a, Ringmar 1997, Zehfuss 2002. 
13  Wendt defines four pre-given national interests: “physical survival, autonomy, economic 
well-being, and collective self-esteem” (Wendt 1999, 198, 235–238). Wendt does not explain 
why these interests are pre-given, but suggests that “the underlying needs are common to all 
states” (Wendt 1999, 235). 
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1.2.2. Societal constructivism 
The majority of constructivist scholarship focuses on domestic factors. One of 
the main schools is the norm-oriented constructivism that focuses on the 
question why states comply with certain norms in the international world.14 
According to Hopf, although this stream of constructivism does not explicitly 
neglect the domestic level as Wendt does, it does not pay much attention to “the 
domestic context within which any international norm is embedded. […] It 
merely identifies the international norm and then explores how it became 
‘adopted or rejected by states’” (Hopf 2002, 278–279).15 Hopf states that the 
point where normative constructivists stop their study should be the start of 
reconstruction of “the social discursive context that made possible the particular 
understanding of that norm so that it could be adopted by the decision maker” 
(Hopf 2002, 279; also see Checkel 1998; Sterling-Folker 2000). Hopf brings out 
that although there are several authors that do focus on “the public at large”, 
such as Berger 1998, Hall 1999 and Katzenstein 1996, too often constructivists 
pick certain domestic actors or groups such as the elites, the legislature, civil 
society pressure groups, and ignore the broader societal fabric (Hopf 2009, 294–
295). Hence, Hopf argues that “[w]hat is mostly missing from social construc-
tivism, paradoxically enough, is society” (Hopf 2009, 294). Building on Ruggie, 
who criticised constructivist researchers for not “beginning with the actual so-
cial construction of meanings and significance from the ground up” (Ruggie 
1998), Hopf argues that constructivists “have to bring society back” (Hopf 
2009, 295) to the constructivist research.  
Hopf, in his works on state identity and foreign policy and the decision-
making logics in international relations (2002, 2005, 2009, 2010), proposes 
societal constructivism (emphasis original), which focuses on how domestic 
understandings influence a state’s foreign policy actions; hence, the way society 
perceives itself matters for the way the decision-maker sees another state. His 
approach concentrates on “the domestic identity relationships between a state 
and its society and how these stand with regard to other states in the world” 
(Hopf 2009, 295). Hopf states that “identities categorize people according to 
common features, making the other’s actions intelligible and an individual’s 
own actions vis-à-vis them intelligible to himself” (Hopf 2002, 5). This logic of 
intelligibility explains why people routinely end up choosing only a fraction of 
possible actions. Therefore, to explain the foreign policy choices of a country 
one has to understand “how states understand themselves through domestic 
others, how state identities are constructed at home as well as through interstate 
interaction” (Hopf 2002, 10). Hopf argues, and demonstrates on empirical case 
studies, that “the state’s own domestic identities constitute a social cognitive 
                                                     
14  For norm-oriented constructivist studies see for example Finnemore and Sikkink 1998, 
Finnemore 1996, Tannenwald 1999, Price 1998. 
15  Both Sterling-Folker (2000) and Hopf (2002) argue that liberal studies on domestic 
politics and preferences (such as Milner 1997, Moravcsik 1997) treat the domestic level 
similar to normative constructivists. 
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structure that makes threats and opportunities, enemies and allies, intelligible, 
thinkable, and possible” (Hopf 2002, 16).  
Hopf’s account of identity is “social, cognitive, and structural” (Hopf 2009, 
280). Hopf sees identities as “social structures that both enable and discourage 
particular understandings of the external world” (Hopf 2009, 281). Every mem-
ber of society has multiple identities, which are relational. “Every society is 
bounded by a social cognitive structure within which some discursive forma-
tions dominate and compete. An individual’s identities contribute to the creation 
and recreation of discourse and social cognitive structure; at the same time, 
those identities are constrained, shaped, and empowered by the very social 
products they have a hand in creating” (Hopf 2002, 1). Although Hopf argues 
for bringing society back in, he does not suggest to bracket the external identi-
ties. Instead, he suggests that the state’s identities are “socially constructed in 
interaction with both domestic and international society” (Hopf 2005, 226). “[I]t 
is only in interaction with a particular Other that the meaning of a state is estab-
lished” and these “meaningful Others” exist for social constructivism “both at 
home and abroad” (Hopf 2002, 288–289, 1998). This means significant others 
can effect changes in a state’s identity, working within the constraints of that 
state’s domestic identity terrain. It is in this way that “the US and Europe are in 
fact ‘causing’ Russian foreign policy, but only insofar as the identities that are 
reproduced also resonate with the discourse(s) of identity that predominate in 
Russia’s domestic context” (Hopf 2005, 227). Hopf also points out that general 
international relations literature sees Self and Other as if the Other could only 
be a state actor and it is assumed that the relationship between Self and Other is 
always conflictual. Hopf argues that there is “no a priori theoretical or, indeed, 
empirical reason to believe so” as “the Self has not only multiple Others, but 
multiple kinds of Others” (Hopf 2002, 9, 263). For example, when explaining 
Russia’s military intervention in Georgia in the 1990s and how Russia itself 
came to see it as an internationally legitimate action, Hopf shows how “the dis-
course of Russian identity is simultaneously the product of both domestic iden-
tity construction and the interaction between the Russian state and international 
actors. What Russia considered to be legitimate actions by a ‘great power’ de-
pended on the identity that was produced by both domestic and external inter-
actions” (Hopf 2005, 225).  
Hopf brings out that most of the international relations literature focuses ei-
ther on the logic of consequences, the rationalist logic that follows the realist 
understanding that states make their decisions based on rational calculations 
about anticipated consequences or the logic of appropriateness, the institutiona-
list logic that sees actions as rule based.16 The logic of habit, which he argues 
plays a crucial role in determining which course of action an actor takes from 
all the options available, has been largely ignored in the study of international 
                                                     
16  On the logic of consequences and the logic of appropriateness see March and Olsen 
1998. Recent constructivist literature also suggests alternative logics, such as a logic of 
arguing (Risse 2000), a logic of habit (Hopf 2002, 2009, 2010), a logic of practicality 
(Pouliot 2008) and a logic of emotional beliefs (Mercer 2010). 
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relations. He argues that “[h]abit, custom, and tradition, neither conscious cost-
benefit calculations nor considerations of oughts and shoulds, enforce social 
order most of the time” (Hopf 2009, 282). Logic of habit explains why indi-
viduals routinely choose only a limited number of options available for them. 
As Hopf puts it, “their choices are effectively bounded by the social cognitive 
structure, its discourses, and their identities” (Hopf 2002, 5).  
1.2.3. The state and society relationship 
This dissertation follows Hopf’s approach that domestic discourses influence a 
state’s foreign policy decisions. Hopf argues that “[s]ocietal constructivism 
concentrates on the domestic identity relationships between a state and its  
society and how these stand with regard to other states in the world” (Hopf 
2009, 295). However, the study will aim to problematize two aspects that Hopf 
largely brackets: the social construction of the state and society relationship and 
its effect on the decision-making. In terms of these issues, Hopf argues for a 
very straightforward, nearly automatic approach: the state and society 
relationship is seen as uniform: society carries certain identities, and as the 
decision-maker “has been socialized within that community” (Hopf 2009, 298), 
these identities will determine “how a decision-maker regards another state” 
(Hopf 2009, 298). Following from this, at the moment of decision-making, the 
decision-maker is presented with one option based on the dominant state 
discourse. Next, these two problems will be discussed in more detail. 
In his approach, Hopf focuses on the dominant state discourse, that is, the 
discourse that is “institutionally empowered” (Hopf 2005, 236). This enables 
him to treat the domestic discourse at the moment of decision-making as uni-
form: the decision-maker operates within this discourse and this discourse will 
determine how he will understand a certain foreign policy situation. At the same 
time, Hopf acknowledges that states have multiple conflictual discourses. “In 
most cases, we will find a predominant discourse and at least one competitor” 
(Hopf 2009, 291). Nevertheless, in his approach he largely brackets the interac-
tions and tensions between the different discourses. Hopf does not explain how 
one discourse becomes dominant or how the interaction between different dis-
courses affects the decision-making process. This might be partly because his 
immediate focus is on how understandings of Self determine understandings of 
Other and thereby influence foreign policy decisions, not on a particular deci-
sion-making process or decision-making. However, the questions on the deci-
sion-making process rise when he turns to empirics. For example, in his 2005 
article on Russian identities in relation to the military intervention in Abkhazia, 
Hopf suggests that there were three main competitors for Russian identity in the 
1990s, each one “was socially constructed in interaction with both domestic and 
international society” (Hopf 2005, 226). At one point, one of these discourses 
became “institutionally empowered” and therefore the state identity (Hopf 
2005, 236). However, he treats this process of one discourse becoming the state 
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discourse as a black box, by simply assuming that one will win out and ne-
glecting the specifics of this particular process.  
Likewise, in his book on identities in Moscow (2002), Hopf argues that in 
1955 different leaders understood the meaning of ‘difference’ on the domestic 
level differently. This subsequently influenced their understanding on difference 
abroad, which translated into a foreign policy decision. He brings out that Khru-
shchev believed difference to be non-threatening (Hopf 2002, 92–94). Hopf’s 
emphasis is on establishing the link between the domestic and the international, 
while Khrushchev’s understanding was based on a broader domestic identity, 
which influenced how he understood the international sphere. However, he does 
not focus on how different leaders came to understand the meanings of different 
concepts differently within the country where certain domestic identities mat-
tered. Although he argues that it mattered that Khrushchev believed that ‘differ-
ence’ is natural and non-threatening, he does not explain how this understand-
ing became possible. For example, in his explanation of the Sino-Soviet split, 
Hopf argues that “[w]hat the state chooses is already somewhat predetermined 
by what is already taken for granted by society” (Hopf 2009, 299). But if these 
societal understandings are multiple and conflictual then it is not justified to 
simply assume that the decision will be automatic, someone needs to negotiate 
between these different understandings prior to making the decision. Hence, the 
political decision is not given, but also socially constructed. As Dessler and 
Owen have argued: “Both of Hopf’s case studies leave us with the question of 
how one discourse or combination comes to dominate. His prototypical deci-
sion-maker has multiple identities, each of which has some influence; both 
preferences and policy choices are thus indeterminate” (Dessler and Owen 
2005, 607). Therefore, there is no reason to a priori assume that the decision-
maker operating within the dominant state discourse can ignore the pressures 
coming from other formative discourses existing within the society and there-
fore when one discourse has emerged as the dominant one, others have no in-
fluence on decision-making process.  
As Hopf does not address the question of tensions between discourses, the 
relationship between the society and state, that is, the decision-makers, for him 
is a very straightforward one. Society carries certain identities of itself, which 
will translate to “how a decision maker regards another state” because “the de-
cision-maker herself has been socialized within that community” (Hopf 2009, 
298). Hopf suggests that there is always some correspondence between the 
state, that is, the decision-makers, and the society, and therefore that they will 
always operate within the same social cognitive structure (Hopf 2002). Hopf 
argues that  
[e]very foreign policy decision maker is as much a member of the social cog-
nitive structure that characterizes her society as any average citizen. Charged 
with the daily responsibility of understanding other states in world politics, she is 
most unlikely to be able to escape from this structure. Her understandings of 
other states rely on her understandings of her own state’s Self. In large part, 
understandings of Self are constructed domestically out of the many identities 
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that constitute the discursive formations that, in turn, make up the social cogni-
tive structure of that society (Hopf 2002, 37). 
So, there is no need to focus on a particular decision-maker, as this is “a social, 
not a personal” approach. “The theory expects these identities to operate 
independently of whoever occupies the position of head of state” (Hopf 2009, 
286).17  
This approach creates the black box of the decision-maker and also brackets 
the complex dynamics of the decision-making process: the aspect of competing 
discourses and how the dynamics between them influences the decision-making 
process and the outcome. It largely ignores the domestic and external pressures 
that the decision-maker has to consider at the time of decision-making. Al-
though he did open the black box of society, he created another black box with 
the decision-maker and decision-making. Checkel commented that “to get from 
identities to interests and choice requires some kind of politics and debate […]. 
At that moment of choice, were options debated, arguments advanced and justi-
fications proffered – all linguistic acts that could easily influence dominant dis-
courses and thus their actual impact on foreign policy interests” (Checkel 2004, 
234).18  
For Hopf, this near-automation of the decision-making is made possible by 
the logic of habit. For him, habits “imply actions by giving us ready-made re-
sponses to the world that we execute without thinking” (Hopf 2010, 541). He 
argues that “[w]e do not apprehend what is out there, and then categorize it. 
Instead, what is perceived as reality is already pre-cooked in our heads” (Hopf 
2010, 541). For Hopf, within the logic of habit the actors will act on their “pre-
cooked reality”, which defines the thinkable courses of action for the particular 
actor. Hopf, building on Kahneman (2003), has stated: “Decision-makers rarely 
need to choose between options because in most cases a single option comes to 
mind” (Hopf 2010, 549). The current study will suggest that Hopf’s claim that 
the course of action the decision-maker will take is determined only by this 
fixed “pre-cooked reality” is over-simplified. To have a straightforward argu-
                                                     
17  Hopf justifies bracketing the decision-maker by stating that his theory is “an inter-
subjective theory of identity, not a subjective one; a structural, not an individualistic one; a 
social, not a personal one” (Hopf 2009, 286). Hence, Hopf seems to suggest that it is either 
one or another: either it is the broad, societal fabric or it is the individualist decision-maker. 
18  Another suggestion on the reason why Hopf brackets the decision-making process and 
diminishes the agency of the decision-maker is methodological. As Hopf himself points out, 
he is aiming for “a more precise and determinant” approach than the systemic constructivism 
and a “more generalizable” approach than normative constructivism (Hopf 2009, 297). The 
intersubjective approach enables the researcher to “generate many more falsifiable impli-
cations for the theory than we would if it were a decision-making approach concentrating on 
the belief system or cognitive heuristics of an individual decision maker” (Hopf 2009, 287). 
However, the current dissertation is interested in a particular decision and decision-making 
process under specific conditions. Therefore, it follows Price and Reus-Smit’s understanding 
of constructivist research being question driven and its claims being made in the context of a 
certain phenomenon, time frame and evidence (Price and Reus-Smit 1998, 272).  
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ment that societal identities, enforced by habit, determine a state’s action, Hopf 
brackets the tensions between different discourses, minimizes the agency of 
decision-maker and largely neglects the complex dynamics of the decision-
making process, where both external and domestic pressures need to be me- 
diated. Because even if we assume that the state as decision-maker acts on the 
“pre-cooked reality”, then how can we take for granted that the decision-maker 
is homogenous on the content of this reality. Secondly, even if there is one 
monolithic understanding within the decision-making body, there can still be 
other competing discourses and thereby pressures both on the domestic and 
international level that need to be processed by the decision-maker. Moreover, 
even if one could argue that there was one uniform option, this should not be a 
priori assumed. Weldes suggests so much, when he states that the question 
“what ‘degree of freedom’ do state officials enjoy in constructing narratives 
about international relations and thus constructing the national interest” is an 
empirical question “that requires a response grounded in extensive empirical 
analyses” (Weldes 1996, 286). 
This dissertation will address these issues by considering the following as-
pects. First, if there are conflicting discourses present in the society, there are 
always tensions between these discourses that create pressures that need to be 
processed at the time of decision-making. The political decision is not given, 
but socially constructed. Even if there is no visible debate between the dis-
courses or no other discourses present at the decision-making process, this is not 
because societal construction is a priori uniform, but because of certain social 
conditions that were in place, and therefore made this situation possible. These 
conditions are the results of long term social processes that can be traced in 
order to explain how a certain decision became possible. Therefore, the emer-
gence and development of the domestic discourses that were present at the time 
of decision-making needs to be explored as this will help to understand how 
these social conditions that were present for the decision-maker at the time of 
decision-making came to be.  
The dissertation will suggest that in order to better understand how a certain 
decision became commonsensical, hence possible, for the state, the relationship 
between the society, carrying these discourses, and the state, negotiating be-
tween these discourses, must be explored. The state, that is, the decision-maker 
does not operate within one coherent discourse, but needs to process the con-
straints and pressures coming from other discourses and also external actors. 
However, this process does not happen in a vacuum of objectiveness, but the 
decision-maker’s own social construction influences how he understands the 
external and domestic tensions and subsequently the particular situation that 
needs to be decided. For that reason, this research project does not follow 
Hopf’s a priori assumption that since the decision-maker operates within the 
same social structure as everyone else, the relationship is automatic. It will be 
argued that it is constructed and to understand how it is constructed, we need to 
open the black box of the statesman and see how he processes the different ten-
sions between the discourses. This analysis on the decision-maker does not  
30 
focus on his personality, but on how his social construction and the social 
conditions under which he operates as these influence his understanding of the 
current situation and therefore make a certain decision possible. As Hopf 
argues, states’ choices are “rigorously constrained by the webs of understanding 
of the practices, identities, and interests of other actors that prevail in particular 
historical contexts” (Hopf 1998, 177). Therefore, when certain understandings 
exist in the public sphere, this introduces social constraints for the decision-
makers, and so makes certain practices acceptable and commonsensical and 
other practices unacceptable. Therefore, in order to understand how a decision 
became possible for the decision-makers, one needs to explore the domestic 
discourses that exist in the society, but also the interactions and tensions be-
tween the discourses and how these dynamics and external pressures are pro- 
cessed by the decision-maker. When this dissertation discusses societal/ 
domestic pressures or constraints, it does not see them as instrumental pressures 
coming from different interest groups aimed at influencing government’s 
policy, but in terms of domestic discourses that are present in the society, that 
the decision-maker is part of. 
The current dissertation follows Hopf’s approach that domestic understand-
ings influence foreign policy decision-making as they influence the way the 
decision-maker understands the situation. However, can one simply assume that 
it is always the case or can there also be cases where the state and society rela-
tionship is conflictual? Hopf provides for a possibility where there is no corre-
spondence between the domestic identity and the identity of the state, hence, the 
decision-maker. He argues that this can happen either when the decision-maker 
is idiosyncratic – her personal views are so unique that they do not have a trace 
in a discursive record – or if the decision-maker operates within other dis-
courses than the people – her ideas are shaped elsewhere and not within the par-
ticular domestic society (Hopf 2002, 37). However, for Hopf these cases are not 
part of the account of the identity offered in his approach. This dissertation ar-
gues that by problematizing the decision-maker and his social construction, one 
can go beyond an a priori assumed relationship between the state and society 
and empirically explore this relationship, by focusing on the social construction 
of the decision-maker in regard to the domestic societal discourses.  
This dissertation is not aimed at creating a societal constructivist theory on 
the state and society relationship. Nevertheless, it aims to contribute to the lit-
erature on societal constructivism by problematizing the aspects of the state and 
society relationship and its subsequent influence on the decision-making. This 
will be done by exploring these aspects in the following two case studies. It will 
be shown that in the process of making the political decision, the decision-
maker does not have coherent given practices at his disposal, but needs to medi-
ate the tensions between the different formative discourses existing in the state 
and the external pressures. It will be further argued that the decision-maker 
makes the decision based on his interpretation of the domestic and external 
situation, which in turn is based on his understandings on the state and society 
relationship, hence his own social construction. 
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1.3. Methodology 
To explain how a particular foreign policy decision became commonsensical for 
the decision-makers the dissertation will follow a three-step model. First, the 
extent of the external pressures that the decision-maker had to process will be 
established. This is necessary as the research project is interested in a particular 
foreign policy decision under acute systemic constraints. Therefore the first part 
of the empirical case study will explore whether systemic constraints were re- 
cognised and balanced against, whether the pressures increased during the  
decision-making process and whether this changed the state’s foreign policy be-
haviour. The second part of the case study will explore the emergence and  
development of the formative discourses through interaction with each other 
and particular Others. The third part of the case study will focus on the actual 
decision-making: how did the decision-maker come to understand the situation 
the way he did. Therefore, first the social construction of the decision-maker 
will be explored. Then it will be examined how the decision-maker negotiated 
between different discourses and subsequent pressures (external pressures as 
established in the first part of the case study and domestic pressures as es-
tablished within the second part of the study). It is important to note that the 
international system and pressures will be discussed, in line with the societal 
constructivist framework, through domestic understandings of the international 
system, external threats and pressures.  
The question the current study focuses on is the impact of domestic ideas 
and practices on the foreign policy decision-making process under high sys-
temic constraints. Hence, discourse analysis as a qualitative and interpretive 
study about the meaning of the language that actors use to understand social 
phenomena will be used (Abdelal et al. 2009, 6). Discourse analysis is a con-
tested concept in IR (See Hardy, Harley and Phillips 2004; Crawford 2004; 
Hopf 2004; Laffey and Weldes 2004; Fierke 2004). The current dissertation 
uses the broad concept of discourse analysis offered by Abdelal et al.: 
“[s]cholars who write rich descriptions of cases are engaged in discourse analy-
sis, especially in the sense that they are relying on their own interpretive skills 
and social knowledge to write convincingly about the content and contestation 
of an identity. Discourse analysis thus can be considered the qualitative con-
textualisation of texts and practices in order to describe social meanings” (Ab-
delal et al. 2009, 7). 
As the dissertation is aimed at exploring how certain foreign policy decisions 
become unthinkable or thinkable, discourse analysis is a suitable methodology 
because “[i]t constrains […] how people categorize and think about the world. It 
constrains what is thought of at all, what is thought of as possible, and what is 
thought of as the ‘natural thing’ to do in a given situation” (Neumann 2008, 62). 
Discourse analysis has a constructivist ontology: reality is seen as socially con-
structed. Its epistemology assumes that “meaning is fluid and constructs reality 
in ways that can be posited through the use of interpretive methods” (Hardy; 
Harley and Phillips 2004, 21). Other qualitative methods focus on explaining 
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the social world ‘as it is’, whereas discourse analysis “endeavours to uncover 
the way in which it is produced”. It “[t]ries to explore how the socially pro-
duced ideas and objects that populate the world were created in the first place 
and how they are maintained and held in place over time” (Phillips and Hardy 
2002, 6). As explained by Laffey and Weldes, “Discourse analysis reasons 
backward to establish a structure from its empirical manifestations. It asks what 
the conditions of possibility are for this or that particular discursive production. 
At the same time, it also examines how discourses are naturalised in such a way 
as to become common sense […] ‘Method’ in this context thus refers to the 
conceptual apparatus and empirical procedures used to make possible this retro-
duction” (Laffey and Weldes 2004, 28).  
1.3.1. Case selection 
The research for this dissertation started with the following puzzle: in case of 
high systemic constraints, can it be taken as a given that systemic pressures will 
dominate the decision-making, as rationalists would assume; or, as history 
seems to suggest, can domestic factors and pressures become the deciding con-
straint for the decision-maker in the foreign policy making process? In order to 
better understand a state that would go against the existing power current, I de-
cided to explore two states facing similar systemic pressures, where one went 
against the existing power current and the other did not, or, in Checkel’s ana- 
logy, to also consider a case where the dog did not bark (Checkel 1998, 339). 
This helps to explore where differences in state choices under similar external 
pressures may come from. Its purpose is to better understand the impact of the 
domestic level factors to the decision-making. Doing cross-national research 
will also help to reduce one of the threats that single study constructivist re-
search face, the “problem of overdetermination that is evident in many con-
structivist analyses, where social structures, usually norms, are invoked as one 
of the several causal variables with little or no insight given on how much of the 
outcome they explain” (Checkel 1998, 339). 
The aim of the study was to explore situations where resisting systemic pres-
sures would be, within the understanding of rational calculations of material 
capabilities, particularly problematic. Hence, the case selection was based on 
the idea that the prospective cases should be situated as much in a Hobbesian 
environment as possible. The selection of “extreme cases” is supported both by 
positivist and post-positivist methodologies, as it helps to clearly see the subject 
of inquiry (Phillips and Hardy 2002; Eisenhardt 1989. I started with making a 
list of possible case studies using the help of Brecher et al.’s comprehensive 
quantitative study “Crises in the Twentieth Century Volume I: Handbook of 
International Crises” (1988). In this study, the authors compile a data set of 278 
international crises from 1929 to 1979. The reason why I focused on the period 
in that study was that I wanted to explore the state actions from the period 
where the realist power theory seemed to hold: either during World War II or 
the Cold War.  
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Brecher et al. (1998) defined a foreign policy crisis as a situation with three 
conditions: a threat to basic values, along with an awareness of limited time for 
response to the external value threat, and a high probability of involvement in 
military hostilities. My guidelines for selecting prospective case studies, built 
on these conditions, were:  a demand from a state with higher material capabili-
ties that would be perceived as threatening the existing social order of the 
weaker state. Next: awareness of limited time; an on-going large-scale military 
and political crisis (such as war involving major powers); and the absence of 
any obvious military allies. Furthermore, I tried to find cases where I could pair 
the behaviour of two weaker states in a conflict situation with the same aggres-
sor. I developed a short-list of cases, several of which I also mentioned in the 
introductory part of the dissertation.  
The case studies chosen for analysis are those of Finland and Estonia and 
their foreign policy decision-making regarding the demands of the Soviet Union 
in the autumn of 1939. In September and October 1939, the Soviet Union pre-
sented Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Finland with demands on mutual non-
aggression pacts that also included Soviet military bases on the territories of 
these states, all of which had the potential to severely undermine their declared 
neutrality and put them into the Soviet Union’s sphere of influence. Estonia, 
Latvia and Lithuania signed the demands within a few days, which kept them 
away from war in 1939, but led them to gradually lose their independence over 
the summer of 1940. Finland’s negotiations with the Soviets lasted over a 
month, as Finland did not agree to the demands. Subsequently the negotiations 
broke off and the Soviet Union attacked Finland on 30 November 1939, which 
was the beginning of the Winter War of 1939–1940. The case selection is based 
on the idea to explore situations where resistance would be, within the under-
standing of rational calculations of material capabilities and high systemic con-
straints, particularly problematic. In the cases of Finland and Estonia there was 
a context of a freshly started world war, the recent destruction of Czechoslova-
kia and Poland, the absence of military allies (no promises for military aid). 
Both states had declared neutrality at the beginning of the war and allowing 
foreign military bases to the country would undermine that neutrality. The de-
mand was made with the notion that there is a definite time limit to reply to it. 
Also, there was a clear power disparity between the Soviet Union and 
Finland/Estonia in regard to material and military capabilities. The differences 
between the two countries’ situations are also relevant. In the literature, it is 
sometimes mentioned that the difference between Finland and Estonia while 
facing Soviet demands was that Finland had conducted mobilisation in late  
August 1939, whereas Estonia had not, therefore that Finland had bigger 
manoeuvring space in the beginning of the talks. These aspects demonstrate the 
suitability of how-possible questions, as these questions acknowledge that 
decisions are taken within a particular context, and are related to previous 
decisions. One difference in systemic pressures to keep in mind and come back 
to, is that the Soviets asked for territorial concessions from Finland, but not 
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from Estonia. The conclusion will discuss this difference and see whether this 
systemic difference influenced the countries’ understanding of the situation. 
As explained in the theory part of the chapter, the analysis focuses on the 
state and society relationship and how that makes certain foreign policy prac-
tices thinkable or unthinkable. For the reasons outlined in the theoretical part, 
the social construction of the society and the primary decision-maker will be 
explored separately. The empirical part of the study is structured as follows: 
Chapter 2: Foreign policy decision in Estonia in autumn 1939; Chapter 3: 
Dominant societal discourses in Estonia; Chapter 4: Decision-maker and deci-
sion-making in Estonia in autumn 1939; Chapter 5: Foreign policy decision in 
Finland in autumn 1939; Chapter 6: Dominant societal discourses in Finland; 
Chapter 7: Decision-maker and decision-making in Finland in autumn 1939. 
1.3.2. Data collection and sampling texts 
An important and challenging step while doing discourse analysis is to delimit 
the discourse both in its scope of time, extent of data and type of data. As Doty 
has stated, “[d]iscourse is inherently open ended and incomplete. […] Any 
fixing of a discourse and the identities that are constructed by it, then, can only 
ever be of a partial nature” (Doty 1996, 6). As constructivist discourse analysis 
is interested in how certain understandings and meanings within the state 
emerged, changed and interacted with each other, discourse analysis commonly 
involves going back in time. Crawford has argued that “[a]nalysis of political 
arguments must thus be context sensitive, looking for the deeper beliefs that are 
the starting points and background assumptions without which the arguments 
would be unintelligible. This entails tracing the process and examining the 
content of decision-making over long periods of time within particular historical 
and cultural contexts” (Crawford 2004, 23–24). 
While exploring the emergence and development of the discourses, the focus 
was on concepts of state, nation, and society: how was the meaning of these 
concepts constructed, how were they understood in relation one another, what 
was seen as necessary for their development and how was the external threat to 
these concepts constructed. Nevertheless, the research followed the constructi-
vist understanding of trying to avoid pretheorizing, hence by casting the net as 
wide as possible while starting the research. An important choice while doing 
discourse analysis is to identify the period to be analysed and to see how far 
back one needs to go. Here I followed the advice by Neumann by first reading 
the secondary historical literature, in order to identify the cut-off points (Neu-
mann 2008). Since an important part of the puzzle is the meaning of state sur-
vival, which is closely related to the dominant understandings of state and na-
tion, I identified as the cut-off point for Finland the emergence of the concept of 
Finnish statehood and nationhood in the early nineteenth century. For Estonia, 
the cut-off point was the politicization of the national movement in the second 
half of the nineteenth century. Going back that far enabled me to see how the 
dominant ideas about the state and society emerged, developed and interacted 
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with one another in the respective societies. As the study aims to explain a cer-
tain outcome, the ending cut-off point was the point when the decision was 
made (in case of Finland the break-off of the negotiations, in case of Estonia 
signing the demands). 
During my research for the societal chapters (Chapters 2 and 5), one of the 
main challenges was that the study covers extensive periods of time: in case of 
Finland from 1809 to 1939 and in case of Estonia from the 1870s to 1939. 
Therefore, I followed the idea of Phillips and Hardy, who suggested that re-
searchers could focus on “important” texts, such as the ones that are widely 
circulated or distributed, associated with changes in certain practices or reac-
tionary: written or made as a reaction to something (Phillips and Hardy 2002, 
73). To find the main discourses in Finland and Estonia I worked with both 
secondary and primary sources, such as newspaper articles, speeches, diaries, 
political police reports, memoirs, parliament minutes and historical and cultural 
studies covering the period in question.  
The second part of the empirical study consists of the social construction of 
the decision-maker and the process of decision-making. In terms of sampling 
data, I again focused on the monuments: speeches and texts that were often cited 
and mentioned in secondary sources. For social construction of the decision-
makers I focused on articles, speeches and well-known statements made by 
them. For the second part of the chapters on decision-making, which focuses on 
the outcome of the puzzle, I worked with both secondary and primary studies, 
such as minutes of political meetings, newspaper articles, speeches, memoirs, 
political police reports and historical studies. 
Within the text I have referred to the decision-makers in the discussed period 
as ‘he’. This choice reflects the reality of the day: all of the decision-makers at 
the time were male. 
1.3.3. Analysing the data 
In contrast to quantitative approaches, there are no standardised methods for 
discourse analysis. Discourse analysis is aimed at identifying “(some of) the 
multiple meanings assigned to texts, which means that more systematic, labour 
saving forms of analysis (such as traditional content analysis) are counter- 
productive because they aim at rapid consolidation of categories” (Phillips and 
Hardy 2002, 74). Hence, a researcher using discourse analysis is always ex-
pected to “customize” his method of analysis and justify one’s choices. While 
analysing the data, I also focused on the practices that influence the availability 
of the texts, such as the legal systems and censorship. As in case of Estonia 
there was a censorship in late 1930s, I focused on the censorship instructions 
and emergency regulations that defined constraints on public speech and as-
sembly and also how these were enforced. Because the circulation for certain 
ideas was constrained in the media, I had to look for venues where the alterna-
tive ideas and information may have circulated. This is why I included diaries 
and memoirs of politicians, civil servants and military, but also ones that were 
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written by people not explicitly related to the state structures, such as members 
of the intelligentsia.  
In the case of memoirs, I had to acknowledge in both cases that these were 
personal accounts, written often many years later, when the dominant under-
standings on what is acceptable and what is not had changed in both societies. 
In case of Finland, some of the prominent sources, such as the ones written by 
Juho Kusti Paasikivi after the World War II, have been arguably written under 
very different social conditions than the ones under which the decision-makers 
operated in 1939. This was also the case for many Estonians who wrote their 
memoirs years later in Western countries. Therefore, I tried to acknowledge the 
situation of people writing retroactively and under different social conditions, 
and if possible I used contemporary texts. Nevertheless, in case I included a 
memoir (also, many memoirs have primary sources, such as letters, articles, and 
documents in them), I tried to take that in consideration and include or look up 
alternative sources. In some cases, such as Paasikivi’s, I explicitly pointed out 
the different social conditions under which he wrote his memoirs in the disser-
tation. While mapping the discourses, I also started exploring the contestation 
between them. How did the dominant discourse emerge and why did it become 
dominant? What were the alternative discourses and how did they circulate? 
What were the interactions between the different discourses and how did these 
interactions develop and change the societal understandings? 
The second part of the empirical study consisted of 1) the social construction 
of the decision-maker, and 2) the decision-making process. In the second part of 
the empirical study, I first focused on the social construction of the primary 
decision-maker: analysing how he (the primary decision-maker was he in both 
cases) was socialised within societal discourses. The aim of this part was to 
explore how he became to understand the situation in 1939 and how this under-
standing translated into a geopolitical decision. The decision-making part of the 
chapter(s) focused on how the dominant discourses influenced particular foreign 
policy decision. It focuses on the state and society relationship, hence how the 
societal discourses influenced the way how the decision-maker understood the 
systemic and domestic pressures. 
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CHAPTER 2. 
ESTONIA’S FOREIGN POLICY DECISION  
IN AUTUMN 1939 
2.1. Introduction  
The following three chapters will discuss how the foreign policy decision of 
Estonia in autumn 1939 to accept the Soviet demands became commonsensical 
and possible for the decision-makers. The second chapter will outline the Esto-
nian foreign policy decision-making in autumn 1939 with regard to the Soviet 
demands. The third chapter will explore the dominant societal discourses in 
Estonia, their emergence, development and interaction and the evolution of the 
understanding on the state and society relationship. The fourth chapter will ex-
amine how the state discourse and subsequent practices influenced the decision-
makers’ understanding of the situation in autumn 1939 and made the decision to 
follow the logic of the international system and thereby the decision to accept 
the Soviet demands commonsensical for the decision-makers.  
The current chapter will discuss Estonia’s foreign policy decision-making in 
autumn 1939 with regard to the Soviet demands. These demands included a 
mutual military assistance pact and a Soviet military base on Estonian territory. 
The chapter focuses on the period between 24 September 1939, when the de-
mands were presented by the Soviet Union, and 28 September 1939, when Es-
tonia signed the Soviet-Estonian Mutual Assistance Pact. The chapter will show 
that there was a uniformity of opinion among the decision-makers to follow the 
logic of the international system, hence to focus on external constraints: a vola-
tile international situation, no possibility to receive external help and an exten-
sive power disparity between Estonia and the Soviet Union. The chapter will 
suggest that although the external constraints dominated the state’s preference 
formation in autumn 1939, the focus was more on avoiding the conflict and less 
on balancing the threat by looking for external help.  
2.2. Estonia’s foreign policy in 1939 
Estonian foreign policy in 1939 was one of neutrality.19 Until the mid-1930s, 
Estonia’s foreign policy had a strong Western orientation, focusing on the 
United Kingdom and Poland. The Soviet Union was seen as the primary exter-
nal threat to Estonian security and independence. The Commander and Chief of 
the Estonian Army, General Johan Laidoner stated at a meeting with Estonian 
newspaper editors in October 1938: “Our danger is that with the strengthening 
of Soviet Russia we could also disappear” (cited in Ilmjärv 2004c, 85). In the 
late 1930s, Germany was seen in some Estonian circles, particularly within the 
                                                     
19  For Estonian foreign policy in interwar period see Jaanson 2005, Made 2008, Medijainen 
2001, Medijainen 2000a, Medijainen 2000b. 
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military elites, as a balancer of the Soviet Union and co-operation with Ger-
many strengthened (see Ilmjärv 2004c; also Warma 1955, 1960, 1993; Parming 
1979). According to Warma, the military elites chose a German orientation as 
Germany was arming itself at fast pace, was strongly anti-communist and it was 
thought that in the case of a military conflict between the Soviet Union and 
Germany, the latter would win (Warma 1955, 82; Warma 1960, 12).20 This 
close co-operation between Estonia and Germany was noted by foreign repre-
sentatives serving in Estonia. In 1935 the British military attaché Major R. Fire-
brace noted: “Here a recognition has taken hold, that a small state like Estonia 
should have a Great Power backing it, that would deliver effective support in 
case of a war. Estonians feel that Great Britain is not able to fill this role, and 
thus all eyes are turned toward Germany as a worthy opponent of the Soviet 
Union” (cited in Ilmjärv 2004b, 225). In July 1939, the British consul Galienne 
had pointed out to the Estonian foreign minister Karl Selter that Estonia, mean-
ing the military, economic and political elites “was tending to become pro-
German” (Warma 1955, 83). In spring 1939, Germany proposed non-aggression 
treaties to the Baltic and Nordic countries. Norway, Sweden and Finland re-
fused, whereas Estonia and Latvia agreed to it. Estonia signed the pact with 
Germany in June 1939.  
In March 1939, the Soviet Union started its demonstrations that it considers 
Estonia within its sphere of interests by presenting Estonia with a diplomatic 
note, stating that the Soviet Union will consider unacceptable all agreements 
which would result in undermining Estonian independence, allowing a third 
country to gain influence in political, economic or other spheres or giving any 
extraordinary rights or privileges to a third country on Estonian territory. In 
Estonia this incident was perceived as a way to pressure Estonia, a demonstra-
tion that the Soviet Union saw Estonia within its sphere of interest and thus 
could interfere in Estonian internal affairs (Arumäe 2004, 97–98). Also, in 
spring 1939, Soviet cavalry units conducted offensive manoeuvres on Estonia’s 
Eastern border (Luts 2004, 64). The Soviet Union’s increasing interest towards 
Estonia and the Baltic states continued during the tripartite talks between Bri- 
tain, France and the Soviet Union that were held in spring and summer of 1939. 
One of the questions covered in the talks were security guarantees to Estonia, 
Latvia, Lithuania and Finland, as demanded by the Soviet Union. The Soviet 
understanding of these guarantees was that the Soviet Union would intervene in 
case the Baltic states would be attacked and also in case of “indirect aggres-
sion”. The Soviets defined the latter term as when a state would give its territory 
                                                     
20  Since 1936 many visits by Germany’s intelligence, military and political officials took 
place to Estonia and Estonian military officials visited Germany. In 1936, after a visit of 
Admiral Canaris, the head of the Abwehr, the secret intelligence organisation of the German 
army, Estonia and Germany started co-operating on intelligence (Ilmjärv 2004b, 70–72). 
These visits continued and for example in the summer of 1939, Admiral Canaris once again 
visited Tallinn. This was followed by other visits such as the German Chief of General Staff 
General Halder who was received by the President, General von Tippelkirsch and the 
Japanese general Kawabe (Parming, 1979).  
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or resources over to a third party aggressor. Furthermore, the interpretation of 
when this indirect aggression would have had taken place, would have been 
determined entirely by the Soviet Union (Arumäe 2004, 104–105). Estonia 
strongly protested against these guarantees. The tripartite talks became stalled 
during the summer of 1939. 
On 23 August the Soviet-German Non-Aggression Pact (Molotov-Ribben-
trop Pact) was signed. According to the secret additional protocol of this pact 
Finland, Estonia and Latvia fell into the Soviet sphere of influence. The gov-
ernment received the first reports on the pact concerning Estonia during the last 
days of August from its diplomatic missions (Ilmjärv 2004d, 360; also see 
Torma 1955, 94). On 30 August the army received reports that the Soviet Union 
had started moving its armed forces and military resources at the Estonian bor-
der (Maasing 1955, 46; also Luts 2004). On 1 September Germany attacked 
Poland and World War II began, and Estonia declared its neutrality on the same 
day. However, unlike Finland, Latvia or Lithuania, Estonia did not conduct any 
type of mobilisation. During the night between 17 and 18 September 1939, the 
Polish submarine “Orzel”, which had sought refuge in neutral Estonia and was 
interned in Tallinn harbour since 15 September, escaped. This became the pre-
text for Soviet demands to the Estonian government. On 19 September the Es-
tonian ambassador to Moscow, August Rei, was summoned by Molotov who 
declared that the Soviet navy was to launch a search for the submarine around 
Tallinn. After “Orzel”, the Soviet Union began military demonstrations close to 
the Estonian borders and from 19 September “the Soviet Navy controlled all sea 
routes, thus cutting off links between Estonia and the rest of the world, except 
the land routes through Latvia” (Ilmjärv 2004b, 359; see also Selter 1955, 39).  
2.2.1. Demands 
The Soviet demands were presented to the foreign Minister Karl Selter on 24 
September 1939 in Moscow. The official account by the Estonian government 
was that Selter was invited to Moscow to sign a trade agreement and was taken 
by surprise when the Soviet side raised politically sensitive issues (Päevaleht 1 
October 193921; Selter 1955; Kirotar 1955; Ant 1999). Other accounts by con-
temporary Estonian diplomats and politicians have disputed this claim and 
argued that in the atmosphere of Soviet power demonstrations on the Estonian 
borders, which followed the escape of submarine “Orzel”, it was either the govern-
ment’s initiative or Selter’s own initiative22, supported by the top leadership, to 
                                                     
21  On 29 September 1939 President Päts in his radio speech stated: “I do not deny that these 
negotiations came unexpectedly to us, that no explanations preceded them and that they 
implicitly came next to signing the trade agreement” (“‘Eesti riik on niisama kindel nagu 
ennegi.’ Vabariigi presidendi K. Pätsi raadiokõne kokkuvõte’”, Päevaleht, 266, 1 October 
1939, 1). 
22  Editor-of-chief of newspaper Päevaleht Harald Tammer stated in early 1940 that starting 
with a diplomatic note in March, the Soviet Union had repeatedly demonstrated that it 
considers the Baltic States to belong to “the sphere of its vital interests. […] The Soviet 
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go to Moscow to see what could be done about the situation (see Warma 1993; 
Rei 1970, Uustalu 1982, 139–141; Myllyniemi 1977; Tammer 1990; see also 
Ilmjärv 2004d, 367).23 During Selter’s meetings with the Soviet delegation, 
Soviet foreign minister Molotov referred to the “Orzel” incident and stated that 
Estonia put Soviet security in danger. The Soviets demanded a mutual military 
aid treaty that would include a Soviet military navy and air force base in Esto-
nian territory. At the second meeting at midnight of the same day, the discus-
sions on the mutual assistance pact began. The draft saw for mutual military 
assistance during “international conflict” and two Soviet naval bases and some 
air bases in Estonian territory with up to 10,000 Soviet soldiers in these bases 
(Ilmjärv 2004b, 366). The delegation returned to Estonia to get instructions 
from the government (Warma 1993).  
2.2.2. Government’s decision on demands 
On 26 September a Cabinet meeting24 and after that a joint meeting of the  
Foreign and Defence Committees of both houses of Parliament took place to 
discuss the Soviet demands. At both meetings there was consensus on the posi-
tion that the main aim of Estonia must be to avoid military conflict, and there-
                                                                                                                                  
Union defended this position throughout the talks that it had with England and France. Since 
the Soviet positions had been established before the aforementioned talks, there was no 
reason to think that they should have faded away as the talks failed. They stayed the same 
when the general constellation changed, which happened in Eastern Europe with the 
German-Soviet treaty and the collapse of Poland” (Tammer 1990, 22). Estonian diplomat 
Alexander Warma has pointed out that Selter’s departure for Moscow was unexpected in 
some circles of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, since according to the initial plan the 
Ambassador to Moscow, August Rei, was supposed to sign the trade agreement. Warma 
describes the opinions of the representative of the army and the head of the foreign trade 
director Meri who stated that it is “unwise and careless” for Selter to go to Moscow at a time 
when the Soviets seemed to be so upset because of the escape of the Orzel and that there is 
certainly something behind this. Later, there were opinions expressed that Selter, with his 
initiative to go to Moscow himself, chose the wrong tactics and made it easier for the Soviets 
to implement their plans (Warma 1993, 18). It was also not an everyday matter for the 
Estonian foreign minister to visit Moscow. A visit like this had taken place only once during 
the period of Estonian independence, in 1934. Subsequently, Selter’s visit to Moscow can be 
interpreted that he was sent there as a special envoy of the government instead of under the 
normal auspices of the Foreign Ministry. 
23  According to Ilmjärv, Selter has given inconsistent information regarding the decision to 
go to Moscow. Selter has once spoken about a secret meeting with Päts, Eenpalu and 
Laidoner where it was decided that he should go to Moscow to save the situation, but later 
had forgotten about this meeting. Ilmjärv also argues that the government’s decision to send 
him to Moscow to sign the trade agreement was done retroactively on 23 September when 
Selter had already left Estonia and therefore the decision as such was made in a very narrow 
circle and the Cabinet members heard about it later (Ilmjärv 2004a, 614–615). 
24  On 26 September the Estonian government gathered for a meeting. Present were the 
President, all Cabinet members, the Commander-in-Chief, the State Auditor, the State 
Secretary, the Chancellor of Justice and Ambassador Rei (Ilmjärv 2004b, 367). 
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fore that the Soviet demands must be met. This was stated by President Päts as 
he pointed out that the foremost task of the government is  
[t]o take the Estonian people and the state as a whole through the current great war. 
So far, we have been successful in the implementation of this task. War has been 
going on for a month. During that time the great state of Poland and its army have 
been destroyed, its towns and lands have been ravaged, and many tens of 
thousands of its people have been executed. Estonia, together with the other Baltic 
states, though being located in the immediate neighbourhood of the war zone, has 
been able to find itself the independent neutrality course at the right time, with 
which it has happily distanced itself from the armed conflict (Warma 1993, 30).  
The main arguments were the following: first, there was a high likelihood for a 
Soviet military attack if no agreement would be reached. According to the 
delegation that had attended the negotiations, the Soviets had threatened to use 
force in case the Soviet goals would not be achieved through the proposed pact 
(Arjakas, Arumäe et al. 1989, 125; See also Warma 1993, 28).25 Ambassador to 
Moscow Rei stated that the proposal “if not in its form then in its substance” has 
the “character of an ultimatum” and that the threat of using military force if the 
proposal would not be accepted, should be taken seriously (Warma 1993, 28). 
Second, as a result of the freshly begun war and the destruction of Poland, Es-
tonia would not be likely to receive any external military support and in case of 
military confrontation would end up fighting alone (Warma 1993, 28–29, Arja-
kas, Arumäe et al. 1989, 139). As General Laidoner stated at the meeting with 
the Parliamentary committees: “Can we hope for help? I say with certainty that 
we will not be getting it currently from anywhere, because no one can give it to 
the extent strong enough and they will not want to give it either, because it 
would be pulling themselves into the conflict and everyone tries to avoid that. 
Currently everyone is an egoist” (Arjakas, Arumäe et al. 1989, 139). At the 
Cabinet’s meeting Laidoner stated that in addition to Western states not being 
able to help, small states were too scared after what happened to Poland and 
therefore would not interfere either, and that Latvia would follow the same 
course (Warma 1993, 28–29). 
Thirdly, Estonia would not be able to wage a war against the Soviets as its 
military leadership considered its long-term military capabilities insufficient 
(Warma 1993, 30; Arjakas, Arumäe et al. 1989, 140–141). The Head of the 
Army, General Johan Laidoner, stated that the Estonian forces, which “can be 
considered only capable of resistance, would not be able to resist for long, espe-
cially if one considers that the activities of a hostile air force could paralyze the 
implementation of the mobilisation” (Warma 1993, 30). Hence, military conflict 
should be avoided, as was stated by President Päts at the meeting with the Par-
                                                     
25  According to foreign minister Selter, Molotov also threatened the Estonians with force: 
“If you do not wish to sign the mutual aid pact with us, then we need to use other ways in 
order to ensure our safety, maybe rougher, maybe more complicated ones. I ask you, do not 
make us use force towards Estonia” (Arjakas, Arumäe et al. 1989, 125).  
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liamentary committees: “It looks like we can choose one path. Aid cannot be 
hoped for. If war will come, our whole state with the whole intelligentsia will 
be destroyed and we will be destroying many of our people’s resources and 
many people” (Arjakas, Arumäe et al. 1989, 140). The notion that there was no 
choice was repeated by the other government members and parliamentarians 
(see Warma 1993; Arjakas, Arumäe et al. 1989, 137–145). The government 
acknowledged that a mutual assistance treaty with the Soviet Union would 
mean giving up its neutrality policy. As parliamentarian Ants Piip stated: “This 
treaty is a hidden protectorate; this has to be clear to us” (Arjakas, Arumäe et al. 
1989, 141). As stated by President Päts at the meeting with the Parliamentary 
committees: “From the other side, then [after signing the treaty] we do not have 
neutrality anymore. When we sign the treaty there will be communist groups 
and it will be difficult to fight against them. But there does not seem to be a 
choice” (Arjakas, Arumäe et al. 1989, 140). 
On 27 September, the Estonian delegation arrived to Moscow and on 28 
September, the Soviet-Estonian Pact of Mutual Assistance with its confidential 
protocols and a Trade Agreement was signed in Moscow. The parties agreed 
that the Soviet side had the right to have up to 25,000 soldiers during the war in 
Estonia instead of the 10,000 that had been proposed a few days earlier. This 
was achieved through Molotov’s aggressive tactics, using a fake incident in the 
Narva bay to argue that the situation has changed and that a more extensive 
Soviet presence was needed. In this staged incident, an unknown submarine had 
torpedoed a Soviet steamboat called “Metallist” (Ilmjärv 2004b). Although the 
Estonian side first stated that this proposal was unacceptable to Estonia, by the 
next morning, 28 September 1939, the government in Tallinn had given a posi-
tive answer to Molotov’s proposal. This confirms that the government’s fore-
most priority was to avoid conflict, because the Soviet’s proposal for changing 
conditions could have been used by the negotiators for slowing the pace of the 
talks down, as they could have stated that for this new situation new instructions 
are needed and therefore they must go back to Tallinn. However, this was not 
done (Warma 1993, 32–37). 
2.2.3. Balancing the threat 
By emphasising the high systemic constraints and power disparity between the 
Soviet Union and Estonia, and therefore focusing on avoiding the military 
conflict, Estonia was seeing the situation through realist/rationalist power-capa-
bilities lenses. Did Estonia attempt to balance the threat? Estonia’s decision not 
to mobilise at all contrasted with the behaviour of its immediate neighbours. 
Although none conducted full military mobilisation, Latvia, Lithuania, Finland 
and Sweden all conducted partial mobilisations in autumn 1939.26 The main 
                                                     
26  Lithuania called four years of reservists to the service in late August and on 17 
September, after the Soviet Army invaded Poland, announced partial mobilization. Latvia 
called its reservists to the service on 11 September (Ilmjärv 2004d, 363). Finland moved 
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reason for not mobilising was to not provoke the Soviets. According to Maa- 
sing, in early September the government and representatives from the parlia-
ment discussed mobilisation and decided that Estonia’s size, location and demo-
cratic state order does not allow for a secret mobilisation and that announcing a 
general mobilisation could be considered as a provocative act and be used as a 
justification to attack Estonia. (Maasing 1955, 46)27. General Laidoner in his 
letter to President Päts from 20 October 1939 stated that “[i]n the past Septem-
ber, during difficult crisis times, I was convinced that the questions between 
Estonia and Soviet-Russia in this situation must be, if possible, solved through 
peaceful talks and not to provoke a military conflict between us and Soviet 
Russia. Keeping that in mind, since the beginning of Soviet mobilisation, I have 
never considered mobilisation or partially calling up the reservists necessary” 
(“Sõjavägede Ülemjuhataja Vabariigi Presidendile” 2004, 536). Hence, this 
suggests that a mobilisation was not conducted because the government’s fore-
most aim was to avoid military conflict, and therefore it was determined not to 
irritate the Soviets.  
Did Estonia try to balance the Soviet threat by asking for external aid?  
General Laidoner did not believe that any help would be realistic. Nevertheless, 
the government did turn to Germany for help both through military and political 
lines (Warma 1993). Although Germany formally replied that no help would be 
coming forward, there were also informal statements that implied that the Ger-
man position was not permanent, which led some government members to 
maintain their belief that Germany would balance the Soviet influence at one 
point (Maasing 1955; Ilmjärv 2004d; Warma 1955).28 For example, at a meeting 
                                                                                                                                  
extra defense brigades to the border in Kannas and on 10 October the government called for 
extra reserve trainings, which in practice meant partial mobilization (Tanner 1957).  
27  According to Ilmjärv eight Cabinet meetings were held from 1–20 September, but their 
protocols do not mention discussions on state security. Ilmjärv assumes that these questions 
could have been discussed on 4 September as only the names of participants are stated in 
that protocol (Ilmjärv 2004a, 592). According to Luts state security was discussed by the 
government on 2 September (Luts 2004, 69), Maasing does not specify the date of the 
meeting or which government members or parliamentarians participated (Maasing 1955). 
28  According to Colonel Maasing, he was sent to Germany on 24 September to ask whether 
Germany would aid Estonia in case of a Soviet attack. Maasing met with representatives of 
the German army in Königsberg, but received a negative reply (Maasing 1955, see also 
Ilmjärv 2004d, 374–375). According to Warma, the German Ambassador Frohwein had 
replied to the request from the Estonian Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the possibility of 
Berlin’s intervention that “the Estonian government knows itself what it will do, but if it 
wants to consider Berlin’s recommendations, then it should sign the treaty, the sooner the 
better. This is Estonia’s only escape” (quoted in Warma 1955, 82). However, there were also 
informal statements made from the German side that implied that the German position was 
not permanent. On 26 August the Estonian and Latvian Army Chief of Staffs, Reek and 
Hartmanis, had spoken with the German military attaché Rössing and requested that the 
German government would officially state that it does not agree to the occupation of the 
Baltic states. Rössing had stated that Germany’s hands are currently tied in the West, but 
“[t]he entering of the Soviets to the Baltic states is very unpleasant for us and creates a 
problem that Germany needs to solve in the future” (quoted in Ilmjärv 2004d, 374). 
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with the Parliament’s Defence and Foreign Affairs Committees on 26 Septem-
ber, foreign minister Selter argued that “the stronger Germany is in in the East, 
the better it is for us” (Arjakas, Arumäe et al. 1989, 44). At the same meeting 
president Päts expressed the hope “that also in the future Germany will not want 
us to be destroyed. Currently Germany had to make concessions, because other-
wise it would have become difficult for her” (Arjakas, Arumäe et al. 1989, 140). 
According to Warma, Estonia turned only to Germany for possible aid (Warma 
1955, 82). The government later stated that the Finns had turned their request to 
discuss Finnish aid down. According to Ilmjärv, no archive materials exist that 
would show that Estonia asked external help from Finland or from any other 
state but Germany (Ilmjärv 2004d).29 Also, they did not consult with the Brits, 
since the British embassy was informed after the decision to accept the demands 
had already been made (Ilmjärv 2004d, 377). An important indication that 
shows Estonia’s focus on realpolitik and power disparity is that although 
Estonia had a military defence union with Latvia since 1923, Estonia did not 
invoke it. Though foreign minister Selter claimed that this was because Latvians 
themselves had postponed a meeting between military leaders, in September 
General Laidoner argued that there was no need to spend time to consult with 
Latvia, as Latvia would follow the course of other states, being too anxious to 
interfere after what happened to Poland (Warma 1993, 30). Furthermore, when 
foreign minister Selter went back to Estonia from Moscow after receiving the 
demands from the Soviet Union, he went through Riga, but did not inform the 
Latvians about the demands (Ilmjärv 2004d). This suggests that the govern-
ment’s focus was on power capabilities and not on legal aspects or institutions. 
Hence, the government followed its German orientation and consulted with 
Germany as a strong power. Possibilities to consult with other states were not 
considered, because it was assumed that either they would not be interested or 
their own power capabilities were too low to be of sufficient help.  
2.3. How-possible? 
The aim of this chapter was to show that there was uniformity of opinion among 
the decision-makers in autumn 1939 to follow the logic of the international 
system. The decision to agree with the demands was based on the notion of a 
military threat, the lack of possible allies due to the on-going war, the recent 
experiences of Poland and Czechoslovakia and the great disparity between the 
military capabilities of the Soviet Union and Estonia. Hence, the decision-
maker perceived the external constraints as dominant. The chapter showed that 
the government made the decision to accept the demands within one day and 
                                                     
29  Although in terms of Finland Estonia later argued that Finland had turned Estonia down 
and at the government’s meeting foreign minister Selter argued that Finland’s attitudes 
towards Estonia “seem to be externally distant, but substantially irritated” (Warma 1993, 29), 
the Finnish foreign minister at the time, Eljas Erkko, later claimed that no proposal for talks 
was received from Estonia (Ilmjärv 2004d, 376, also see Pakaslahti 1970).  
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that this decision was consistent with the policy line the government had kept 
already since late August: to avoid a military conflict. The commitment to this 
policy was firm, thus when the Soviets increased their demands during the  
second round of talks, the Estonian negotiators did not need to return to Tallinn 
for new instructions, since their aim was to reach an agreement with the Soviets. 
The chapter also discussed that the government’s strategy to balance the threat 
by trying to find allies was conducted through a power/capabilities angle. This 
is consistent with the government’s policy since the mid-1930s that there was a 
need to orientate on one great power that would help Estonia in times of crisis. 
As this state was Germany, the government focused on consultations with Ger-
mans, and there were voices within the government that Germany would help to 
balance Soviet influence in the future. In addition, the government did not in-
voke the military defence union with Latvia, which suggests that the legal and 
institutional aspects were not considered important compared to the external 
pressures and power disparity. 
Nevertheless, while exploring the speeches and statements by the country’s 
top leadership until September 1939 on the subject of the external threat, the 
main idea, stated over and over again, is that if the country’s independence 
would be threatened, Estonia would protect its independence. In January 1939, 
Chief of Armed Forces General Laidoner spoke at a church service held for 
young people in Tartu. He said: “We must not be afraid if fate would force us to 
protect ourselves with arms. We are not going to do that passively, but will  
attack bravely” (cited in Ant 1999, 30). Propaganda Minister Oidermaa ex-
plained the meaning of neutrality to the people by claiming: “Neutrality is most 
effective if it is clear that the nation that has declared it wants and can protect 
itself by all means” (cited in Ant 1999, 31). In May Oidermaa stated: “If 
someone would attack us, we will bravely face it and hit the enemy back. This 
is our oath and testament” (cited in Ant 1999, 31). President Päts stated in his 
Victory Day speech (23 June 1939), that “we will never allow strangers to put 
their hands onto our fatherland and property” (cited in Ant 1999, 32).  
This need and obligation to defend one’s country was explained as an issue 
of domestic principles. In his speech at the Estonian Military Academy in De-
cember 1938, Laidoner criticised Czechoslovakia’s foreign policy during the 
Munich crisis arguing that the country lacked “the necessary military mentality” 
(paraphrased in Ilmjärv 2004b, 293). In April 1939, in his speech at the anniver-
sary of the Tondi military academy, Laidoner spoke about Austria and Czecho-
slovakia vanishing  
without anyone of their citizens raising a weapon. If fate would put us in front of 
these challenging times, then we could not disappear like this. We all read how 
some Czech soldiers, when they were ordered to lay down their swords, broke 
their swords. According to our understandings and principles one should not 
break his sword, but fight with it. And it seems more and more that the reason 
for the perishing of these countries was the lack of courage to defend their 
independence. Our principles tell us that if someone would touch our country, 
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then our army will step towards the enemy. The whole nation will come along 
with the army (cited in Ant 1999, 31).  
The State’s Propaganda Service’s overview of the second quarter of 1939 to the 
national broadcasting and Esperanto union explained the opinion of the state’s 
leadership in the following terms: “A nation which is not ready to defend itself 
and which lacks the firm belief into its defence capacities and will, will never 
find itself friends and supporters during difficult times. If one does not resist 
bravely at times of danger, there is no hope for external help. If one wishes for 
friends, one needs to be brave, since the brave have friends but the cowards 
never will” (cited in Ant 1999 31). According to Ant, after mid-August 1939 the 
number of this kind of speeches decreased. However, President Päts continued 
until early September. On 21 August 1939, President Päts had stated in a speech 
that “these would no longer be Estonian men and women, if they hesitate to 
fight for our beloved homeland when there is a need for it” (Päevaleht, 21 
August 1939). The understanding that at times of danger it is important to take a 
non-Czechoslovakian course was also present within the society. As shown by a 
nation-wide study conducted in April 1939 by the State Propaganda Office in 
co-operation with the Fatherland League on the public opinion, attitudes and 
assessments on the international situation, people stated that they were “not 
going to act like Czechoslovakians” (cited in Ant 1999 35). The need to avoid 
the behaviour and fate of Czechoslovakia was brought out by a proposal that 
leading statesmen should not be allowed to take any visits abroad in order to 
make sure they would not be made to sign unequal treaties (Ant 1999, 37). 
The public rhetoric of Estonia’s top leadership until August 1939 focused on 
the obligation to defend one’s country as a principal issue and as a precondition 
for receiving external help. This begs the question how in September 1939 the 
same people in the top leadership based their arguments regarding the demands 
solely on the logic of the international system. How did this dichotomy, be-
tween the previous public statements and the subsequent action, when “the 
times of danger” actually happened, become possible? The rationalist answer 
would be that as states are always concerned with physical survival, it is ex-
pected that with increasing volatility on the systemic level the international 
logic took priority. The theoretical part of the dissertation argued that when 
certain understandings enter the public sphere, this introduces social constraints 
for the decision-makers, and therefore makes certain practices, such as deci-
sions, acceptable and others unacceptable. So, the question here is: how did it 
become possible that this discourse, widely promoted by the top leadership, on 
seeing the obligation to defend one’s country as an issue of principles and pre-
requisite for external help, did not seem to create constraints on the decision-
making process? How did this uniformity of decision-making become possible? 
This takes us to the question of state and society relationship and the role it 
played in making the government’s understanding of the situation and the fol-
lowing actions possible and commonsensical for the decision-makers. Hence, 
what was the relationship between state and the society and how was the  
47 
decision-makers’ reading of the situation constructed regarding the domestic 
discourses? In order to understand how the decision to accept the Soviet 
demands became commonsensical as the only possible choice for the decision-
makers in Estonia in autumn 1939, the dominant national discourses and 
identities in Estonia in 1939, their emergence, development and interaction, 
with a focus on the state and society relationship, must be explored. 
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CHAPTER 3. 
DOMINANT SOCIETAL DISCOURSES  
IN ESTONIA 
This dissertation follows the constructivist understanding that anything that 
happens, happens because it has been made socially possible, by the inter- 
subjective practices, identities and interests embedded in the societal under-
standings. Therefore, this chapter will explore the main domestic discourses that 
were present in Estonia prior to and in 1939, their emergence, development and 
interactions and their understanding of the state and society relationship. Ted 
Hopf’s argument that it should not be a priori assumed that Other is an external 
actor, such as another state, and that there can be multiple Others and multiple 
kinds of Others, will be followed (Hopf 2002, 2005). The chapter will suggest 
that the main domestic discourses relevant for the dissertation’s argument are 
the following: 1) Radical-nationalist, 2) Collectivist-nationalist, 3) Liberal-indi-
vidualist. It will also explore how one of these discourses, the Collective- 
nationalist discourse, became privileged and evolved into the state discourse, 
while other discourses were marginalised. It will be shown that during the 
emergence and development of Estonian national identities, the Estonian so- 
ciety developed outside the state decision-making sphere, which was seen as 
represented either by the Baltic Germans or Imperial Russia. Therefore, within 
Estonian society, the state was seen as the Other. Hence, when Estonia became 
independent, Estonian politicians and society in general had limited experience 
with statehood and what it entailed. As a result, the economic crisis of the early 
1930s paved the way to a political crisis where the solution to political stability 
came to be seen in a strong executive leadership, as this was the governance 
experience the society knew. As a result, the dominant state discourse saw the 
state and society relationship in the following terms: the supremacy of national 
collectivist interests over individual interests was a necessary precondition for 
national development. Hence, the decision-making sphere and the societal 
sphere were seen as separate as this would ensure more political stability and 
better incentives for the nation’s development.  
3.1. The emergence, development and interaction  
between the main dominant discourses  
3.1.1. Introduction 
This section will discuss Estonian societal and political developments prior to 
its independence in 1918. During the time of Estonian national awakening in the 
1860s, Estonia had been part of the Russian Empire since 1710. However, the 
Baltic German elites held nearly absolute power in Estonia for several centuries, 
although they comprised only three per cent of the overall population (Rohtmets 
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2010, 37).30 The period of the Estonian national awakening was characterized 
by an ethnic and social conflict between Estonians and Baltic Germans. Due to 
the exclusive power position that the Baltic Germans held in Estonian territory, 
Baltic Germans, and through them Germans and Germany in a wider sense, 
came to be seen as the Other and “the national enemy” for Estonians (Mertels-
mann 2005, 44).31  
The politicization of the national movement, which first had mainly focused 
on cultural and language issues, started in the late 1870s. This process was 
characterized by the first political debate among Estonian nationalists, which is 
known as the Hurt-Jakobson debate. Jakob Hurt and Carl Robert Jakobson, two 
influential activists of the nationalism movement, broadly shared their under-
standing on nationalism as something determined by birth and natural charac-
teristics of a person (Jansen 2001, 96). They disagreed on the issue whether 
Estonian nationalism should stick to its cultural-linguistic focus (Hurt) or also 
work on creating advantageous political circumstances for the existence of the 
nation (Jakobson). Jakob Hurt, a cleric by profession, stated that “the word na-
tion is for me not a political but an ethnographical term” and recommended in 
1892 not to “touch politics, it will sting you lethally” (cited in Laaman 1936, 
48). To Carl Robert Jakobson, for a free development of the nation, political 
rights of the Estonian people and realistic reform attempts were important (see 
Jansen 2004, 100–101). Political equality with Germans became the leading 
motive of him and his newspaper Sakala (Jansen 2004, 45). Jakobson saw “the 
Baltic German dominance as a historic disaster for the Estonians and he was the 
first Estonian nationalist to demand equal representation for the peasantry and 
urban dwellers (mainly of Estonian origin) in the Baltic Diet” (Raun 1987, 65). 
Jakobson advocated the Finnish model where the peasant estate was equal to 
other estates in the Diet (Laaman 1936, 45). The Finnish culture, society and 
national awakening also significantly influenced the Estonian nationalist 
movement. As Jansen points out, Finland became a political role model for Es-
tonia, as it had its own constitution and was a so-called “state within a state” 
(Jansen 2004, 113). 
Although the political debates between the Estonian political activists dis-
agreed on questions of where the immediate focus of the national movement 
should lie, at the centre of the Estonian nationalist movement were confronta-
                                                     
30  The Baltic German elites were the successors of the Teutonic Knights who had 
conquered the region in the thirteenth century (Parming 1975, 8). In the nineteenth century 
the Baltic German landowners owned most land, had an exclusive representation at the Diets 
(Landtag) of the local areas and controlled the judiciary and the police (Raun 1987, Jansen 
2001, 89, Jansen 2004, 156). 
31  One of the main aims of the first wave of Estonian nationalism was to work against 
Germanization. As the language had been the indicator of social affiliation, it had been 
considered natural that when an Estonian moved upwards socially, they would also become 
Germanized (Jansen 2004, 39–40). Hence Estonian nationalists actively campaigned for 
anti-Germanization, and to remain Estonian was seen as an ethical obligation for everyone 
born into native families (Jansen 2001, 96).  
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tions with the Baltic German elites. Baltic Germans tried to maintain the status 
quo and keep political power in Estonian territory in their own hands, and there-
fore this group largely opposed the Estonian cultural and political aspirations 
(Raun 1999, 343). The Baltic Germans were not willing to involve Estonians 
into its society, as Estonians were not accepted to the educational, cultural or 
corporative associations of Germans and were kept away from the political 
sphere. Therefore, Estonian nationalists looked for alternative ways to get some 
say in the public sphere by establishing an ‘Estonian society’ next to the existing 
German society (Jansen 2001). The opposition of Baltic Germans towards 
Estonian cultural and political initiatives and their unwillingness to involve Es-
tonians in their society created strong anti-German sentiments among Estonian 
nationalists. Hurt called the Baltic Germans “the colonizers without a people, a 
fragment of a big German nation whose supreme power in the region is not legi-
timate” (paraphrased in Karjahärm and Sirk 1997, 274). Jakobson in his “First 
Fatherland Speech”, given in 1868 in Tartu, established the historical approach 
which became strongly embedded in the Estonians’ national consciousness, 
where the period when the Baltic Germans held power in Estonian territory 
became characterized as the “age of darkness” and “the 700-year night of  
slavery” (Rohtmets 2010, 37; Tamm 2008, 503, 505).  
In the 1880s, nationalistic sentiments were on the rise in Russia, which re-
sulted in Russification policies in Estonia. Nevertheless, Russification period 
resulted in a decrease in Baltic German influence (Mertelsmann 2005, 45).32 
The historical experiences with Baltic Germans had made the Estonian nationa-
lists consider the West a larger threat for the young national identity than the 
East (Medijainen 2001, 113) and therefore Russification was seen as a lesser 
evil of the two. Estonian nationalists largely agreed on that, which is shown by 
statements of the political opponents Päts and Tõnisson. The nationalist Jaan 
Tõnisson was afraid that if Germany would win World War I, Estonians and 
Latvians would be denationalised, similar to the Danes in Schleswig, the French 
in Alsace and the Poles in Silesia. Tõnisson considered Russification less dan-
gerous, because “in his view the Slavic character lacked singleness of purpose 
in the national subjugation of other peoples” (Karjahärm and Sirk 1997, 396). 
This was the reason why Estonian nationalists, in spite of their ideological dif-
ferences, were “the most loyal citizens of Russia and Russian patriots” (Tõnis-
son quoted in Karjahärm 1997 and Sirk, 276). Konstantin Päts said in 1914 
“Our homeland will remain part of the Russian state. We do not desire that our 
                                                     
32  Initially, Estonian and Russian nationalism had shared goals, as “both interpreted the 
Estonian peasants to be oppressed by the Germans, whose influence should be decreased in 
the future” (Mertelsmann 2005, 45). Also, a national identity had already been developed by 
that time and only a limited number of Russians were living in Estonia, lacking their own 
well-established elites (Mertelsmann 2005, 46). Another aspect of it was that Russification 
balanced against Germanization. Although the usage of the Russian language in schools 
increased, the exclusive position that the German language had held as the ‘lingua franca’ 
decreased and subsequently the influence of the Baltic Germans decreased (see Mertelsmann 
2005, Raun 1987). 
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little homeland would become the fighting arena for the big states. As the shore 
of the Russian state we have broad possibilities for development and the Rus-
sian state will not have a reason to look at the inhabitants of our homeland with 
suspicion” (Päts 1914, 1).33 
In the early twentieth century, a second wave of Estonian nationalism 
emerged, which focused more on nation building and had stronger political as-
pirations than the earlier wave. A political debate emerged between the “men of 
ideals” gathered around the Postimees newspaper in Tartu and led by its editor-
in-chief Jaan Tõnisson on one side and “the men of economy” in Tallinn who 
were gathered around the Teataja newspaper in Tallinn and led by Konstantin 
Päts, founder of this newspaper, on the other (Karjahärm and Sirk, 1997). The 
debate concentrated on the question of the priorities and the right focus of the 
nationalist movement. For Tõnisson, the essence of societal life were the na-
tionalist patriotic ideas that had to be developed and promoted. He saw the “na-
tion as a value in itself, the highest level of the development of humankind” 
(Jansen 2004, 122). Päts at the time represented the radical group and for him 
societal life was not only about patriotic ideas, but also about improving the 
socio-economic conditions of the population, because a “serf does not have a 
nationality” (Päts 1904, 1). However, the crucial trait of Estonian nationalism 
that united different streams was the confrontation with Baltic German elites 
who opposed the political aspirations of Estonians. Baltic Germans argued that 
Estonian national intelligentsia agitated Estonian peasants against the nobility 
and aimed to incite ethnic conflict. Both Päts and Tõnisson argued that the Es-
tonian nationalists criticized the Baltic Germans only because of the latter’s 
resentment of Estonians cultural and political aspirations. Tõnisson wrote in 
1903 that they [Postimees] would have not criticized the Germans if the “Ger-
mans would have not so often worked against our nation’s development and 
would not have tried to push us off from our natural path of development” 
(Tõnisson 1903, 1). Along similar lines, Konstantin Päts wrote in Teataja, in 
1914, as a response to a letter by one representative of the Baltic German no-
bility who argued that Estonian intelligentsia agitated Estonian masses against 
the Baltic Germans: “I agree with you that the nobility has been the only 
                                                     
33  The resentment and mistrust towards Germans and Germany played an important role in 
shaping Estonia’s independence aspirations. Until 1917, the focus of the Estonian national 
movement was on the development of the Estonian culture and society and on a greater 
cultural autonomy in the Russian empire with political rights for Estonians. Even in 1905, 
the most radical demands of Estonian nationalists were within the limits of a federal state 
order. There was a widespread belief that first one would have to fight for strengthening 
democracy in Russia and only then for evolving and strengthening Estonian autonomy. As 
argued by Medijainen, it is thereby fully understandable that even liberal Estonian politi-
cians, who had to flee to western countries after the 1905 revolution to escape persecution, 
came out with the autonomy project and did not advocate for an independent country 
(Medijainen, 2001, 113). This was not because they would have preferred a Russian sphere 
of influence over Estonian independence, but because of political realities, where a stronger 
Russian political order was seen as a balance against Baltic Germans’ influence and power 
and Germany’s expansion aspirations.  
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political actor here for a long time and that our current situation carries the 
consequences and characteristics of this leadership of the nobility. I do not wish 
to prove that the Baltic nobility has not been clever enough to lead politics 
according to their views [italics original].” But for Päts, these views had 
benefited only the Baltic Germans. He accused the Baltic Germans of not 
building any institutions for Latvians and Estonians and of preventing the 
emergence of these institutions (Päts 1914, 1). 
In the early twentieth century, Estonians came to power in some city coun-
cils, for example in Tallinn, where Estonians won elections against Baltic Ger-
mans with the co-operation of Russians. Estonian nationalists at the time were 
loyal to the tsar and did not explore alternative forms of government to the Rus-
sian empire (Raun 1987, 66). The resentment and mistrust towards Germans 
and Germany played an important role in shaping Estonia’s independence aspi-
rations. Until 1917, the focus of the Estonian national movement was on the 
development of the Estonian culture and society and on a greater cultural auto-
nomy in the Russian empire with political rights for Estonians (Medijainen, 
2001, 113). The impetus for Estonian national independence at that particular 
time came through an increasing German threat. In September 1917, the Ger-
man army had taken Riga and approached Estonia and there was a clear threat 
of German occupation. In October 1917, the Bolshevik revolution took place 
and the existing political order collapsed. As a result, the Estonian nationalists 
did not have the option to balance the German influence with Russian influence 
anymore. Therefore, in December 1918, the Committee of Elders of the Esto-
nian Maapäev (Landtag), that had been elected earlier that year, decided to de-
clare Estonian independence in case of a German occupation (Raun 1987, 104). 
In February 1918, Germans invaded the Estonian mainland34 and on 24 Feb- 
ruary 1918 Estonia declared its independence.35 From 1918–1920 Estonia 
                                                     
34  The German occupation from February to November 1918 further increased the anti-
German sentiments within the society. Many Baltic Germans collaborated with the German 
occupiers “dreaming of a Baltic satellite state of the German Empire under their rule” 
(Mertelsmann 2005, 46). Journalist and national activist Georg Eduard Luiga stated: “What 
they have done during seven hundred years we can forget, but what they have done now 
during these seven months is impossible to forget” (quoted in Rohtmets 2010, 39). The 
confrontations between Estonians and Baltic Germans reached its peak during the 
Landeswehr war in 1919, where Estonian forces won from a Baltic German military force 
called the Landeswehr and the Iron Division that consisted of Baltic and Reich Germans. 
The Landeswehr war, which was perceived as a “holy war against the archenemy” (Roht-
mets 2010, 40), further strengthened the understanding of the Baltic Germans as the 
archenemies. 
35  On 19 February 1924 the Committee of Elders of the Maapäev decided on the text of the 
independence manifesto to form the Eesti Päästekomitee (Estonian Rescue Committee) 
consisting of Konstantin Päts, Konstantin Konik and Jüri Vilms with the task to declare 
Estonian independence. “On 24 February 1924, Eesti Päästekomitee declared Estonia an 
‘independent and democratic republic’ within its ‘historical and ethnographic borders’” 
(Raun 1987, 105) and also designated to the office the first Estonian government, called the 
Estonian provisional Government and led by Päts. 
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waged the War of Independence against the Red Army and the Baltic German 
military force called the Landeswehr. 
3.1.2. Understandings on the state and society relationship 
The state and society relationship in interwar Estonia was strongly influenced 
by the pre-1918 experience of Estonians where the state, represented exclu-
sively by the Baltic Germans, was seen as the Other, separated from the 
Estonian society that carried Estonian cultural and political aspirations. In 1918 
Estonia became independent and turned from “a Kulturnation into a Staatsna-
tion” (Karjahärm and Sirk 1997, 391). The development from a national move-
ment with limited experience with political representation to an Estonian state-
hood was a rapid change for Estonian national activists who had promoted the 
idea of greater autonomy within a more democratic Russia until 1917. While 
this development was sudden for the nationalist leaders, it must have been even 
more rapid for the wider public. This suggests that until 1918 the “state”, either 
as Estonian and Livonian provinces governed by Baltic German elites or by 
Imperial Russia, had had the role of the “Other” with regard to Estonian society. 
In both cases, the state as the decision-maker stood outside of the Estonian so-
ciety. Hence, the Estonian society where the Estonian cultural and social life 
happened and the state as a decision-making body were separated. Therefore, it 
was not surprising that the society was first not consolidated on the question of 
the necessity, importance and meaning of Estonian statehood. As Pajur points 
out, in the early 1920s parts of society had only lukewarm feelings towards an 
Estonian nation state and criticism of the Estonian state was strong (Pajur 
2005b, 75). This scepticism did not necessarily mean that critical people or 
groups would have also been critical towards Estonian culture or societal life, 
but rather suggests that they did not see that these two spheres, the cultural and 
societal, where the national values are embedded, and the political, where the 
decision-making happens, must necessarily be united.  
This gap between the societal and the political spheres became visible during 
the economic crises of 1923–1924 and 1931–1934, which developed into a cri-
sis of democracy in 1932–1934. In the early 1920s, the mixed societal positions 
towards Estonian statehood and the economic crisis of 1923–1924 resulted in 
leftist ideas gaining popularity. This led the Estonian communists, an illegal 
underground party with the goal to conduct a revolutionary coup and to unite 
Estonia with the Soviet Union, to attempt a coup on 1 December 1924. The 
coup failed and it also ended the Estonian Communist Party as an active politi-
cal body. One of the important consequences of the coup was that it helped 
strengthen Estonian nationhood and consolidate society in this question. The 
coup was followed by a period of political stability as a wall-to-wall coalition 
government was formed to show the unity of Estonian nationalist political 
groups (Parming 1975, 13).  
The weak civic and political culture became once again visible during the 
global economic crisis, which hit Estonia fully in 1931, when unemployment 
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increased rapidly. As the standard of life decreased, people started looking for a 
scapegoat, finding it mainly in politicians and political parties. “The reputation 
of the politicians and political parties sunk extraordinarily low and people’s 
alienation from the state became visible” (Pajur 2005c, 83). The economic crisis 
brought the doubts and disappointments, existing within the society towards 
Estonian nationhood and the Estonian decision-maker, again into the limelight. 
Writer Anton Hansen Tammsaare, in his 1934 essay “About happy and unhappy 
times”, brings out that people had had very high hopes and illusions on how life 
in an Estonian-governed Estonia would be like: “for very many the own state 
flickered as some sort of country of idlers, where vodka and milk rivers run 
through shores of scrambled eggs and semolina porridge” (Tammsaare 1990, 
54). Therefore, during the devastating economic crisis and grave unemploy-
ment, many people started pointing their finger at the Estonian statesmen. 
Our disappointments started later, because that big and difficult thing, which was 
our freedom fight, could never be accomplished without certain illusions. We 
had long dreamt of if not about our own national independence, then still about 
our own room and our own permission.36 We had thought of it as our ultimate 
happiness, if Estonian men themselves would manage Estonian business, be-
cause it seemed to us that the Estonian man, when handling Estonian things, is 
an entirely special man. He was supposed to have certain special virtues, which 
Russians, Germans and even Swedes who in turns had governed over us, lacked. 
[…] Thus it happened, that when we achieved national independence and the 
Estonian man started to handle Estonian affairs, we got disappointed in him. We 
found that he lacked the dreamt hopes, as if he would not be a true Estonian man. 
[…] We found that the Estonian man in the Estonian state does not care enough 
for the other Estonian man, as if he would be some Russian or German. In any 
case, we certainly believe that the Swede took better care of us than our own 
Estonian man is doing (Tammsaare 1990, 53–55). 
The reason why the economic crisis led to such a wide-spread political crisis 
has been found in the weak civic and political culture which resulted from the 
short period of statehood. Taagepera argued that “democracy consists not only 
of a legal framework, but also of what Almond and Verba37 have called the 
civic culture, which cannot be instantly created”. Since Estonians hardly had 
any experience with self-government before 1918, it had had “little opportunity 
to develop a civic culture to match their legal ‘instant democracy’” (Taagepera 
1974, 407). Although Estonians had a strong national identity, due to the exis- 
ting state system, the Estonian society had until 1918 largely stood outside of 
participatory politics. Therefore, when Estonia became a Staatsnation through 
independence, Estonians had limited experience with what this entailed. The 
following sections will explore the main domestic discourses, their emergence, 
                                                     
36  Reference to a word game in Estonian: “oma tuba, oma luba”, which means that within 
one’s own space one is free in his actions, behaviour 
37  Almond and Verba 1963. 
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development and interactions focusing on the understandings on state and state 
and society relationship. 
3.2. Radical-nationalist discourse 
The radical-nationalist discourse became the dominant discourse during the 
devastating economic crisis in 1931–1934 and the political crisis or crisis of 
democracy that unfolded in 1932–1934. For this discourse, the foremost priority 
of the state was to ensure the unity of the society, as the interests of the state 
and society were seen as collective not individual. In this discourse, the focus 
on national unity was based on the Estonian historical tradition, but had been 
interrupted by the political fragmentation where political parties prioritised 
group interests over national interests. The solution for this situation was found 
in a strong executive president that would take care of the decision-making and 
provide political stability, which was necessary for ensuring the nation’s  
development.  
The main carrier of the radical-nationalist discourse was the Central League 
of the Veterans of the War of Independence (Eesti Vabadussõjalaste Keskliit). 
This movement, that had started as an apolitical advocacy organisation for vet-
erans’ rights, grew rapidly into a factual non-parliamentary political group, 
which was one of the biggest, if not the biggest, political organisation in Estonia 
(Marandi 1991, 476).38 The veterans’ solution for political instability was a 
strong executive branch of government, which was to be achieved through con-
stitutional change.39 Therefore, this period is often described as the “constitu-
tional crisis” in Estonian history, a crisis that started because of deficiencies of 
the constitution, the lack of an executive branch and too extensive powers of the 
parliament in particular40. As a result of the shortcomings of the constitutional 
                                                     
38  According to Marandi, the number of members of Veterans increased from around 500 in 
the summer of 1929 to 10,000 in late 1932 to 60,000 on 12 March 1934. Their support was 
high mainly in urban areas, whereas Estonia itself was predominantly a rural country, with 
69% living in rural areas in 1934 (Marandi 1991, 476–477). 
39  Until the Veterans emerged, constitutional change had been the monopoly of the Farmers 
Union in general and of Konstantin Päts in particular. In autumn 1926, the Farmers Union 
presented a draft bill, aimed at maintaining the core principles of parliamentarism, but which 
was also to give more power to the head of state. As the Socialists were against it and other 
parties were neutral, the issue was not taken further. However, the idea of constitutional 
changes had entered the sphere of interests of lawyers and politicians. In 1929, the Farmers 
Union and the National Centre Party presented similar projects, but the question faded once 
again (Pajur 2005b, 88). Although the idea had been present since the 1920s, it was the 
Veterans movement that took it to the masses and made it a national level issue. 
40  The 1920 Constitution was influenced by the Weimar, Swiss, French and U.S. consti-
tutions, and thereby, as Raun points out, “reflected the democratic idealism of the centre left 
majority in the Estonian Constituent Assembly” (Raun 1987, 112–113). It provided for a 
unicameral Parliament (Riigikogu) consisting of 100 members, elected in every three years. 
The parliament was based on proportional representation, with universal voting rights: all 
citizens from the age of 20 could vote. The 1920 Constitution did not provide for an 
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system, governmental crises occurred frequently. However, several authors, 
such as Pajur, Marandi and Parming, have argued that the fragmentation of the 
political scene and the subsequent popularity of the Veterans movement was 
related to the devastating economic crisis and the subsequent political crisis and 
not constitutional deficiencies41 (Marandi 1991; Pajur 2005c; Parming 1975).  
The Veterans saw themselves as “a moral elite”, the “creators of the state” 
(Kasekamp 2000, 64) and this view was embedded in the general Estonian do-
mestic discourse (Kasekamp 2000, 64). As the Veterans were the ones who had 
achieved Estonian independence, they also saw it as their responsibility to safe-
guard it (Kasekamp 2000, 65). As stated by General Põdder, the Veterans were 
not united in their status or former profession as war veterans, but the Veteran 
movement was about the “idea” that the War of Independence was allegedly 
based on (Põdder 1932, 2). This central idea of the radical-nationalist discourse 
was national unity, the so called integral nation. The Veterans’ congress stated 
that Veterans fight for “the development of the Estonian people into a free and 
strong integral nation, the interests of which stand above and are more powerful 
than individual or class interests” (“Kongressil vastuvõetud resolutsioonid” 
1932, 1). Hence, the aim of the Veterans was to create a state based on national 
unity, “a system which unites the Estonian nation into one organic whole where 
each class asserts itself only through the organic whole” (Vardja 1933, 2). For 
the Veterans, this kind of system, where the focus was on national unity, not on 
different social classes, was rooted in the Estonian historical tradition, but had 
been lost in the Estonian political system where political parties stood only for 
the interests of certain societal groups, not for the nation as a whole (Vardja 
1933, 2).  
As the Veterans were focused on creating a society based on national unity, 
they strongly criticized the political parties which they believed responsible for 
fragmentizing and dividing the nation. They contrasted themselves as a “dy-
                                                                                                                                  
independent executive branch of government, as the cabinet was formed in and fully 
responsible to the Parliament. The head of the Cabinet was the State Elder (Riigivanem) 
elected by the Parliament, and he was simultaneously the Prime Minister and the Head of 
State (Parming 1975, 8). The Constitution saw for popular initiative and a referendum 
through which at least 25,000 citizens could introduce and enact legislation (Raun 1987, 
113; Ruusmann 1998, 208) 
41  Parming states that although there were a large number of parties participating in the 
elections in the 1920s,41 there were only “three important political groups: the Socialists, the 
Centrists, and the Agrarians”, which altogether received 80–90 % of the seats. Even in the 
peak of the depression, the National Centre Party got 23 % of the seats and the United 
Farmers 42%. Therefore, Parming argues that the constitutional factor cannot be the main 
reason for the political crisis (Parming 1975, 17). Also, historians have shown that the 
frequent changes in the government were not anything extraordinary at the time. There were 
16 governments formed based on the 1920 Constitution with an average length of 10.5 
months. The average length in Finland was 10 months and 28 days and in Latvia 11 months 
and 12 days. Pajur further points out that instability of the governments mainly occurred 
during times of societal crisis, such as the communist coup of 1924 and the economic crisis 
of the early 1930s and that otherwise the average length was longer (Pajur 2005a, 72).  
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namic” movement within the current political system, which they saw as “a false 
democratic party system in its stagnant forms and alienated from the people” 
(Vardja 1933, 2). Therefore, the Veteran movement aimed at “replacing false 
democracy with a new democracy: the national state” (Vardja 1933, 2). The 
Veterans’ solution to the political instability and creation of national unity was 
to create a strong presidential institution, “to put a master in the house” (Kase-
kamp 2000, 66) and to curb the mandate of the parliament. The Veterans 
advocated corporatism, “co-operation between all classes and occupations, but 
gave little thought specifically to economic issues and had only the vaguest 
notions of what corporatism might actually entail.” The Veterans were vague on 
the content and organization of this corporate system in Estonia (Kasekamp 
2000, 80). 
When the Veterans worked at creating national unity that reached over the 
different social classes and groups of the society, their internal Others were the 
societal groups they saw as focusing only on certain groups in the society, and 
therefore responsible for fragmentizing and dividing the nation: the political 
parties. As the Veterans saw the class divisions as undermining national integ-
rity, they were vehemently anti-Marxist and fiercely criticized the Socialist 
party. Kasekamp argues that the Veterans’ influences and contacts with the Na-
zis in Germany and Fascists in Italy have been exaggerated in contemporary 
works and later studies (Kasekamp 2000, 69, Valge 2011 803). The Veterans 
shared the strong anti-German sentiments that were present in the Estonian so-
ciety. In addition to the former Baltic nobility, the most hated Baltic Germans 
for the Veterans were the so-called “Landeswehr men” who fought against the 
Estonian forces in the Landeswehr war in 1919 (Kasekamp 2000, 74). Also, the 
Veterans’ ideology was not racist. “There was also none of the racism charac-
teristic of the Nazis among the ex-servicemen. Estonians were indeed seen as 
special, but not as superior. The ideology of the ex-servicemen – and, what is 
more important, the practice – rejected the concept of a charismatic leader à la 
Hitler in a quite obvious manner” (Valge 2011, 803). The Veterans’ hostility 
towards the Russian minority was modest for a radical-nationalist organization, 
which might have been due to the low socio-economic status of the majority of 
the Russians, but which meant that they were not seen a threat in the way the 
Baltic Germans were perceived. However, the Soviet Union was seen as the 
main security threat and Nazi Germany was seen as the balancer of the Soviets 
(Kasekamp 2000, 76–77). Conclusively, the Veterans’ attitude towards external 
Others reflected the mainstream societal understandings of the external threats 
and influences: the mistrust and resentment towards the Baltic Germans, rela-
tive lack of hostility towards local Russians and suspicion towards Bolsheviks 
and thereby Soviet Russia.  
Since for the Veterans the solution to political instability was the creation of 
a strong executive power, the number one issue of their agenda during the peak 
of their popularity was changing the constitution. In 1932–1933 three referen-
dums were held on constitutional proposals: two bills proposed by Parliament 
were rejected by the public, whereas the third one, proposed by the Veterans, 
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through a popular initiative, won with a landslide in September 1933.42 The new 
Constitution provided for a powerful executive, elected directly by the people 
for a five-year term. The executive had the right to appoint and dismiss the  
government and had broad veto rights over the laws passed by the parliament 
(Raun 1987, 117–118). 
3.2.1. Strong societal support for the Veterans’ idea of a strong president 
The reason why the economic crisis led to such a wide-spread political crisis 
and why the Veterans’ call for a strong executive to restore the political order 
won such popularity among the public has been found in the weak civic and 
political culture which resulted from the short period of statehood. Although 
debates on the meaning of nation, its interests and its roles had started in the 
1860s, they had first taken place among small, educated circles. According to 
Jaan Tõnisson: “The period when our nation had to work persistently to achieve 
freedom was apparently too short for people to become internally ready to use 
and carry freedom” (cited in Laaman 1949, 287). Similarly, Arnold Susi has 
stated that the popularity of the Veterans’ constitutional bill showed the de-
valuation of democratic values, boredom with freedoms and rights, so that there 
was readiness to transfer all these rights “to one master in the house” (Susi 
1938, 214).  
The separation of the societal and decision-making spheres in pre-1918 Es-
tonia helps to explain why the public looked for a strong executive who would 
take the decision-making responsibility, instead of seeing themselves as poten-
tial solvers of the crisis in their country. Pajur observes that the head of state 
was seen as someone who possessed nearly “supernatural leverage”. A presi-
dent would bring back order, end the fights between political parties “and bring 
back the ‘good old time’ in an economic sense” (Pajur 2005c, 88). A high civil 
servant had remarked in 1933 that “if one listens to the people, then everyone 
seems to want one thing. Not some sort of constitution, parliament or something 
like this. Everyone just wants absolutism. Enlightened absolutism. The kind of 
absolutism that would know what to do and would be able to do it” (Laaman 
2010, 254). This once again refers to the notion that people’s understandings of 
the state originated from the historical experience of living in the Russian Em-
pire. This is not to say that most people would have wanted it back, but that 
absolutism was the state system they knew. Tammsaare explains this develop-
ment with the fact that Estonian political culture and tradition had emerged 
during times of absolutism, from which a direct leap to democracy was at-
                                                     
42  The first bill was rejected very narrowly in a referendum (49.2% of the voters were for 
the bill and 50.8% against). The second bill presented by the Parliament also failed to get the 
support of the electorate, but in this case 32.7% of the voters supported the bill and 67.3% 
were against. In addition to the repeated opposition of the Socialists and the Veterans against 
the bill, the result was also influenced by the deepening economic crisis and the sub-
sequently deepening dissatisfaction with the parties in parliament (Pajur 2005b).  
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tempted. He stated: “We think that democracy is to be blamed for everything. 
Democracy, of which we actually do not have much idea. And how would we 
get an idea of it? All our politicians are from the days where one autocrat sat in 
Piiter [St. Petersburg], one autocrat sat in Toompea, and one autocrat sat in his 
mansion […] This is our political tradition, our political culture. And then we 
tried to leap to democracy” (Tammsaare 1990, 28). Tammsaare also addresses 
the criticism that the Estonian constitution of the time was ultra-democratic and 
therefore inefficient, by saying that the problem lies in a lack of political culture 
and tradition: 
But now we suddenly say together with Italians and Germans that this is the fault 
of democracy. […] But how can it be the fault of democracy if it is truly missing 
for us? Or does someone think that a person becomes a democrat when he calls 
himself a farmer, settler, clergyman or socialist? Culture creates democracy, but 
we lack the culture. Culture requires tradition, but also that we lack, or it [the 
tradition] is against democracy (Tammsaare 1990, 28).  
Also Eduard Laaman argued in 1936 that the biggest shortcoming of “the first 
republic”, as he calls the pre-1934 period, was that it did not concentrate enough 
on political and civic education of the nation. In the society 
spread this carefree view, how we would not need any political education. One 
did not see culture in the democratic order, which needs practice, responsibility, 
efforts. It was taken as a natural condition, which simply exists. For Estonians, it 
was as natural to be a democrat, as it was natural for the bird to sing. Our 
politicians suffered most themselves from this carefree attitude. Because these 
non-politicized masses were not taught to see that our system lacks something. 
When the shortcomings of the system were encountered, then the rulers were 
blamed for it (Laaman 2010, 199–200).  
The strong executive for whom the new constitution provided emerged soon, 
although in a different form than the Veterans expected. The governments had 
changed frequently during the crisis and in the autumn of 1933 Konstantin Päts 
became the head of state. After the success of their constitutional bill and an 
overwhelming victory in the local elections in January 1934, the Veterans pre-
pared for Presidential elections, which were scheduled for the second half of 
April, with an increasingly aggressive tone towards the existing state system in 
their propaganda. On 12 March 1934, Päts, under the pretext of an “urgent state 
necessity” based on an alleged planned coup attempt by the Veterans, declared 
the state of emergency for six months and appointed General Laidoner as com-
mander-in-chief of the armed forces. All Veterans’ organisations were shut 
down and more than 800 people were arrested (Kasekamp 2000, 100) and all 
political activities were prohibited. These steps were approved by the Parlia-
ment, who considered it a temporary step to curb the Veterans who had openly 
positioned themselves against all political parties and parliament as such. In his 
speech in parliament on 15 March 1934, where he explained and justified his 
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actions, Päts emphasized the Veterans’ condemnation of the existing political 
system:  
First, they started to prove in front of the entire nation that the Government of 
the Republic of Estonia, the state institutions and the leading powers have not 
been able to do anything else for 15 years than to cause calamities to people. […] 
Second, everyone who did not go along with the new course was threatened with 
the harshest punishment and they said that if they would get state power, they 
would revenge. And that there was no doubt that the power would switch [to 
them]. If this would not happen through elections or according to law, then it 
would be taken over (Riigikogu V koosseis: täielikud protokollid 1934, 1435–
1438).  
Päts’s accusation that there was the threat of a coup by the Veterans has never 
been proven.43 He also stated that there would be an external threat to Estonia’s 
existence in case the Veterans would take power (see Valge 2011). Yet another 
reason for his actions was that the nation, in his words, was ill. He stated: “We 
also cannot think that when people that have been abetted, when from one side 
there is an anger and revenge and from the other side a fear-wave, that under 
these conditions somebody could fulfil his obligations as a citizen and make 
decisions. The people have to withdraw, instead of agitation, the explaining 
should be done, it must be explained that our state had a difficult illness” 
(Riigikogu V koosseis: täielikud protokollid 1934, 1435–1438).  
Päts’s approach at first was supported by many politicians, since the Vete- 
rans had fiercely attacked the existing parties and because the situation was seen 
as temporary. The Socialist party supported Päts since they had been the main 
recipient of the Veterans’ attacks and were afraid of the consequences of the 
Veterans taking power. Additionally, in August 1933, Tõnisson, who at that 
time held the head of state’s position, had enacted a nation-wide state of emer-
gency, prohibited the Veterans’ organisation and enacted a pre-censorship. 
These measures were lifted after the Veterans Constitutional bill passed. How-
ever, since the state of emergency had been declared recently before and the 
Veterans had strongly attacked the existing political system, parliamentarians 
supported these measures and Tõnisson at first publicly stated that this was the 
right course to take. After the Parliament had given its consent, Päts postponed 
                                                     
43  Firstly, as Marandi points out, the statutes of the organisation, the constitutional bill and 
the political resolutions of the congresses all remained within the existing democratic state 
order. Many public statements and articles of Veterans emphasised that the aim was to 
improve, not to overthrow the existing governing system. Another significant factor is that in 
1933, after the Veterans’ constitutional bill won a landslide victory in the referendum, and 
the masses of supporters demanded a revolutionary coup from Sirk, he refused to go for it 
(Marandi 1991, 494). Furthermore, the Veterans did not really need a coup as they were at 
the peak of their popularity. Therefore, their idea was to take power using the tools available 
in the existing democratic system, such as through the popular initiative and elections. 
Kasekamp has argued that “[t]hough the Veterans sought to amend the constitution to 
strengthen the power of the state by establishing a strong presidency, they did not aspire to 
erect a one-party authoritarian state, much less a totalitarian one” (Kasekamp 2000, 66).  
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the elections for the parliament and for the head of state until the termination of 
the state of emergency. Like other political parties, the Veterans themselves 
reacted to the situation passively. Kasekamp explains that this was because they 
thought that Päts would remain within the limitations of the rule of law. Also, 
they thought the situation would be similar to that of the summer of 1933 when 
Tõnisson’s government had banned the Veterans and enacted the state of emer-
gency (Kasekamp 2000, 100–101). As the Veteran leader Artur Sirk stated just 
before his arrest: “Let them imprison us, the people will vote us out of jail” 
(Marandi 1991, 414). In spring 1935, trials of the Veterans were held and their 
sentences were considered mild (Raun 1987). However, in December 1935, 
plans for an armed coup were discovered by the political police. This time the 
leaders of the Veterans received long prison sentences, although they were 
gradually freed in 1937 and 1938. This was the end of the Veterans as their 
public support faded fast, which showed that their support had been based on 
people’s yearning for political and economic stability and strong leadership. 
The Veterans’ ideas of strong leadership, unity, patriotism and national integrity 
continued to dominate the society as they merged into the Collectivist-national-
ist discourse, the official state discourse of post-1934 Estonia developed by 
Konstantin Päts. Parming argued: “By the end of 1935 Päts had adopted almost 
every one of the Veterans’ probable ruling methods” (Parming 1975, 57).44 
3.3. Collectivist-nationalist discourse 
The Collectivist-nationalist discourse was the official state discourse in post-
1934 Estonia. In terms of the role of the state and the state and society relation-
ship, the state was seen as the decision-maker, the societal and political initia-
tives and ideas had to be coordinated from the top down as only this ensured a 
coherent national development, which was based on unity and on collective 
values and interests. National collective interests were seen as supreme over 
individual or group interests.  
3.3.1. The development of the discourse into state discourse 
The discourse became a dominant one with the regime change of 12 March 
1934, when the head of the interim government Konstantin Päts declared the 
state of emergency for six months, banned the Veterans’ organisations and ap-
pointed General Laidoner as commander-in-chief of the armed forces. He also 
postponed the elections for the parliament and presidency until the termination 
of the state of emergency. These steps were approved by the Parliament as tem-
porary measures to stabilize the volatile political situation. As Veterans had 
                                                     
44  Kasekamp also points out that radical right-wing movements were more successful in 
states with a strong perception of Communist threat, which did not exist in Estonia 
(Kasekamp 2000, 156).  
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attacked all existing political parties, socialists in particular, and had been en-
joying wide public support, the parties were in favour of curbing the power of 
Veterans. Therefore, Päts’s actions in March 1934 were received in parliament 
with an applause, rather than a protest or further inquiries. Also, all of the party 
newspapers agreed to the government’s steps (Valge 2008, 8). The first signs 
that the situation might not be temporary came in August 1934, when Karl Ein-
bund (later Kaarel Eenpalu) became Minister of Interior Affairs and Vice-Prime 
Minister (later Prime Minister). Eenpalu became the third leading figure next to 
Päts and Laidoner during the post-1934 period, which he christened the Silent 
Era (Ruusmann 1998, 281). The name was meant to contrast with the pre-1934 
time, which the regime dubbed noisy and unstable. In early September, Päts 
extended the state of emergency for another year and the elections were again 
postponed. This time, he did not ask for the parliament’s consent, which was an 
unconstitutional action (Marandi 1997, 18). In response, the parliamentarians 
demanded a special session, which convened on 28 September 1934.  
On that day Eenpalu had a speech before the parliament where he stated that 
the state of emergency must be maintained as certain political groups have not 
given up their “malicious attack” (cited in Valge 2008, 9). He also stated that in 
order to guarantee the necessary healing and unity, “this irresponsible political 
fight has to step aside to give place to cultural, positive and united political ac-
tivities” (Eenpalu 1995, 86). During the negotiations on 2 October, some parlia-
mentarians such as the socialists, a Russian minority party and the Farmers 
Unions expressed support for the government’s actions. A representative from 
the United Farmers argued that the government has ignored the parliament un-
constitutionally and called for the elections. According to Valge, only one par-
liamentarian, the Marxist Aleksander Jõeäär gave an assessment on the regime 
change of 12 March, stating that as this was supposedly an anti-fascist action, 
then “[i]f there would have been a will to truly protect democracy and fight 
fascism there would have been no need to curb the anti-fascist parties and to 
limit the basic rights of the citizens in general” (cited in Valge 2008, 9–10). 
Independent parliamentarian Mihkel Juhkam criticised the limitations of the 
parliament’s power and its implications for the political system: 
The current trend of the government’s politics seems to promise anything but 
democracy. This argument, that in case the government is not getting along with 
parliament the government can follow the principle salus populi suprema lex, in 
other words, everything is justified in the name of people’s well-being, is not 
very convincing. Who has not explained it like this? Marius and a bit later 
dictator Sulla, Louis XVI and later the États Généraux, Robespierre and later 
Napoleon, Wilhelm II and later Hitler. Everything happened in the name of 
people’s security and well-being. […] Before, there was indeed too much 
politics, but now too little. […] Even the government does not seem to do poli-
tics. Politics is conducted by a very narrow, invisible circle, which is so busy 
with it, that it cannot see the forest for the trees. Therefore, life is rather com-
fortable to the previous political organisations: nobody has to do anything and 
nobody is responsible (Juhkam 1995, 88–94).  
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Juhkam also pointed out that this state system isolates and alienates the state 
from the society: “if this way of doing politics, that began on 15 September, 
will continue, then I am afraid that it will lead the government to isolation and 
into a dead end with no exit” (Juhkam 1995, 88–94). Juhkam’s speech was the 
last speech held in the fifth parliament. After this speech Eenpalu handed par-
liament a decree from Päts that ended the session of this parliament. The par-
liamentarians followed the order and left the room and the fifth parliament 
never convened again (Pajur 2005a, 93–94). Ilmar Raamot, who was present, 
stated that “[n]othing happened. No one protested or promised spontaneously to 
continue the fight for the rule of law and people’s freedom. The people’s repre-
sentatives went quietly home” (Raamot 1991, 60). However, the board of the 
parliament continued receiving salary and allowances (Valge 2008, 9). The 
question is why the parliamentarians left. They had the people’s mandate and 
therefore not only had the right but also the responsibility to represent the  
people. In this session of the parliament the non-government forces had a 
majority, as their candidate won the elections for the speaker’s position over the 
government nominated candidate. Furthermore, Päts was not a president elected 
by the people according to the new constitution, but the head of government, a 
post many of them had held before, as the governments had been changing 
often. Therefore, one could argue that there was no constitutional basis for his 
decree to end the parliament’s session. No in-depth study has been conducted 
on the subject, but several assumptions have been formulated. For example, the 
parliamentarians may have left because the situation was still considered tempo-
rary, because of the deep division between the Veterans and the rest of the po-
litical scene (Valge 2008, Pajur 2005a), or because the parliamentarians were 
still afraid of the Veterans because of their high popularity among the society 
and therefore still perceived the government’s measures to be primarily directed 
against the Veterans. Parliamentarian Juhkam in his speech blamed the politi-
cians for being content with not doing actual politics, but leaving it to a narrow 
circle. What is striking here is that postponing the elections was unconstitu-
tional, as was prolonging the state of emergency without the parliament’s con-
sent. However, no politician protested against this violation of the constitution 
(Valge 2008, 4). This suggests that the focus was more on realpolitik than on 
legal or institutional aspects, which may have resulted from the limited experi-
ence in independent statehood and a lack of political culture and traditions. 
On 12 October 1934, Eenpalu announced to journalists that the Parliament 
would be put on “silent mode” (Ruusmann 1998, 282). Political parties were 
abolished in March 1935 and from 1934 to 1937 the President ruled by decree. 
The new regime consolidated itself in 1934–1935. In December-January 1934–
1935 regulations introducing censorship and curbing the freedom of expression 
were introduced. It was prohibited to print publications that were disrespectful 
or critical towards the regime, leaders or state institutions. In 1934 the State 
Propaganda Office was founded, which was a body supervising media censor-
ship (Pajur 2005a, 95). In 1935 some of the newspapers were closed. The most 
notable action was sequestering Postimees and removing Jaan Tõnisson, its 
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editor since 1896, one of Päts’s long-term opponents and most vocal critics of 
the new order, from his position. This severely constrained Tõnisson’s possi-
bilities to express his political opinions and views and to reach a nation-wide 
public (Aru 1996).  
In 1936, a referendum was organized on the question whether the Consti- 
tuent Assembly should be convened in order to amend the constitution or draft a 
new constitution. Since no campaigning against the government’s proposal was 
permitted and because it was believed to be the first step in returning to a demo-
cratic system, the government won the referendum with a landslide (Kasekamp 
2000, 126). The National Assembly convened in February 1937 and worked on 
the new Constitution based on the draft prepared by Päts. A strongly debated 
issue was the undemocratically selected upper chamber to the Parliament, which 
found only modest support even among Päts’s closest supporters (Kasekamp 
2000, 126). Nevertheless, the 1937 Constitution did not contain significant 
changes from the draft Päts had prepared.45 It provided, similar to the 1933 
Constitution, for a powerful head of state that was to be elected for a six-year 
term. In 1938 Konstantin Päts was elected president of Estonia by the two 
houses of parliament and an assembly of local government representatives.46 
The new constitution provided that in case all these three bodies nominated one 
candidate, public elections were not required, but the President could be then 
elected at a special joint meeting of all three bodies. 
The 1937 Constitution restored the rule of law in the country. However, po-
litical parties remained abolished. Mati Graf has argued that until the last days 
of independence, the government had no political will or plan to restore the 
multi-party system (Graf 2000, 421). Any kind of spontaneous political organi-
sation remained prohibited. The government claimed that in the future there 
would be a new type of political party, which would not aim at gaining power, 
but left unclear what these parties then would do (Pajur 2005a, 101). The state 
of emergency was continuously extended until the summer of 1940, when Esto-
nian independence perished (Marandi 1997, 18). Since the appointment of a 
commander-in-chief during peacetime and the suspension of the elections were 
                                                     
45  The 1937 Constitution, similar to the 1933 Constitution, provided for a powerful head of 
state, now called the president, who was to be elected for a six-year term. “The chief 
executive would appoint and dismiss the cabinet, have a suspensive veto over legislation, 
and be able to dissolve both houses of parliament”. However, “the president could only issue 
decrees when the legislature was not in session” (Raun 1987, 121). For Karjahärm the 
elements in the constitution, such as constraining the fundamental rights of the citizens for 
the interests of the state, extensive presidential powers and the system for presidential and 
parliamentary elections are all signs of a conservative political system (Karjahärm 2001, 
298). Typologically the new constitution was semi-presidential where the executive was 
dominating over legislative (Pajur 2005a, 99). The adoption of the new constitution led to 
the restoration of the rule of law in Estonia. 
46  “Candidates for this office were to be nominated by the two houses of parliament and an 
assembly of local government representatives. However, the people were allowed to elect the 
president only in case if all three institutions did not nominate the same candidate” (Raun 
1987, 121). 
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both unconstitutional actions, “Päts’s and Laidoner’s actions in March 1934 
cannot be termed anything but a coup d’état” (Kasekamp 2000, 104; see also 
Valge 2011, 793; Marandi 1991).47 As Valge claims, “although the 1934 coup is 
one of the most important events in the history of Estonian domestic politics, 
there has not yet been a study that has concentrated on the reasons, events, re-
sults and meaning of the loss of democracy” (Valge 2011, 793). The following 
section will explore the ideas and understandings that the discourse carried and 
promoted. It will also discuss the reasons why the majority of the society 
seemingly supported the regime and the understandings promoted by it and why 
there was no significant nation-wide opposition to the regime.  
3.3.2. Characteristics of the discourse  
This section will discuss the ideas carried by the collectivist-national discourse 
and its understanding on the state and society relationship. It will be shown that 
the central characteristics of the discourse were collectivism, as opposed to 
individualism, national unity, solidarity, singleness of purpose, corporatism and 
statism. Next, the practices carried out within this discourse will be discussed. 
During the first years of the regime, its ideology was based on the idea of a 
nation in crisis. One of Päts’s main justifications for enacting the state of 
emergency in March 1934 was that the nation was ill and must be healed 
(Riigikogu V koosseisu protokollid, IV istungjärk, 15. märtsil 1934, 1438). On 
28 September 1934, prime minister Eenpalu in his speech before the parliament 
stressed the notions of unity, solidarity and integral nation that were about to 
become the central features of the government’s ideology: “from the nation’s 
life these actors that prevent the cooperation must be removed, while taking 
under consideration, that the nation is a family from one flesh and blood, which 
is carried and given impetus by the power that directs the actions, common aspi-
rations, and a common will that is stronger than the separate aspirations of dif-
ferent movements” (Eenpalu 1995, 79). In 1938, after the adoption of the new 
constitution, “a more definitive ‘ideology of the 12th of March’ began to 
emerge” (Raun 1987, 122).  
In terms of the state and society relationship, the discourse emphasized the 
supremacy of collective interests and values over individual or group interests 
as a necessary precondition for national development. For Karjahärm and Sirk, 
the most important doctrine of the new order was solidarity, which “postulates 
that societal prosperity is a norm both for the state and the individual. The state 
can require certain sacrifices for the public good from the individual” (Karja-
                                                     
47  Valge argues that “appointing a commander-in-chief during peace-time – that is, 
appointing Laidoner as commander-in-charge – was not possible, according to Article 80 of 
the Constitution, and the decree issued by Päts on 19 March to postpone the elections was 
also illegitimate, since Article 60 of the Constitution specifically did not permit an 
amendment of the electoral law by decree. Elections based on the 1933 Constitution were 
never again carried out in Estonia” (Valge 2011, 793).  
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härm and Sirk 2001, 286). As stated by Prime Minister Eenpalu in October 
1938: “the people have supremacy over the individual; the task of the individual 
is to serve the people and in the interests of the people’s solidarity and unity the 
actions of the individual should be constrained and restrained” (paraphrased in 
Karjahärm and Sirk 2001, 287). This principle was also stated in paragraph 8 of 
the 1938 Constitution: “the supreme obligation of each citizen is to be loyal to 
the Estonian state and its constitutional order” (cited in Kalmo 2010, 122). 
Prime Minister Eenpalu called the new order “guided democracy” (Raun 1987, 
122). The new regime argued that in contrast with the chaotic old system, in the 
new system the political organization of the people must happen only through 
organized ways, on instigation by the state. Political organization was permitted 
through state initiated and coordinated new institutions: The Fatherland League 
(Isamaaliit) and corporative organisations. 
A key element of Collectivist-nationalist discourse was corporatism. As po-
litical parties were banned, the government promoted political organisation 
through professional associations as an alternative that was more effective in 
achieving national unity than political parties were. This was also based on the 
idea of prioritizing so called unified collective interests over the individual or 
group interests. Päts stated: “Organising according to professional lines must 
ensure that the person does not have to kneel before the parties, but he has to 
feel that those, to whom he turns, are his closest colleagues and that they can 
assert themselves with unified power and they must do so. […] Therewith  
everyone must feel that they are one big family and that they can live only when 
they have the common roof of the Estonian Republic” (Päts 1935, 6). Corpora-
tism was associated with the notion of collectivism: as stated by Eenpalu, the 
purpose of organising through professional chambers was “to engage all of our 
occupational groups, without class conflict, in our joint effort to develop our 
state toward our common national and state goals” (Toomus 1937, 199).  
There was no nation-wide discontent to the post-1934 regime and the  
government enjoyed broad public support (Parming 1975, Kasekamp 2000, 
124). The major political parties first supported the regime change, as they had 
felt threatened by the Veterans. An explanation is that the regime relied on 
existing societal understandings. First, there was an understanding in society 
that favoured a strong executive state and strong nationhood (Karjahärm and 
Sirk 2001, 285) and believed that these would provide political stability. 
Parming argues that “[i]n a sense, it was irrelevant who provided political 
stability. It could have been democratic parties, but it was Päts who provided it 
instead” (Parming 1975, 62). The other important factor was that prior to 
regime change there had been general public discontent and a lack of trust in 
political parties. As people were tired of aggressive political agitation and 
endless political battles and they appreciated the structured and consistent 
actions of the government (Ruusmann 1998, 284; Roolaht 1990, 242). This 
explains people’s apparent satisfaction with the strong executive and the 
absence of protests against abolishing the political parties. An additional aspect 
was that the economic crisis, which had led to resentment of the political 
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system, was largely over by 1934. Although this was due to the end of the 
global economic crisis, the stability contributed to the understanding that a 
strong executive power worked better than a politically fragmented parliament. 
Furthermore, the government both in its rhetoric and its actions focused on the 
other central idea that the society had liked, as the Veterans’ popularity had 
shown: promoting patriotism and nationalism in every sphere of society. The 
State Propaganda Office, which was set up to direct the public opinion, or-
ganized several nation-wide campaigns, which became popular among society, 
such as Estonianizing family names, beautification of Estonian homes, popu-
larizing the national flag and language and folk customs (Rajasalu 1993, 99).  
Another reason for a lack of nation-wide resentment was that considering 
some other countries at the time, the regime was still comparatively moderate 
and mild. Although political parties had been banned since 1935, the opposition 
did exist and was able to contest the elections; all main political groups were 
represented in the bicameral parliament that convened in 1938. Although the 
opposition was not eliminated, it was made irrelevant by curbing its means of 
reaching the general public and efficiently participating in the decision-making 
process. For example during the elections for the lower chamber (Chamber of 
Deputies, Riigivolikogu) of the bicameral parliament in 1938 all political acti-
vities or campaigning were prohibited, except by the government’s own Na-
tional Front for the Implementation of the Constitution (Põhiseaduse elluviimise 
rahvarinne) and criticism of the government or the National Front was pro- 
hibited (Pajur 2005a, 99).48 Because of the single member constituencies and 
the fragmentation of the opposition, the National Front received 47% of the 
votes, but 57% of the mandates (46 seats). The opposition won 26 seats, in-
cluding all four mandates in Tartu and 5 out of 12 in Tallinn (Pajur 2005a, 99). 
When Parliament convened, ten people who had campaigned as independents 
joined the government’s side. Therefore, although opposition candidates had a 
clear victory in Tartu, the results did not significantly increase the possibilities 
to participate in the decision making process for non-governmental parlia-
mentarians, such as opposition leader Jaan Tõnisson’s. The opposition lacked 
the means to initiate draft bills, which required at least 16 votes, or to make 
inquiries about government activities, for which 20 votes were needed. It did 
not help matters that the opposition was not united, consisting of the ‘Demo-
cratic bloc’ (6), socialists (6) and two independent workers representatives.49 
The only tool left to the opposition was to criticize the government from the 
parliament’s lectern. However, as the media were not allowed to cover critical 
statements, their criticism remained concealed from the general public.  
                                                     
48  Pajur points out that although the National Front officially was apolitical and aimed at 
uniting all citizens who wanted to work for the implementation of the new constitution, its 
board members were mainly people from the Fatherland League, ex-Farmers Unions and the 
employees of the State Propaganda Office (Pajur 2005a, 99). 
49  In the lower chamber of the 1938 bicameral Parliament, the liberals formed the “Demo-
cratic” faction, which consisted of the representatives of the former Centre Party, the Settlers 
and two representatives associated with the Veterans (Kasekamp 2000, 130).  
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3.4. Liberal individualism 
In contrast to the Collectivist-nationalist discourse and its focus on collective 
values and unity, the Liberal-individualist discourse focused on the individual’s 
rights and responsibilities. Although there was a clear ideational dichotomy 
between the collective-nationalist and liberal-individualist discourses, there was 
no broad nation-wide public debate between these two approaches, since the 
possibilities of the liberal-individualist opposition to freely express their opin-
ions within the public sphere were effectively curbed by the state after 1935. 
With regard to the state and society relationship, the liberal-individualist dis-
course saw the development of the individual into an active citizen as a precon-
dition for the development of the state and the nation. The maxim by Hans 
Kruus, “Individual, get up!” became one of the main slogans for this discourse 
in the late 1930s as it summed up the anti-statist and -authoritarian position 
(Karjahärm and Sirk 2001, 314). The discourse argued that for the state’s and 
the individual’s development, a democratic state order that follows the rule of 
law and allows for the freedom of speech and of assembly is crucial.  
The stronghold of this discourse was the university town Tartu, its circles of 
intelligentsia and academics in particular. However, the nation-wide reach of 
this discourse was severely constrained after 1935 as political parties were 
abolished, censorship regulations in place and several opposition newspapers, 
such as Postimees, either closed or curbed. Therefore, the ideas promoted by 
this discourse were mainly limited to the circles of Tartu’s intelligentsia and 
academics. Elo Tuglas describes the existence of debates in Tartu and their  
limited reach, hence the incapacity of the ideas circulated to reach the national 
level:  
Yesterday [6 February 1938] Jaan Tõnisson held a meeting in “Vanemuine” with 
around 1,500 people. The hall was packed with people, also the adjoining rooms. 
A meeting like this had not been organized since 1917. And it was one of the 
best speeches of Tõnisson. Overall, a great and heartfelt sympathy. But what 
does the curbed Postimees write? It writes about the day of scouts, women’s day 
and then somewhere on the edge of the paper somehow that Tõnisson had been 
speaking to “his own folks and supporters”. As if he would have been sitting at 
home, in front of the fireplace and would have had a conversation with his close 
acquaintances (Tuglas 2008, 423). 
This shows that although alternative ideas existed and were expressed, the 
manoeuvring space for a liberal opposition on the national level was limited in 
post-1934 Estonia. After the regime change, Tõnisson, similar to many other 
politicians and many other public figures, took first a ‘wait and see’ position. 
However, after the parliament was put on “silent mode” in autumn 1934 and it 
became obvious that Päts’s ruling by decree was not the short-term develop-
ment that had been expected at first, Tõnisson started criticizing the govern-
ment’s actions in Postimees. In 1935, Tõnisson’s editorials focused on the  
sovereignty of the individual, the importance of the development of an 
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individual into a conscious citizen and the democracy and rule of law as 
preconditions for this development (Aru 1996, 19–20). In the summer of 1935, 
the state sequestered Postimees and removed Tõnisson, its editor since 1896, 
from his position. The official reason for the decision was the problematic 
financial situation of Postimees, but the real reason was to curb the voice of the 
opposition. This severely constrained Tõnisson’s possibilities to express his 
political opinions and views or to reach a nation-wide public (Aru 1996). 
Although he continued using all legal possibilities to criticise the existing 
system, his public reach was largely limited to the circles of the Tartu 
intelligentsia. Tõnisson held many speeches in the lower chamber of Parliament 
in 1938–1939, but as the media was not allowed to publish them, they never 
reached the general public (Aru 1996, 18).  
That the carriers of the discourse also enjoyed wider public support in Tartu 
was shown during the 1938 elections for the lower chamber of the bicameral 
parliament where the opposition candidates won all four mandates in Tartu. 
Nevertheless, this did not increase their options to participate in effective  
decision-making, as the opposition lacked the necessary number of members to 
initiate legislation. In the bicameral Parliament, the liberal individualist ideas 
were promoted by the ‘Democratic Faction’ whose chief spokesman was Jaan 
Tõnisson, who was also considered the opposition leader. As the opposition had 
limited means to organise through institutions or to openly express its views in 
the media, alternative ideas spread orally and hidden between the lines in 
theatre and on radios. Since media were censored, the most important places for 
exchanging fresh information, expressing opinions and sharing stories for the 
wealthier part of urban society were the cafés. As this was the place where op-
positional ideas spread, the opposition was also called “café opposition” 
(Ruusmann 1998, 309), or “café liberals” (Roolaht 1990, 129). However, these 
information channels had not much influence on the majority of the people, who 
lived in the rural areas. 
As the main stronghold of the liberal-individualist discourse was Tartu, the 
political and social thought popular in Tartu was also called “Tartu’s spirit”, 
which as phrased by Tõnisson was embedded in “Freedom, rule of law, demo- 
cracy, culture” (Tõnisson 1995, 160). Tõnisson’s political thought is described 
by Hans Kruus as “ethical individualism” (Kruus 2005, 229). In terms of the 
state and society relationship, the discourse, as expressed by Tõnisson, argued 
that there was an integral link between the individual and society as “[t]he indi-
vidual is the starting point of the nation’s development. It is through individuals 
that the general success of society will materialize” (Kruus 2005, 230). As the 
state discourse prioritised collectivism over individualism, Tõnisson defended 
the role and importance of the individual. In 1938, he stated in the Parliament: 
“We nowadays hear that the individual as such has no value […] but only  
people have value. This is the same as to say that the forest is the pride and 
beauty of the nature; so, why does one need trees!” (quoted in Kruus 2005, 
230).  
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Liberal individualism stressed the importance of the rule of law to the stable 
development of the state. Therefore, Tõnisson disagreed with Päts’s idea on the 
new Constituent Assembly whose task would be to improve the constitution. 
For him, changing the constitution could only be conducted in accordance with 
the existing constitution. He wrote: “Our constitution provides for a public ref-
erendum as the method for amending the constitution […] The other irrefutable 
essential requirement for changing our constitution is that it must be based on 
the principles of democratic statehood” (Tõnisson 1935c, 2). In the memoran-
dum of 1936, the four former head of states argued: “The important precondi-
tion for maintaining Estonian independence and for the development of its so-
cietal order is the rule of law. A small nation cannot rely as much on its military 
power as on its sense of justice and moral self-consciousness” (Tõnisson et al. 
1995, 134). The letter argued that the new order had undermined the importance 
of the rule of law. 
One of the key demands of the opposition was reinstatement of the political 
parties, which were banned in 1935. As Tõnisson argued, “Political parties are 
the necessary organs of the democratic state, through which an organised people 
can express and implement their will on state affairs” (Tõnisson 1935b, 2). Os-
kar Mänd wrote in 1938 that the “question of political organisation is unsolved 
until the current day. The previous organisations are dissolved, but nothing has 
been created to replace them. Therefore the development of the political ideolo-
gies and the nation’s political education has been stagnant already for several 
years” (Mänd 1997, 1398). For the liberal individualist discourse the Fatherland 
League did not fill the void left by the political parties. As argued by the former 
heads of state in their 1936 Memorandum:50 “As it [The Fatherland League] 
does not have ideals or aims, it cannot be expected to unite the citizens around 
itself in a united and cohesive cooperation for the sake of their country. It is 
one-sided propaganda that invites citizens to give up their principles and self-
assertion, without giving them any positive aims, and brings only harm instead 
of gain. This does not improve the creative abilities of people, but slumbers 
them” (Tõnisson et al. 1995, 136). To remedy the situation, the former state 
elders asked for loosening the emergency regulations, the restoration of the rule 
                                                     
50  One of the most important actions of the liberal opposition of the period was the 
memorandum by the four former heads of government, Jaan Tõnisson, Jaan Teemant, Johan 
Kukk and Ants Piip, in 1936. Because of the censorship, the memorandum was not printed in 
Estonia, but was published in the Finnish Helsingin Sanomat in November 1936. It is not 
clear how well-known it was within Estonian society, but it clearly defined the main 
priorities of the liberal opposition. The pretext of this letter were the planned elections to the 
Constituent Assembly. Prior to that Päts had declared the nation to be healthy enough to 
return to a constitutional order. Hence, the opposition had hoped that prior to the elections 
for the Constituent Assembly activities of political parties would be permitted again. 
However, the government stated that before adopting the new constitution political fights 
could not be allowed. As a response, four former heads of state wrote Päts a memorandum 
stating that as the nation according to Päts was healthy again, the state of emergency and rule 
by decree should be ended and the constraints on the civil and political rights should be 
lifted (See Tõnisson et al. 1995).  
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of law, including freedoms of speech, association and meetings and to allow for 
free elections, for example by allowing other groups and individuals to present 
candidates in addition to the committees created by the government (Tõnisson 
et al. 1995, 137).51 
For the liberal individualism discourse, active citizens were the necessary 
precondition in order to protect the state against an external threat. Tõnisson 
wrote that “[t]he best defence against an external threat is internal strength and 
readiness of our people. […] In order to get over dangerous foreign policy per-
spectives, our state has to be based on such national enthusiasm which would 
make every citizen of an independent Estonia a voluntary fighter for the na-
tional determination and independence against external threats” (Tõnisson, 
1935a, 2). The liberal individualist understanding that collectivism and statism 
lead to the alienation between the society and the state was expressed by Hans 
Kruus in 1937. Kruus emphasizes that in a situation where the state sees itself as 
the caretaker lies a danger that the state “cannot escape the obsession that the 
one it is taking care for, which are the society and the individual, is and will be 
underage, which has to be guarded and ‘directed’ everywhere. The state power 
will alienate from people, becomes autocratic, starts living its own life and loses 
the viable link with the society, which is the only source of the vitality for the 
state” (Kruus 2005, 402–403). Kruus’s solutions for preventing the dangers of 
statism were the rule of law and the development of the individual. He wrote: 
“Individual, get up! One should not say from the standpoint […] of ‘collectiv-
ism’ that this would mean the fragmentation of our societal and state thinking. 
No, in the right implementation this would mean ensuring the foundations of the 
state and society and their total strength” (Kruus 2005, 405). In conclusion, the 
liberal individualist discourse argued that the individual alertness and emphasis 
on individual principles is necessary for the development of the state, national 
cohesion and for balancing the external threat.  
3.5. Conclusion 
The chapter discussed the main societal understandings in interwar independent 
Estonia, which were the Radical-nationalist, Collective-nationalist and Liberal-
individualist. The chapter explored how the collective-nationalist discourse 
came to be the state discourse and how the state and society relationship was 
constructed within this understanding. It was discussed that during the emer-
gence and development of Estonian national identities, the state, represented by 
the Baltic Germans and/or Imperial Russia was seen as separate, or the Other, in 
                                                     
51  Because of the censorship the memorandum was not published in Estonia, but still 
spread rather extensively in Estonia, because of being printed by Helsingin Sanomat in 
Finland. As a protest the opposition boycotted the elections to the Constituent Assembly, 
which resulted in a largely pro-government Constituent Assembly. The discussions for the 
new Constitution were based on Päts’s proposal and the constitution was approved in July 
1937 (Pajur 2005a, 97–98). 
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respect to Estonian society. When Estonia became independent, the society and 
politicians had limited experience in the sphere of political decision-making and 
there was a lack of political culture and traditions. Furthermore, as the state had 
been seen as the Other, the society was first not consolidated on the meaning of 
an Estonian state. Although the situation did improve after the attempted Soviet 
coup, the weak link between the state and society became visible during the 
economic crisis in 1931–1934. The economic instability led to a political crisis 
where the dominant discourse during the crisis, Radical-nationalism, saw the 
solution in strong executive leadership and in an integral nation and unity. As a 
strong statehood was the governance experience the society knew and because 
the fights between political parties and frequently changing governments 
seemed to show that parliamentary democracy was not able to provide stability, 
this position had strong public support. After the regime change in 1934 the 
Collective-nationalism discourse became the official state discourse. It built on 
the ideas of Radical-nationalism and saw the state and society relationship in 
terms of a strong executive state and the supremacy of national collectivist 
interests over individual interests as necessary preconditions for national 
development. Therefore, the state system saw for the centralised top-down 
political and societal organisation. Hence, the decision-making sphere and 
societal sphere were seen as separate as this would ensure better political 
stability and incentives for nation’s development.  
There also existed another societal position, labelled here the Liberal-indi-
vidualism that emphasized the role of the individual and the political education 
of the individual as a prerequisite for the development of the society and 
strengthening of national unity. In this understanding, societal initiatives and 
activism through political parties was a necessary precondition for the develop-
ment of political thought and through that for the general development of the 
state. Nevertheless, the reach of the Liberal-individualist discourse was limited 
due to censorship regulations and the abolishment of political parties, and its 
ideas did not reach the overall public. As a result, the dominant state under-
standing of the state and society relationship was that of the Collectivist- 
nationalist discourse under which the state as a decision-maker and the society 
as the carrier of national values were separated.  
The next chapter will focus on how this state discourse came to be for the 
decision-maker, how these understandings that the discourse embedded deve- 
loped into institutional practices and how these practices enabled the decision-
maker to focus on the logic of international system in autumn 1939.  
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CHAPTER 4. 
THE DECISION-MAKING PROCESS  
IN ESTONIA IN AUTUMN 1939 
The aim of this chapter is to explore how Estonia’s foreign policy decision to 
accept the Soviet demands became possible and commonsensical for the decision-
maker in autumn 1939. The first part of the current case study (Chapter 2) 
showed that in autumn 1939 there was a uniformity of opinion among the 
country’s top leadership on the focus of external constraints and the logic of the 
international system. The second part of the case study (Chapter 3) showed that 
there were variations within the societal understandings, but these were not able 
to play as the alternative discourses were not part of the public sphere on the 
national level and were also excluded from the sphere of decision-making. The 
current chapter, the third part of the case study, will explore the understandings 
of the decision-maker on creating the social conditions that excluded alternative 
discourses from the effective decision-making and the public sphere.  
The theoretical chapter argued that decision-makers are never presented with 
a single automatic option. Even if there is a uniformity of opinion or no visible 
debate between the discourses, this is not because of a natural condition of the 
society in question, but because of certain social conditions that made it possib-
le. It was suggested that in order to understand these social conditions, the 
relationship between the society, where these discourses are embedded, and the 
state/decision-makers, who need to negotiate between these discourses, must be 
explored. The decision-makers do not have a fixed set of domestic discourses at 
their disposal; there are always tensions between the domestic discourses and, 
besides, these discourses are not static: they change with external and internal 
events. Hence, there is always a need for a political decision. The chapter will 
suggest that the decision-maker’s own social construction regarding the domes-
tic discourses determines how he understands the state and society relationship 
and consequently the domestic and external pressures. This is why to explain 
how the decision became commonsensical for the decision-maker, his or her 
own social construction must be explored. The aim of the chapter is to discuss 
how the decision-maker in autumn 1939 came to understand the situation in 
such a way that the systemic constraints dominated. The focus of the chapter is 
not on the personality of the decision-maker, but on his social construction, 
hence on his ideas and understandings on the state and society relationship and 
how the social conditions under which he operated came to be, as these influen-
ce his understanding of the current situation and therefore make a certain 
decision possible. The first part of the chapter will focus on the social construc-
tion of the decision-maker, his ideas and understandings on the role of state, 
state design, decision-making and the state and society relationship. Next, how 
these ideas were developed into institutional arrangements, hence practices, will 
be explored. The third part of the chapter will discuss how these practices, the 
way the political reality was constructed, made the decision to accept the Soviet 
demands commonsensical for the decision-makers in autumn 1939.  
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4.1. Social construction of the decision-maker 
This section explores the social construction of Estonia’s primary decision-
maker in 1939, the Estonian President Konstantin Päts. First, the choice for the 
primary decision-maker will be explained. The section will then show how the 
decision-maker was positioned within the dominant domestic discourses, how 
he came to understand the state and society relationship the way he did and how 
this understanding influenced shaping the social conditions that were present in 
1939. Next, the section will explore how these conditions made the state’s focus 
solely on external constraints possible in 1939.  
4.1.1. President Päts as the primary decision-maker 
Konstantin Päts was an Estonian statesman of four decades. In 1917, Päts 
became one of the three members of the Estonian Päästekomitee (Defence 
Committee) that announced the Estonian independence on 24 February 1918 
and nominated a temporary government, where Päts held the position of prime 
minister. After the independence war from 1918–1920, Päts became an active 
politician within the Farmers Union. He was the head of government for five 
times and a minister in several cabinets. On 12 March 1934, after a public ini-
tiative led by the extreme right Veterans’ movement had changed the constitu-
tion, Päts as Prime Minister conducted together with General Johan Laidoner a 
regime change by enacting a state of emergency. By 1939, Konstantin Päts had 
served as head of state since 1934 and had been the President of Estonia since 
1938. The Estonian Parliament did not convene between 1934–1938 and during 
that period Päts, as acting head of state, had ruled by decree. This practice par-
tially continued after the Parliament convened under the new Constitution in 
1938. The 1937 Constitution, which was based on the draft prepared by Päts, 
provided for a powerful head of state who was elected for a six-year term. The 
President had the right to appoint and dismiss the government, veto legislation 
and disband both houses of parliament (Raun 1987, 121). Regarding the deci-
sion on the Soviet demands, the 1937 Constitution granted the right to sign  
international defence agreements to the President without Parliament’s ratifica-
tion. Though the law required the President to consult with the State Defence 
Council and the respective parliamentary committees, their opinion was an ad-
visory one and not binding (Ilmjärv 2004b, 415). Although it has been ac-
knowledged that General Laidoner played a major role in foreign policy ques-
tions (see Ilmjärv 2004b; Warma 1993), Päts shaped the state design and the 
way the state and society was constructed. Therefore the current section will 
focus on him as the primary decision-maker and it will be explored how the 
state discourse of Collective-nationalism came to be and how it played out in 
decision-making in autumn 1939. 
Several scholars have emphasized Päts’s high political ambitions and politi-
cal pragmatism in achieving his goals (See Kasekamp 2000; Ruusmann 1998; 
Pajur 2005a). He has been considered a political opportunist and deal-maker, 
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which explains how he could publicly support the Veterans’ constitutional bill 
in 1933, negotiate with the Veterans on becoming their presidential candidate in 
early 1934, prohibit their organisations in April 1934 and start criticizing the 
Veterans’ constitution, which he himself had campaigned for, already in 1934 
(see Ruusmann 1998; Raun 1987). Furthermore, Päts’s government took over 
the Veterans’ logic of blaming all instability on the political parties and adopted 
other popular ideas from the Veterans, such as the central focus on patriotism in 
every sphere of society. Hence, Karjahärm and Sirk has argued that the govern-
ment’s platform from 1934 to 1940 was adapted to political circumstances, as 
“[f]or liberals there was a story of individual freedoms, for nationalists about 
national cohesion, for socialists it was about the equality of all professions and 
occupations” (Karjahärm and Sirk 2001, 291). This chapter aims to show that 
although Päts had pragmatic and opportunistic policies, these alone are not suf-
ficient to explain his political framework. The current chapter follows the social 
constructivist theoretical framework and thus will focus not on the personal 
characteristics of the decision-maker, but on his social construction: the forma-
tion of his understandings on the design and role of the state, the state and soci-
ety relationship and decision-making. Päts was the initiator, and to a large ex-
tent, the designer of the National-collectivist discourse explored in the previous 
chapter, which was the official state discourse in post-1934 Estonia.  
Päts’s understandings of state, society and the relationship between these 
two were based on the notion of the integral nation. A perfect society for Päts, 
as stated by Karjahärm and Sirk, was “a balanced whole, in which the individual 
parts had to work in immaculate harmony, like the organs of a living organism” 
(Karjahärm and Sirk 2001, 302). His ideas were influenced by scholars whose 
works he studied and translated, such as Francis Lieber, Adolf Damaschke, Ru-
dolf Diesel and Theodor Hertzka, but also from his experiences on the consti-
tutional debates of 1918 and economic and political crisis of 1932–1934. Next, 
Päts’s understanding of the state and society relationship and the main aspects 
of his political thinking, strong corporative institutions and executive leader-
ship, will be discussed. 
4.1.2. State design 
One of the central ideas of Päts’s political thinking since the beginning of his 
statesman’s career was that a state must be based on strong institutions. He 
stated: “The strength of the states lies in the state institutions” (26 January, 
1936, quoted in Laaman 1999, 21). His understanding of institutions directly 
relied on the approach of Francis Lieber52, a nineteenth century American politi-
                                                     
52  Francis Lieber was a nineteenth century American political scientist, born and educated 
in Germany. Lieber, influenced by anti-revolutionary German liberals, was a proponent of 
the organic view of the state. The German liberals, in their reaction to the Revolution and the 
Napoleonic occupation, rejected the individualist approach of the Revolution and saw the 
nation as an organic whole “containing clusters of associations and groupings held together 
76 
cal scientist, and on his book On Civil Liberty and Self-Government, which Päts 
translated into Estonian in 1908.53 For Lieber, stability and continuity can be 
ensured only through institutions, also the rights, privileges and ideas can last 
only if “embodied in vital institutions” (Brown 1951, 79). In his understanding 
of institutions, Päts’s followed Lieber’s approach:54 “An institution is a body of 
certain customs, laws or regulations with a fixed effect; this body has its exter-
nal tools or organs with which it can be independently active and take care of its 
preservation and future expansion” (Päts 1908, 1). 
In a letter to a member of Baltic German nobility published in 1914, Päts ar-
gued, building on Lieber, that institutions are crucial for a state as they provide 
continuity and stability. He stated:  
Organised life, political life cannot be imagined without a variety of institutions. 
Institutions make it possible that within certain borders ever-changing and 
renewing societal groups are working, that they always lead their activities 
according to firm principles, so that the successors will continue what the prede-
cessors have left pending. Only the institutions will ensure in this way the 
continuation of a certain course and only these will make the progress possible 
(Päts 1914, 1). 
For Päts’s, strong institutions on which the “organised life” was based, were not 
the political parties, but the corporative/professional organisations. According 
to Laaman, Päts always instinctively preferred the “natural” origin organi-
sations, Gemeinschafts, to arbitrary Gesellschafts (Laaman 1999, 22). Päts’s 
contemporary biographers tended to argue that Päts had never been a big sup-
porter of political parties, as he had always favoured professional corporations 
over them (See Raud 1938, 46; Laaman 1949, 310; Toomus 1937). Organi-
sation by profession had been one of Päts’s central ideas already since the early 
twentieth century. For example in 1903, Päts encouraged people to create more 
professional associations based on different professions such as cattle farming 
                                                                                                                                  
by a political relationship” (Brown 1951, 88). Lieber developed this focus of the German 
liberals on “the existence of social groups between the individual and the state” further “in 
his theory of institutional liberty” (Brown 1951, 88). Lieber criticised Rousseau’s contract 
theory for its neglect of the notion that society always exists. Hence, the state is not based on 
an arbitrary contract, but as explained by Bernard Edward Brown, “[t]he state, then, as an 
aspect of society, like society always exists, and is never created by contract or any other 
conscious action” (Brown 1951, 42).  
53  Jüri Adams has argued that Lieber’s book is “the greatest known influence on his 
political world view” (Adams 2001, 12–13). Eduard Laaman has stated that all Päts’s later 
goals and agendas and the 1937 constitution in particular “carry the mark of this book” 
(Laaman 1999, 20). 
54  Lieber’s definition of institutions: “An institution is a system or body of usages, laws, or 
regulations of extensive and recurring operation, containing within itself an organism by 
which it effects its own independent action, continuance, and, generally, its own further 
development. The idea of an institution implies a degree of self-government. […] The 
institution is the opposite of subjective conception, individual disposition, and mere personal 
bias. The institution implies organic action” (Lieber 1853, 255, 267). 
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and shipping as this would help to improve the economic conditions of the 
lower classes (Päts 1903, 1). In 1924 and in 1931 the Parliament, following 
Päts’s initiative, created two professional chambers: the Chamber of Commerce 
and Industry and the Chamber of Agriculture. In 1934–1936 Päts issued decrees 
for the establishment of fifteen other professional chambers, from which dele-
gates were later assigned places in the upper house of the Parliament of 1938 
(Kasekamp 2000, 121).55  
For Päts, the democratic crisis of the early 1930s was clear proof that people 
should be organised through corporative institutions and not political parties. In 
a speech on 31 December 1934, he stated: 
Coming from the Russian state and not knowing the weak sides of democracy, it 
was thought in Estonia that we will be happy once we implement the most far-
reaching democratic order. But now we see that first the people have to be 
organised, and this is what the government currently works on. We first organize 
the people and then the high state institutions. We do not want to create the kind 
of institutions that the people could laugh and point at, as they did to the highest 
representative body even very recently. We want to create a democratic 
institution, which would be worthy of its people, like in England, where 
parliament is respected and honoured. […] Our previous order, built only on 
political parties, showed its weaknesses and therefore we now have to organise 
the nation based on different principles – and this is gradually happening” (Päts 
1935, 1).56 
Organisations through corporative organisations would, according to Päts, also 
ensure the unity of the society and nation, which the political parties had 
compromised. As Päts explained in 1935:  
We have to organise our people according to the big economic professions and 
broad intellectual professions. […] It should not be forgotten that nothing should 
be created on an empty spot, but the creation has to be based on what has been 
developed throughout the ages and which is known in history or is hidden in our 
subconsciousness, even though it cannot be knowingly explained. Organising 
according to professional lines must ensure that the individual does not have to 
bow before the parties, but he has to feel that those, to whom he turns, are his 
closest colleagues and that they can assert themselves with unified power and 
they must do so. Then the farmer does not need to run to the parties, but the 
farmer will stand in its own organisation, the artisan in his own, and the 
merchant in his own organisation. Therewith everyone must feel that they are 
                                                     
55  Professional chambers were created for the following groups: engineers, doctors, 
pharmacists, houseowners, veterinarians, agronomists, housewives, co-operatives, dairy-
workers, fishermen, rural workers and small landowners, workers, teachers, artisants, and 
employees of private enterprises (Kasekamp 2000). 
56  Here, one can see again the links with Lieber, who argued that “[t]he true and staunch 
republican wants liberty […]. He wants the real rule of the people, that is an institutionally 
organised country, which distinguishes it from the mere mob. For a mob is an unorganic 
multitude, with a general impulse of action” (Lieber 1853, 369). 
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one big family and that they can live only when they have the common roof of 
the Estonian Republic (Päts 1935, 1).  
Päts supported the constitutional design of a strong executive branch already at 
the Constituent Assembly in 1919, but since the left had the majority in the 
Constituent Assembly, the parliamentarian model without a head of state won. 
Päts himself argued in the Constituent Assembly in 1920 that he did not con-
sider the new state system, that the Constitution would provide for, parliamen-
tarian. Though the Constitution foresaw the government to be responsible for 
the legislative body, which meant that it had to resign in case parliament so 
required, the other side of parliamentarianism, that the government would have 
had a degree of independence from the legislative body, was not there. Ac-
cording to Päts, “[o]ur legislative body is free in its activities from the govern-
ment’s influence, the government cannot in any way put its decision side by 
side with the legislative body’s decision, it also cannot turn to the people for the 
protection of its position” (Päts 2001c, 142–143).  
In his discussion on constitutional design Päts kept coming back to the ar-
gument that the parliament’s and political parties’ powers were too broad, and 
thereby that they did not sufficiently represent the will of people. He empha-
sized repeatedly that the Estonian constitution, compared to other parliamen-
tarian type constitutions, was a different and uncommon one (Päts 2001d, 155; 
2001e, 187; 2001a 273; 2001f, 355). Päts continued working on the Constitu-
tion, presenting Constitutional change proposals in the Parliament in his own 
name (1924) but also on behalf of the Farmers’ Union (1926 and 1929). How-
ever, his idea gained nation-wide popularity only when the Veterans took it up 
in 1932 in the context of the devastating economic crisis and the subsequent 
political instability. Although Päts and the Farmers’ Union publicly supported 
the Veterans bill in 1933, already a year later Päts started to criticize the 1933 
Constitution for granting too extensive powers to the executive. In 1936, Päts 
declared the nation to be healthy enough to return to a constitutional order and 
called for a referendum on the question of calling for the new Constituent As-
sembly. Since the opposition had no means to campaign for its candidates, a 
part of it boycotted the elections and therefore the Assembly was pro-govern-
ment. As a result the draft bill presented by Päts himself was accepted and the 
new Constitution was adopted in 1937.  
The 1937 Constitution followed the institutional approach of Lieber in seve-
ral angles. Prior to the adoption of the Constitution, Päts issued decrees which 
established fifteen corporative chambers based on different professions. The 
new Constitution saw for a bi-cameral parliament: the upper-chamber com-
prised the representatives of these professional corporations, the heads of uni-
versities and churches and ten people nominated by the head of state. Here, Päts 
seemed to follow Lieber’s argument that the experience of Anglo-Saxon co- 
untries has shown that bicameral parliaments were effective, whereas the uni- 
cameral system had proven to be unstable. Lieber saw the bi-cameral parliament 
as one of the guarantees of liberty. Two houses represented “the impulse as well 
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as the continuity, the progress and the conservatism, the onward zeal and the re-
tentive element, which must ever form integral elements of all civilization” 
(Lieber 1853, 160–161). Lieber points out that there are different modes of 
comprising the upper house, worst of them the French system where the mem-
bers served in their personal capacity and more effective being the ones that 
were based on either certain class or by different bodies such as in the United 
States (Lieber 1853, 161). By creating the professional chamber, Päts followed 
Lieber’s principle that the state has to be based on institutions, and basing an 
upper chamber of the parliament on these corporations, one could see the at-
tempt to ensure the stability and tradition within the state system, which for Päts 
the political parties were not able to provide. Again in his justification for the 
necessity of the bi-cameral system, Päts follows Lieber’s argument that “[t]he 
excellence of the bicameral system” lies “on the different modes of composing 
the houses” (Lieber 1853, 162). In a speech delivered in 1935 Päts explained:  
It was thought here that if we already elect one chamber, then this one, as a body 
of smart people, will not make mistakes. But it is known that there are many 
smart people who do not want to be involved in politics and there are many, who 
are not smart, but do want to be involved in politics. Therefore we cannot cherish 
the hope that only the best people will be elected to the representative organ, and 
therefore it is not redundant, if we would form the future Parliament in such a 
way that the people would come from different levels (Päts 1999a, 237).  
The Constitution also took over the Anglo-Saxon plurality voting system since 
the lower chamber voting system was based on single-mandate constituencies. 
The president was formally elected by the people, but there could be a maxi-
mum of three candidates nominated by the two chambers of parliament and a 
temporary body consisting of the representatives of local municipalities. Also, 
in case these three institutions would nominate the same person, this person be-
came a president without popular elections. This was exactly what happened in 
1938 and Päts became president by the nomination of these three bodies and not 
through elections. Another change compared to both the 1920 and 1933 Consti-
tutions was that the new Constitution did not allow for the popular initiative.  
4.1.3. Understandings of the decision-making and  
state and society relationship 
Päts’s understanding of the state and society relationship was related to his 
understanding on the decision-making: on the one hand, he saw the head of 
state as representing society directly, without the interference of political par-
ties, while on the other hand, society for him was not capable of effective  
decision-making. This was partly because of his understanding of the decision-
making, as he argues that decisions have to be taken firmly and intuitively. For 
both of these reasons Päts was, throughout his career, a strong proponent of the 
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constitutional design with a strong executive president. In 1928, Päts pointed 
out in a speech that  
[i]n other places people have created a balance for executing the powers. Al-
though this power, president, cannot do more, it can under certain circumstances 
remove parliament and address the people. This is the greatest democratic 
principle. We do not have it. We do not have this institution that could address 
the people. We cannot remove parliament, it will calmly sit its time out, can even 
adopt a law that prevents the institute of referendum. We have created for 
ourselves a hundred-headed monarch, fully enforcing itself as all the other 
organs depend on it. It has been said that the people have supreme power, but 
this power is dependent and people should see how this supreme power is 
governing. We need a president that could execute the people’s will, otherwise 
our state is not democratic (Päts 1999a, 274).  
In March 1934, Päts justified the regime change he and General Laidoner had 
conducted in the following terms:  
The supreme power in our country is our people. Our people have to execute 
their supreme power with a clear mind, based on sober pondering. One cannot 
demand that a person who has a fever can make elaborate decisions. We also 
cannot think that people that have been agitated, where from one side there is 
anger and revenge, and from the other side, a wave of fear, that under these 
conditions somebody could fulfil his obligations as a citizen and make decisions. 
The people have to withdraw, instead of agitation, explaining should be done, it 
must be explained that our state had a difficult illness (Riigikogu V koosseis: 
täielikud protokollid 1934, 1435–1438).  
As Päts’s supporters argued, by conducting a regime change in 1934 and 
changing the state system, Päts represented the people directly as in his decision 
followed the will of the people, who had understood the need for it already ear-
lier. Toomus argues that 
people, and I do not mean here the agitated masses, had dissolved parliament 
already long before the state elder did it. And then followed what the masses had 
wanted: the implementation of a single power against parliament, but not led by 
a will as was seen in the 1933 Constitution; not the way as was advocated by 
Sirk, that it does not matter whether the people delegate their power to one or a 
hundred men. Päts was forced to take the role as the caretaker of power (Toomus 
1937, 68).  
Within this approach, “people” are not seen as individuals or a sum of different 
pluralist understandings, but as a unified actor.  
Päts saw the relationship between the state and society as the head of state 
representing people directly. Hence, the role of the head of state is to understand 
the spirit of the nation and therefore to carry out the sovereignty of the people. 
As Toomus put it, the pre-1934 political system acknowledges “the mandate, 
not the natural calling” (Toomus 1937, 35). Päts himself explained the role of 
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the leader as someone who guides his people and nation, and does not try to 
please people or individuals before the elections, which he considered a weak-
ness of political parties. He stated: “Our leaders should have the courage to 
choose the path themselves, show the people which road to take” (29 November 
1936, quoted in Toomus 1937, 128). 
Päts’s understanding of the decision overlaps with his understanding of a 
head of state who intuitively understands the spirit of the people as politics for 
him is an art where intuition and inspiration hold very high positions. He stated: 
“I have to say that doing politics is an art. It is certain that it is not some kind of 
research work, some kind of scientific experiment, but there are several ele-
ments in politics that overlap with art.” He gives an example of Pilsudski: “If he 
has a difficult political moment, he would go to a lonely place, and wait for an 
intuition, and if that has arrived then he would exert all his strength to execute 
his plan” (Päts 2001b, 369–370). He quotes Bismarck who has said that politics 
is not a handicraft that anyone can learn and continues that “if politics is like 
this, that it depends on the intuition then one cannot say that politics can be 
conducted according to some programme; that you can take a manual where 
everything is included and do politics without mistakes according to it” (Päts 
2001b, 370). From his understanding of the politician, Päts moves to the notion 
of decision that for him follows inspiration. “When the doers will get inspired, 
they have to decide immediately, the decision-maker has to find the most ap-
propriate option and implement it.” (Päts 2001b, 371). In Päts’s understanding, 
authority makes the decision and firmly implements it.  
Another part of Päts’s understanding of the state and society relationship was 
based on his belief that society, as represented by different political parties, was 
not capable of effective decision-making. For Päts one of the main reasons why 
the previous parliamentarian system was so ineffective was that it did not pro-
vide enough space for the head of state to make decisions. In 1932 Päts as a 
head of state argued in his speech before parliament that 
everyone orders the government around. […] The government lacks authority, it 
is not acknowledged. Everyone comes with their own proposals and if the 
government does not fulfil them, then government will be shouted at. I have not 
become the head of the government to be ordered around, I want to lead the 
government myself according to the Estonian constitution. I have to say I cannot 
permit giving orders to the government. The government must have authority, 
we cannot govern if everyone keeps giving us instructions (Päts 1999a, 203). 
Päts’s opinion on society is that society is important, but society and parliament, 
which does not have a clear hierarchical structure, cannot efficiently make 
decisions. He saw the democratic parliament of the 1920s as an inefficient 
talking shop where opinions were presented, but that did not have enough 
agency for taking decisions and implementing it. 
The possible shortcomings of this type of state and society relationship were 
pointed out in a memorandum by the four former heads of government, Jaan 
Tõnisson, Jaan Teemant, Johan Kukk and Ants Piip, in 1936. The letter points 
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out that Päts was creating social conditions, under which he had to operate as a 
statesman and these conditions of “guided democracy”, where individuals were 
always expected to wait for the government’s directions and where all political 
organization was centrally initiated and organized, curbed the self-initiative and 
alertness of the society. This, in turn, could lead to the people’s alienation from 
the state. “We have not only been without freedom of speech, assembly and 
association for three years, which has a particular importance to the rule of law 
and is necessary for people’s political education in order to link people’s wills 
with the state’s destiny, but there is also a lack of feeling that the situation will 
improve in the near future” (Tõnisson et al. 1995, 134). The letter argues that by 
enforcing emergency regulations and giving laws and orders by decrees in cases 
on very broad areas, where there is no imminent emergency for the state’s de-
velopment, the government has changed “emergency legislation into ordinary 
legislation” (Tõnisson et al. 1995, 134). The letter focused on the gradually 
weakening link between society and the state and the possible consequences of 
excluding society from the public/decision-making sphere: “We see with con-
cern that our people’s activeness and the defence will is diminishing, and sub-
sequently that the government is forced to seek support, not from the people, 
but from an administrative defence apparatus. This situation will change our 
nation state into a police state (Tõnisson et al. 1995, 136). The letter points out 
that the choices currently made and the conditions created, under which the 
society is not actively participating in the political life, can have consequences 
in times of crisis. Also, concentrating that extensively on ensuring internal  
control and stability reduces the state’s ability to focus on possible external 
problems. “Using all government’s forces primarily for protecting its own 
security will weaken the necessary attention to foreign policy questions and will 
cripple our alertness during this time of international crisis” (Tõnisson et al. 
1995, 136).57  
Päts did not give a written reply to the letter, but he did discuss it in a public 
speech, where he argued: 
Revising the Constitution needs to happen in co-operation with the government 
apparatus, with people who have common sense and experiences to state their 
firm opinion on every small constitutional issue. If we would now open the op-
tion to hold meetings and would give candidates the possibility to speak freely 
about what every one of them would like to see in the new constitution, we 
                                                     
57  To remedy the situation, the former state elders asked for loosening the emergency regu-
lations, the restoration of the rule of law, including freedoms of speech, association and 
meetings and to allow for free elections, for example by allowing other groups and indi-
viduals to present candidates in addition to the committees created by the government 
(Tõnisson et al. 1995, 137). Because of the censorship the memorandum was not printed in 
Estonia, but was published in the Finnish Helsingin Sanomat in November 1936. As a 
protest the opposition boycotted the elections to the Constituent Assembly, which resulted in 
very pro-government Constituent Assembly, the discussions for the new Constitution were 
based on Päts’s proposal and the constitution was approved in July 1937 (Pajur 2005a, 97–
98). 
83 
would get a situation for which the head of the recently opened Institute of 
Technology warned me, that if one would call for several specialists from dif-
ferent areas and ask them for a decision for one question every day, then we get 
many different decisions. And that is because everyone will look at it from their 
particular angle and will not adopt the other’s angle, but consider themselves as 
the bigger specialists. This would be the same about the details in the Cons-
titution. Our people have already decided through voting [the 1936 referendum 
whether a new Constitution would be necessary] what they want (Päts 1999b, 
256). 
Hence, for Päts, if everyone would keep coming up with different opinions, this 
would not get you to a better decision, but would result in a large number of 
different decisions that makes the overall picture messy and slows the effective 
decision-making down. The reason for that is that everyone comes with their 
individual agenda and is unable to see the broader picture. The solution for Päts 
was a head of state who is above all these individual agendas and considers the 
general benefit of the nation and who has the authority and responsibility to take 
the decision and implement it. 
4.1.4. Conclusion 
The current dissertation follows the social constructivist theoretical framework 
and thus it focused on the social construction of the decision-maker, formation 
of his understandings on the design and role of the state and the state and 
society relationship. The chapter showed that Päts believed that the stability and 
the continuity of the state rest in strong organic institutions and therefore it is 
the obligation of the statesman to create these institutions. He focused on 
institutions from the beginning of his career when he urged people to create 
more associations and saw them as the cornerstone for national development 
and criticized the Baltic Germans for not creating a single national level institu-
tion. He believed that only a strong executive institution is crucial for political 
stability, because only then the people’s will is properly considered. 
Although there certainly were changes in his understandings, the chapter has 
shown that Päts was consistent in his belief that a strong state has to rest on 
strong institutions, focusing on a strong presidential institution and the corpora-
tive professional institutions. This consistent firm belief in a certain state design 
may also be one of the explanations on Päts’s behaviour towards the Veterans. 
Päts had been fighting for a system with a strong executive since 1919, but then 
his approach did not gain support. He continued throughout the 1920s, present-
ing several constitutional drafts, but there was not much public interest. The 
crisis of the 1930s probably further crystallized his opinion that his state de-
sign’s approach would be more suitable for building a strong, stable state. How-
ever, unlike the Veterans, Päts had never managed to take the issue of a consti-
tution to the masses. Therefore it is understandable that when suddenly this 
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issue, which he had been talking about for more than ten years, became central, 
he took his chance.  
Päts’s opinion of society is not that society should be disregarded or not con-
sidered important, but that society cannot efficiently and effectively make deci-
sions. For him, a parliament with extensive powers without any executive con-
trol reflects a model of society that results in inefficient governance since at one 
point a decision needs to be made. His argument on the inefficiency for this 
type of state system was for him proved by the political and constitutional crisis 
of 1932–1933, although his belief in hierarchical institutions and in strong in-
stitutional power goes further back. For Päts, society’s opinion should be con-
sidered, but if these individual opinions would not correspond to the state ones, 
the state was not obliged to change its position every time to please society be-
fore elections, but should rather explain its position better. This was evident for 
example in a speech in 1936 where he argued that the leader should choose the 
path and “[s]how the people which road it should take” (29 November 1936, 
quoted in Toomus 1937, 128). Therefore, Päts did not question the importance 
of the society but he saw the society and state as separate in the sphere of  
decision-making, as it is the state that makes decisions and society that carries 
the national values.  
4.2. Institutional practices  
The current section will discuss how these ideas on the state and society re-
lationship and decision-making developed into institutional arrangements, 
hence determined how the political reality was constructed in Estonia. The cur-
rent dissertation argues that the decision-makers are constrained by the existing 
social conditions. These social conditions can emerge partly by their own mak-
ing, but when they are in place, they cannot be ignored. Päts was the main ini-
tiator and shaper of the state’s design and the state and society relationship in 
post-1934 Estonia. To ensure the stability and effective decision-making he 
created a system where he separated the societal sphere and the political, that is, 
the decision-making sphere.  
Building on the Veterans’ idea on national unity, the state discourse priori-
tised national collective interests over individual interests. Therefore, the state 
system saw for the centralised top-down political and societal organisation, 
where the societal activities and initiatives were coordinated by the state to en-
sure the focus on nation’s interests. As one of the central elements of the state 
discourse was corporatism, one of the state practices for organised political or-
ganisation was the creation of professional chambers. From 1934–1936 fifteen 
corporative chambers were established which assembled people by professions. 
Representatives of these chambers were later assigned seats in the upper houses 
of the National Assembly and the 1938 Parliament. In 1938 Päts founded the 
State Economic Council (Riigi Majandusnõukogu) with 15 members elected by 
the occupational chambers and 10 appointed by Päts to advice the government 
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(Kasekamp 2000, 121). The corporative organisations “were supposed to fulfil 
the roles of state institutions, political parties, trade unions, educational institu-
tions and other tasks” (Karjahärm and Sirk 2001, 288). In reality they were not 
that active, for example the State Economic Council’s role was limited “since 
the government rarely asked for advice” (Kasekamp 2000, 121). 
In addition to corporate organisations, the other type of political organisation 
permitted and supported by the government was the Fatherland League (Isa-
maaliit), which was founded immediately after the abolishment of political 
parties in 1935. Officially it was not a party, but a cultural organisation, which 
had as a goal an “internally and externally strong Estonian state and Estonian 
fatherland” (Statute of the Fatherland League, 1935, § 1, quoted in Toomla 
1999, 185). However, according to some, such as Pajur and Toomla, the Father-
land League was a political organisation (Toomla 1999, 186). It was supported 
by the government, had top-down leadership and its members had to support the 
political course taken by the government (Pajur 2005a, 94). Officially, it pro-
moted the core elements of the state’s discourse within the society, such as “a 
spirit of harmony, solidarity, co-operation among all classes, and singleness of 
purpose” (Kasekamp 2000, 22). However, the organisation did not become 
popular. First, its membership consisted mainly of previous members of Päts’s 
Agrarian Union, but gradually also members from other parties joined and it 
became recommendable to all civil servants58 (Pajur 2005a, 94). The Fatherland 
League focused on unifying political groups supporting the government’s 
course, promoting state propaganda, and shaping the new political elite (Pajur 
2005a, 94). Kasekamp argued that “[t]he Fatherland League, with its nebulous 
nationalist ideology, hierarchical structure, and pretence of being something 
other than a party, was in many respects a pale imitation of the Veterans’ 
League” (Kasekamp 2000, 122). The government’s course to organise through 
associations and thereby to reduce the means of the opposition was in general 
effective, with student organisations and the academic community in Tartu 
being the notable exception. Therefore, in 1935–1937, the government took 
centralizing actions that limited the autonomy of the University, such as moving 
the technical faculty from Tartu to Tallinn and making the rector, pro-rector and 
deans, who until then had been elected by the University, government ap-
pointees (Karjahärm and Sirk 2001, 293).  
The government practice for ensuring the top-down political organisation 
was enforced with maintaining the state of emergency and by the regulations 
that prohibited public meetings and anti-government publications. By 1939 the 
state of emergency had lasted for five years and had been announced to be a 
universal governing instrument by Prime Minister Eenpalu in September 1938 
(Pajur 2005a; Roolaht 1990, 128–129). Political parties had been abolished since 
1935 and any kind of spontaneous political organisation remained prohibited. 
The government claimed that in the future there would be a new type of 
                                                     
58  Among people the Fatherland League, Isamaaliit in Estonian, was also called “saamaliit” 
(saama means to get) (Pajur 2005a, 94). 
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political party, which would not aim at gaining power, but left unclear what 
these parties then would do (Pajur 2005a, 101). Mati Graf has argued that until 
the last days of independence, the government had no political will or plan to 
restore the multi-party system (Graf 2000, 421). The assembly law and printing 
law prohibited public meetings and publications that were disrespectful towards 
the Estonian state, nation, existing political order and state institutions. As Pajur 
states, this vague formulation could be used by the government to fight opposi-
tional occurrences (Pajur 2005a, 101).  
The bicameral Parliament that convened in 1938 had a passive role. For  
example, it did not initiate a single piece of legislation in two years since the 
opposition did not have enough votes to initiate a draft bill and the pro-govern-
ment side lacked interest. The parliament further worked mainly on legislation 
of secondary importance, whereas for key laws the President continued giving 
out decrees during periods when the Parliament was not in session. Nearly all 
these decrees were ratified by the parliament’s commissions. The National 
Front faction, the pro-government majority in the parliament, did not have a 
coherent political agenda and therefore focused on approving the government’s 
draft bills (Karjahärm and Sirk 2001, 290). Also, several non-governmental 
newspapers were closed already in 1935. Many of the clashes and disagree-
ments that existed between the government and certain parts of society, and the 
ideas this clashes were based on, did not reach the nation-wide public through 
media channels. For example, although the clashes between academic circles 
and the government were well-known in Tartu, the media were not allowed to 
write about it in detail and therefore did not reach the national level (See for 
example Tuglas 2008, 401 or Roolaht 1990). Under these state practices the 
alternative ideas and understandings could not reach the wider public and, more 
importantly, the public discussion between different discourses was curbed.  
One illustrative example of the separation of the state and societal spheres 
and the practices that were created as a result of that separation is the govern-
ment’s increasing military cooperation with Germany since the mid-1930s in 
spite of strong anti-German sentiments in the society. As the third chapter 
pointed out, there were strong anti-German sentiments in Estonia as the Baltic 
Germans, and through them Germany in a wider sense, came to be seen as the 
Other and “the national enemy” (Mertelsmann 2005, 44). In pre-independence 
Estonia Germany was seen as the main threat to Estonian national aspirations 
and political development. The narratives and understandings of the Baltic 
German rule of Estonian territory as “the age of darkness” and “the 700-year 
night of slavery” spread rapidly within the society and came embedded in the 
domestic understandings. Russian influences and Russification policies were 
considered less of a threat because they had decreased the influence of the Bal-
tic Germans. These anti-German sentiments were present in the society in the 
late 1930s as shown by a nation-wide study conducted in April 1939 by the 
State Propaganda Office in co-operation with the Fatherland league on the pub-
lic opinion and attitudes towards the international situation. The study showed 
that the society perceived Germany and German influence as the main threat. It 
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asked whether Germany’s or Russia’s dominance would be more favourable to 
Estonia and nine out of eleven counties saw Germany as a bigger threat (Ant 
1999, 35). Some people felt that falling into the Russian sphere of influence 
would be better than German domination, as “one could get rid of the Russians 
more easily” (cited in Mertelsmann 2005, 48).59 The feelings that the nationalist 
leaders expressed before World War I, that Russians, unlike Germans, lacked 
the urge to control a single nation fully, or would be a lesser threat to the Esto-
nian national culture and identity, still seemed to be present.  
The first part of this case study, chapter 2, discussed the gradually strength-
ening German orientation among the Estonian political and military elites since 
the mid-1930s. The British consul Galienne pointed out in July 1939 that “Esto-
nia was tending to become pro-German”, but specified that he did not mean the 
general public, but the military and economic elites and that this was en- 
couraged by the government (Warma 1955, 83). In June 1939 Estonia signed a 
non-aggression treaty with Germany, which Norway, Sweden and Finland had 
refused. How were these government policies possible amidst strong anti-
German societal sentiments? This chapter would suggest that it was the way the 
state and society relationship was constructed and the subsequent institutional 
practices that made the government’s de facto German orientation possible. The 
separation of the societal and decision-making spheres was enforced by the 
emergency and censorship regulations and by the state discourse that stressed 
the need to focus on collective values. In practice this meant that initiatives 
came from the top down as that would ensure political stability and the nation’s 
development. Therefore, anti-German sentiments in the society did not con-
strain the government’s room for manoeuvring, as the decision for foreign pol-
icy orientation was seen as a political decision, belonging to the government’s 
sphere and separate from societal ideas.  
This example, of the government’s decision for a de facto German orienta-
tion versus anti-German societal sentiments, shows the state’s decision-making 
practices that were made possible under the current social conditions. In 1938, 
the government closed two newspapers, the liberal Vaba Maa and the socialist 
newspaper Rahva Sõna, as their articles and caricatures critical of Germany 
undermined the government’s foreign policy orientation. These steps by the 
government were instigated by the German ambassador who repeatedly de-
manded the constraining of Estonian press in foreign policy matters in 1938. As 
he wrote in October 1938, prior to closing the socialist Rahva Sõna: “Even if 
the official stance of the Estonian government favours neutrality, despite widely 
spread panic in the population, the same cannot be said about the attitude of the 
Estonian press. […] The inciting publications of the press have caused regretta-
ble reverberations among the populace” (cited in Ilmjärv 2004b, 294). In case of 
Vaba Maa, Foreign Minister Friedrich Akel had written to the Ministry of  
                                                     
59  As argued by Ilmjärv, the different attitudes “toward Germans between the Estonian 
people and their government” (Ilmjärv 2004b, 321) were exposed during the visit of the 
military ship “Admiral Hipper” that visited Tallinn in the summer of 1939 as there were 
violent clashes between German soldiers and Estonians. 
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Internal Affairs several times arguing that their articles significantly un-
dermined Estonian-German relations. Vaba Maa was closed in March 1938 
after it published a cartoon were Hitler trampled on pieces of paper that re-
presented the treaties of Versailles and Locarno (Ilmjärv 2004b, 293). The 
closure of Rahva Sõna was the result of German-critical articles published in 
August and September 1938 (Ilmjärv 2004b, 295). As the government in its 
foreign policy focused on keeping and strengthening the relations with Ger-
many, then to ensure the implementation of that policy, distractions, such as the 
ones created by critical articles or caricatures, had to be removed.  
These state practices were made possible by the separation of the political 
and societal spheres. Although there were alternative positions present, such as 
the opposition arguing against signing the German-Estonian non-aggression 
pact in Spring 1939 (Arumäe 2004), these ideas did not have a nation-wide 
reach. The carriers of these ideas were able to present their approaches in cer-
tain constrained spheres, but they were not able to effectively participate in the 
decision-making. This separation of ideas became possible because of the so-
cietal positions that found political stability in a strong executive leadership, 
possibly caused by society’s limited statehood experience, and with that a lack 
of political traditions and culture. In the theoretical chapter, it was stated that 
social ideas and understandings constrain the decision-makers. However, as in 
this case the societal and decision-making spheres were kept separately and the 
alternative societal ideas were not available in the public sphere, the decision-
maker was not constrained by the societal understanding of Germany, but could 
base his decision on realpolitical needs.  
4.3. Decision-making process in 1939 
This section will explore how the state discourse and practices embedded in this 
discourse explain the foreign policy decision-making in autumn 1939. The 
current study argues that the decision-making is not simply about the private 
beliefs of the decision-maker, but that these beliefs are based on certain broader 
societal understandings and that the subsequent decision-making is influenced 
by the interaction of the decision-makers’ understandings and other societal 
understandings. It will be suggested that the government was able to focus only 
on the systemic constraints as the dominant state discourse saw the decision-
making and societal spheres as separate. Therefore, the government practices 
were developed in a way that societal pressures did not reach the government 
and the government was able to focus solely on external constraints and assess 
the situation from a realpolitical perspective.  
4.3.1. Decision-making in 1939 
In September 1939, in the decision-making process regarding the Soviet de-
mands, the decision-maker’s aim was to avoid a military conflict with the So-
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viet Union, Päts considered it the government’s foremost task “[t]o take the 
Estonian people and the state as a whole through the current great war” (Warma 
1993, 30). In order not to provoke the Soviets and to prevent a military conflict, 
Estonia, in contrast to its immediate neighbours, did not conduct a mobilisation. 
The policy line of Päts, and the government in general, concentrated solely on 
external constraints: disparity in military capabilities, a volatile international 
situation and lack of external aid. For Päts, the demands were an expected move 
from the Soviet Union considering the current international situation, hence 
ordinary state behaviour of a great power. He stated at the cabinet meeting that 
“the incident of submarine “Orzel” gave a convenient occasion for the demands, 
but these demands would have been presented to us in any case sooner or later” 
(Warma 1993, 31). Military conflict had to be avoided, as aid was not to be 
expected and “[i]f war will come, our whole state with the whole intelligentsia 
will be destroyed and we will be destroying many of our people’s resources and 
many people” (Arjakas, Arumäe et al. 1989, 140). As was shown in the second 
chapter, the government actively requested assistance only from Germany,  
seeing the situation through realpolitical lenses.  
Did the position of society also figure in government discussions on the 
subject? The government acknowledged that signing the treaty would have a 
negative influence on the nation’s self-conscience, which parliamentarian 
Jürima confirmed: “The treaty will affect people very negatively. The majority 
of the people certainly do not want an increase in Russia’s influence, but there 
is no choice” (Arjakas, Arumäe et al. 1989, 139–140). The Speaker of Parlia-
ment’s Lower Chamber Jüri Uluots stated: “This treaty will certainly curb part 
of our sovereignty and will also strongly wound the nation’s self-consciousness. 
If we resist, the consequence will be that we will be taken away from our  
country. This is the system Soviet Russia uses” (Arjakas, Arumäe et al. 1989, 
144). However, the understanding of having “no choice” came from the syste-
mic level, hence through external constraints and although the issue of public 
opinion was discussed and it was noted that it would not be positive, the public 
opinion was not present in the discussion as a constraining factor to the  
decision-making process.  
The Soviets presented their demands to the Estonian foreign minister in 
Moscow on 24 September 1939, the decision to agree to the demands was made 
at the cabinet meeting and subsequent Parliament’s Foreign and Defence Com-
mittee meetings on 26 September, after which the mutual assistance pact be-
tween Estonia and the Soviet Union was signed on 28 September 1939. In all, 
the entire decision-making process took five days, including a trip between Tal-
linn and Moscow. This straightforward approach became possible because the 
country’s top leadership was free to focus only on the systemic level pressures. 
The decision-maker, to create an effective decision-making system and ensure 
domestic stability, had created social conditions where the other societal under-
standings were not part of the decision-making sphere. By suggesting that the 
domestic pressures did not reach the government, the dissertation does not sug-
gest that there were people protesting on the streets demanding for an alterna-
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tive position, which the government ignored. Instead, it does suggest that within 
the state discourse the state practices were constructed in such a way that alter-
native understandings were not able to enter into the nation-wide public sphere, 
through for example newspapers, radio or organised societal initiatives. As a 
result, there was no societal debate on the issue from where these pressures, 
such as alternative understandings, could have emerged. 
An illustrative example is provided by Tõnisson. The first part of the case 
study showed that the decision-making was uniform, as everyone agreed that 
accepting the demands was inevitable. However, although opposition leader 
Jaan Tõnisson at the meeting of the Parliamentary Committees agreed that the 
treaty must be agreed to, he argued on the tactics of the negotiations, stating that 
the parliamentary committees should not give their consent to sign the treaty 
without deciding on its scope beforehand. He also stated that although the 
situation was difficult, the treaty should not be immediately signed, but the ne-
gotiators should try to bargain as much as possible (Arjakas, Arumäe et al. 
1989, 142–143). These ideas were not further considered. Also, in spring 1939 
Tõnisson was against signing the non-aggression pact in Germany and spoke 
against it in the Parliament (Arumäe 2004). However, he was not able to present 
these ideas publicly, as the media were not allowed to publish Tõnisson’s 
speeches (Aru 1996, 18). If he could have done that, for example through a  
radio speech, this would have introduced an alternative idea to the public sphere 
and as a result, this could have created an option that the government would 
have needed to process this idea or react to it somehow.  
As the decision-maker’s understanding was that unorganised opinions un-
dermine effective decision-making, the government’s policy since the beginning 
of World War II had been to minimize the possibility for spreading alternative 
accounts that would undermine domestic stability and slow the decision-making 
down. From early September 1939, the government further enforced the state 
practices that controlled public opinion and alternative societal positions. From 
early September 1939, the government implemented additional censorship 
measures to control public access to foreign information. The media were al-
lowed to use only political information from foreign sources that had been con-
firmed by the Estonian Information Agency (ETA). If any unapproved informa-
tion was published nonetheless, the edition had to be confiscated (Ilmjärv 
2004b, 354; Ant 1993, 41). In addition, the government began to actively en-
force the state of emergency regulations. These regulations prohibited showing 
any disrespect towards the state order, parliament, the head of state, the govern-
ment or its ministers. It was forbidden to provoke societal alarm, damage 
foreign relations or put the protection of the state order into danger. Further-
more, any meetings or gatherings that were not in accordance with the existing 
order were prohibited. These regulations also gave the right to the Commander 
of Internal Security (Sisekaitseülem) to arrest people whose actions or be- 
haviour were considered dangerous to the state security or public order. The 
regulations that were first enacted for organising domestic affairs were now 
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used to control the influence of the international situation on domestic politics 
(Ant 1999, 80–81).  
The first part of the case study described the statements the country’s top 
leadership made until August 1939 on the necessity to fight for one’s country. 
The chapter asked how to explain this rhetoric in the context of the govern-
ment’s decision in autumn 1939. Since the societal sphere and decision-making 
sphere were separated, the government’s rhetoric with the focus on the logic of 
the international system was not part of the public discourse. The government 
did not present the pact as an inevitable choice to avoid military conflict. First, 
the public was not informed about the agreement before it was already signed. 
The first comments about the pact were published in the Estonian press on 29 
and 30 September (Ilmjärv 2004b, 368). On 29 September President Päts in a 
radio speech justified the demands through the volatile international situation as 
the Soviets needed the military bases to satisfy their legitimate security needs. 
He emphasised that the negotiations were unexpected, but after both parties had 
presented their views it became clear that “our big Eastern neighbour will fully 
respect the treaties that have been signed with it after the Freedom War to con-
firm our independence […]. The signed treaty will not violate our sovereign 
rights, our state will remain independent”. The President also stated that “there 
was nothing really special in these demands and considering our history and our 
geopolitical location, it was clear that we need to enter into a treaty with our big 
Eastern neighbour. As a coastal country we have always been a mediator be-
tween West and East and this has given a firm distinctiveness to our entire cul-
tural and national independence.” He also emphasized that the pact was an 
agreement between two equal partners and that “the Estonian state is as strong 
as before” (Päevaleht, 1 October 1939). Also, on 3 September 1939 President 
Päts held a public speech where he emphasised: “We will be defending our 
country – if necessary then with words, if necessary – then with the help of 
whole nation” (Päts 1939, 1) said that if necessary, Estonians could defend the 
independence of their country”. This suggests that government’s aim with these 
statements was to enhance the national unity and defence will in case there 
would be a military conflict.  
One could also argue that the decision to sign the treaty was not seen as the 
ultimate decision, not to fight under any circumstances, but as an intermediary 
decision to avoid a military attack at that particular moment. The statements by 
Päts and other politicians and by military elites suggest that the situation was 
seen as temporary and that they were still hoping for Germany’s aid. As Päts 
stated at the cabinet meeting: “Let’s hope that also in the future Germany does 
not want us to be destroyed. Currently Germany had to make concessions, be-
cause otherwise it would have become difficult for her” (Arjakas, Arumäe et al. 
1989, 140). However, the focus of the current case study were not the govern-
ment’s long-term strategies, as one would need to cover the period until Sum-
mer 1940, but to understand how this rapid decision became socially possible in 
Autumn 1939. The study found that the decision was made possible by the 
separation of the societal and decision-making spheres and lack of interactions 
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between different societal discourses, which made it possible for the state to 
only focus on the systemic constraints. 
4.3.2. Conclusion 
What was possible and acceptable for the Estonian decision-makers in autumn 
1939 was strongly influenced by the state and society relationship, hence the 
separation of the decision-making sphere and societal sphere and the subsequent 
state practices, as a result of which the decision-makers were able to focus 
solely on systemic constraints. Subsequently, the focus of the government’s 
discussion was on realpolitical perspectives, not on domestic aspects, such as 
laws or institutions. As the alternative discourses were neither part of the  
nation-wide public sphere, nor of the political sphere, there was no need to 
negotiate between these understandings and therefore the government could 
focus on effectively implementing the decision of avoiding military conflict. 
The way the practices, such as emergency regulations, were further enforced in 
autumn 1939 was consistent with the decision-makers’ understanding that 
during a time of crisis the domestic situation must be stable, so that the govern-
ment could focus on effective decision-making.  
4.4. Conclusion of the case study 
The current case study focused on the how-possible question of the foreign 
policy decision of Estonia regarding the Soviet demands in autumn 1939. The 
case study comprised three parts: the first part (Chapter 2) focused on the deci-
sion from the angle of the external pressures and showed that Estonia followed 
the international logic, hence saw the external constraints as dominant, in its 
decision to accept the Soviet demands. The second part (Chapter 3), explored 
the dominant domestic discourses, their emergence and interactions as the dis-
sertation argues that these domestic understandings influenced how the situation 
in 1939 was understood by the society and the decision-makers. The focus of 
the chapter was on understanding the external threat and the state and society 
relationship, as it was suggested that the way this relationship was constructed 
influenced the decision-makers’ understanding of the balance between domestic 
and systemic constraints. It was argued that as the Estonian territory, during the 
emergence and development of Estonian national identities, was administered by 
the Baltic German nobility and the Estonian society had no part in the political/ 
decision-making sphere, the state was seen as the Other. Therefore, when 
Estonia became independent, the meaning of the Estonian state was not con-
solidated within the society and there was limited understanding on what inde-
pendent statehood entailed. As a result of this lack of political culture and tradi-
tion, during the economic crisis the gap between societal and political spheres be-
came visible. The solution for political instability, as advocated by the Radical- 
nationalist discourse, came to be seen in strong executive leadership. This paved 
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way to the Collectivist-nationalist discourse that became the state discourse in 
post-1934 Estonia. This discourse saw the supremacy of national collectivist 
interests over the individual or group interests. Therefore, the state and society 
relationship was constructed in a way where the decision-making sphere and the 
societal sphere were separated and the political organisation and directions for 
the state development were initiated by the government. Although there was an 
alternative discourse labelled Liberal-individualism that saw the development of 
the individual into an active citizen as a precondition for the nation’s develop-
ment, state practices greatly limited the reach of this discourse and the carriers 
of the discourse were not able to effectively participate in the decision-making 
system.  
The third part (Chapter 4) focused on the logic behind the decision-making 
process in autumn 1939. It first explored the social construction of the primary 
decision-maker, the logic behind his understanding on state design and state and 
society relationship and how he processed the tensions between different dis-
courses while developing the collectivist-nationalist discourse. The chapter 
showed that President Konstantin Päts as the primary decision-maker was con-
sistent in his belief that a strong state has to rest on strong institutions, focusing 
on a strong presidential institution and corporative professional institutions. The 
decision-maker’s understanding on the state and society relationship was that 
the head of state represents people directly and that society cannot effectively 
make decisions. Therefore, he saw the society and state as separate in the sphere 
of decision-making, as it is the state that makes decisions and society that fo-
cuses on cultural and social values. The second part of the chapter discussed 
how these ideas developed into institutional arrangements, hence state practices. 
Third part suggested that the government was able to focus only on the external 
constraints in autumn 1939, because due to the state system and dominant prac-
tices, under which the decision-making and societal spheres were separated, the 
societal pressures did not reach the government. As the alternative discourses 
were not part of the public sphere, there was no need to negotiate between these 
understandings and therefore the government could focus on effectively imple-
menting the decision of avoiding military conflict. 
4.4.1. How-possible reversed  
The first case study of this dissertation discussed the state’s foreign policy 
decision-making under high systemic constraints to explain how it became 
commonsensical for the decision-makers to follow the logic of the international 
system, hence to concentrate on external constraints while deciding on the So-
viet demands in Autumn 1939. The next case study, the Finnish foreign policy 
decision-making regarding the Soviet demands in Autumn 1939, will show the 
domestic factors and constraints dominating in the decision-making process and 
explore how these societal understandings and the subsequent decision to not 
agree with the demands became possible for the decision-makers. This disserta-
tion argues that in order to understand how a decision becomes possible, the 
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societal understandings and practices must be explored. Therefore, the decision-
maker’s personal traits do not matter in the end of the day, but the social condi-
tions under which he operates. One aspect to support this point is that the pri-
mary decision-makers in these two cases, President Päts of Estonia and Foreign 
Minister Erkko of Finland, as described by their contemporaries and biogra-
phers, or by themselves, had some rather similar personal traits. Both of them 
have been described as spontaneous men who tended to make rapid intuitive 
decisions without lengthy consultations and wanted these decisions to be im-
plemented without delay (Brotherus 1973, 73; Pakaslahti 1970, 34; Laaman 
1999, 16; Päts 2001b 369–371). Both believed in strong and centralised leader-
ship (Brotherus 1973, 51; Pakaslahti 1970, 49; Virkkunen 1995; Päts 1999a) 
and neither of them was very close to his respective political party (Laaman 
1999, 1949, 310; Raud 1938; Brotherus 1973, 51). However, their decision-
making paths diverged because they operated under different social conditions, 
which influenced their understanding of the situation. The current dissertation 
suggests that focusing on how the state and society relationship was constructed 
helps to understand the complexities of the decision-making better and the  
decision-makers can be seen as exemplifying this construction. The next case 
study will focus on societal understandings and practices that made Finland’s 
foreign policy decision possible in autumn 1939.  
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CHAPTER 5. 
FINLAND’S FOREIGN POLICY DECISION IN 1939 
5.1. Introduction  
The following three chapters will tackle the question how Finland’s decision not 
to accept Soviet demands became possible for the decision-makers. This chapter 
will outline Finland’s foreign policy line and show that despite increasing 
external pressures, the policy did not change significantly in autumn 1939. The 
sixth chapter will explore the dominant societal discourses in Finland, their 
emergence, development and interaction. The seventh chapter will focus on 
how did these societal discourses influence the decision-makers’ and society’s 
understanding of the situation in autumn 1939 and made the decision not to 
accept the Soviet demands commonsensical for the decision-makers.  
The current chapter will explore the foreign policy decision-making as con-
ducted by Finland’s government in autumn 1939 with regard to the Soviet de-
mands. These demands included territorial concessions and the establishment of 
a Soviet military base on Finnish territory. The chapter focuses on the period 
between 5 October 1939, when the Soviet Union invited Finnish representative 
to Moscow, and 30 November 1939, when as a result of not reaching an agree-
ment on the Soviet demands, the Red Army attacked Finland. The section will 
outline Finland’s policy, focusing on the assumptions of rationalist thinking of a 
state’s foreign policy behaviour under high systemic pressures. According to the 
rationalist understanding, when a state’s physical survival is at stake, this con-
cern will overshadow all others in forming state’s behaviour. The state will aim 
to balance the threat, if possible with external help. The state’s decision-making 
is, according to the rationalist view, extensively influenced by the state’s rela-
tive military and economic power; in a conflict between two states where one 
has relatively higher military capabilities, the weaker one must focus on solving 
the conflict by any means as it is a conflict over autonomy for that state. Also, 
an increase in systemic pressures should have a constraining effect on the 
state’s foreign policy manoeuvring space. Therefore, an increase of the external 
threat or failure in balancing the threat should influence and change a state’s 
foreign policy behaviour.  
The chapter aims to show that Finland’s foreign policy did not change sig-
nificantly during that two month period, despite several moments where the 
systemic pressures increased. Hence, it will be argued that the systemic condi-
tions, the volatile international climate and the gradually increasing external 
pressures alone do not offer a sufficient explanation for Finland’s foreign policy 
behaviour in autumn 1939. To demonstrate this, the chapter will explore how 
the external threat was perceived and how the government understood the sys-
temic power distribution. In order to explore these aspects I first trace the policy 
decisions. I identify the starting point: how Finland’s policy line was formulated 
by the government at the time the invitation to negotiate was received on 5 Oc-
tober; next, were there any considerable changes in their policy line and what 
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were seen as the reasons for these changes; the end point: what was the policy 
before the launch of the Soviet military attack. Throughout this process I focus 
on the notion of external threats and pressures, meaning the moments where the 
external constraints increased and whether and how they changed the policy. 
Also, I follow the rationalist and/or systemic understanding of a state as a uni-
tary actor, hence the focus will be on the formal policy decisions of Finland’s 
government.  
5.1.1. Finland’s foreign policy in 1939 
Finland’s foreign policy in 1939, prior to the beginning of the World War, was 
based on policy of neutrality and a Scandinavian orientation.60 One of its main 
foreign policy priorities in the late 1930s was the fortification of the Åland 
islands together with Sweden. In 1939 the treaty on the fortification plan was 
signed, but as the Soviet Union’s attitude towards it was negative, Sweden 
stated in June 1939 that it would not proceed.61 However, it continued to be a 
priority for Finland and Finland continued working on it in the spring and sum-
mer of 1939. In 1938 the Soviet Union initiated unofficial, so-called, Jartsev 
talks62, where it requested to move the border in Karelia in order to secure 
Leningrad and to rent some islands in the Gulf of Finland, but no agreement 
was reached. In March 1939, the Soviet Union initiated official negotiations 
regarding renting islands. The Soviet government stated that if agreement would 
be reached it would then support the fortification of the Åland islands. The Fin-
nish government refused, arguing that this would violate the Finnish neutrality 
policy. In the spring of 1939, when Germany proposed non-aggression pacts to 
                                                     
60  For Finland’s foreign policy in the interwar years see Soikkanen 1983, Suomi 1973, 
Korhonen 1971, Kallenautio 1985, Paasivirta 1968, Apunen and Wolff 2009. 
61  Finland proposed the plan to develop a joint program to fortify the Åland islands to 
Sweden in 1937. The reasoning behind the plan was that in their current situation the islands 
were unprotected and in case of an external threat third countries could invade the 
archipelago between Finland and Sweden. Sweden first required the blessing from the Soviet 
Union, but after the Anschluss agreed to proceed with talks on the fortification of the islands. 
The inter-governmental treaty on the plan was signed in January 1939. One of the pre-
requisites of the treaty to take effect was that the Soviet Union should have agreed to it, but 
this did not happen. In June 1939 Sweden withdrew the issue from the parliament and 
thereby indefinitely withdrew from the process (Kallenautio 1985, 164, Paasivirta 1968, 100, 
Hentilä 1999, 176). Nevertheless, Finland continued pursuing the issue. 
62  In 1938, the government (Prime Minister A.K. Cajander, Foreign Minister Rudolf Holsti 
and Finance Minister Väinö Tanner) had been conducting unofficial negotiations with a 
KGB Officer, Boris Jartsev, who was officially a second secretary of the Soviet Embassy. On 
behalf of the Soviet government Jartsev requested to move the border in Karelia in order to 
secure Leningrad and also expressed the wish of the Soviet Union to rent some islands in the 
Gulf of Finland. After Eljas Erkko became the Minister of Foreign Affairs he broke off these 
unofficial negotiations. In March 1939, the Soviet Union initiated official negotiations and 
Boris Stein was sent to Helsinki to propose that Finland could rent some islands in the Gulf 
of Finland. Erkko refused, arguing that this would violate the Finnish neutrality policy. On 
the Jartsev talks see Tanner 1957, Suomi 1973, Apunen and Wolff 2009.  
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the Baltic and Nordic countries, the Finnish government first supported the idea. 
However, after Norway and Sweden refused, Finland followed them in refusing 
the non-aggression pact as its priority was a neutrality policy and its Scandina-
vian orientation.  
One of the main foreign policy concerns of Finland in the spring and sum-
mer of 1939 was the tripartite negotiations held between Britain, France and the 
Soviet Union, which included the security guarantees to Estonia, Latvia, 
Lithuania and Finland demanded by the Soviets. Although little information of 
these talks was available for the Finns, the government knew that the Soviet 
Union’s understanding of these guarantees was that the USSR would intervene 
if one of these countries would be attacked, even if this attack would be “indi-
rect”. As such understanding would have given the Soviet Union a possibility to 
intervene in its internal affairs, Finland strongly protested to Western states 
against these guarantees (Tanner 1957). The tripartite talks became stalled over 
the summer of 1939.  
The international climate in early October 1939, when Finland received the 
invitation for talks from the Soviet Union, had become more tense and volatile 
compared to the situation a few months earlier, as the long-term adversaries 
Germany and the Soviet Union had signed a non-aggression pact and the second 
World War had just begun with the invasion of Poland. The signing of the pact 
had come as a complete surprise. At first it was seen as a relief, as it finally 
stalled the tripartite negotiations on the Soviet guarantees to Finland and gave 
hope that Finland’s security situation would be stable with Germany and the 
Soviet Union no longer having a looming conflict with each other. However, 
the government received reports in early September that the pact did concern 
Finland, leaving it to the Soviet sphere of influence (Soikkanen 1983). Also, 
rumours about the Soviet Union’s intentions started spreading in Finland at the 
same time and were strengthened by the invasion and division of Poland (Soik-
kanen 1983; Blücher 1950). On 1 September, when World War II began, 
Finland both independently and together with other Nordic states issued a decla-
ration of neutrality. The tensions increased when in late September the repre-
sentatives of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania had all been invited to Moscow, and 
Estonia and Latvia had signed mutual assistance pacts with the Soviet Union 
(Estonia on 28 September and Latvia on 5 October), which included allowing 
Soviet military bases on their territories. Lithuania was to follow shortly and 
signed the pact on 10 October. 
5.1.2. Demands 
This was the international situation when Finland’s government received an 
invitation on 5 October 1939 to go to Moscow to discuss “concrete political 
questions” (Tanner 1957, 21). One of the tactics implemented by Finland’s  
foreign minister Eljas Erkko was to slow down the pace of negotiations. The 
Soviet talks with Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania had been conducted within a 
few days, with the Soviets enforcing the speed of the talks. Erkko’s tactic was 
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not to allow the other side to dictate the tempo.63 He decided not to go to 
Moscow himself, as the Latvian, Lithuanian and Estonian foreign ministers had 
done, but to send the Ambassador to Stockholm Juho Kusti Paasikivi instead. 
Paasikivi was a distinguished statesman and diplomat, very knowledgeable on 
Russia and had been the Finnish negotiator during the Tartu Peace Treaty in 
1919–1920. However, he was not a government minister and hence did not have 
decision-making authority. This meant that the Finnish delegation had to 
consult Helsinki about every step of the talks, which subsequently meant that 
the negotiators had to travel back and forth by train between Moscow and 
Helsinki, which slowed the tempo of the talks down. 
Before the visit, the government outlined its instructions for the negotiator. 
The instructions were based on the idea that Finland would keep to its foreign 
policy course, its neutrality policy and its Scandinavian orientation. Any mutual 
assistance pact, territorial concessions or boundary changes were out of the 
question, as they would violate the inviolability of Finnish territory (Tanner 
1957). The government started looking for external support immediately after 
the invitation from the Soviet Union had been received on 5 October. On 6 Oc-
tober the foreign minister met with the German ambassador to assert that Rus-
sia’s advances in Finland would be against German interests. Likewise, the Fin-
nish ambassador in Berlin met with the head of the German Foreign Office to 
require support for Paasikivi’s position in Moscow. However, because of the 
Soviet-German pact, the German side stood away from the issue (Jakobson 
1961, 109–111). On 7 October, the Finnish ambassador met with the US Secre-
tary of State to request a diplomatic intervention. On 12 October the US Am-
bassador to Moscow gave a note to Molotov from Roosevelt. Roosevelt wrote 
that the US wishes the Soviet Union to only present Finland with requests that 
do not go against peaceful and friendly relations and do not affect the independ-
ence of other countries (Manninen and Salokangas 2009, 241–242). Also, the 
Swedish, Norwegian and Danish ambassadors to Moscow presented notes to the 
Soviet government on 12 October, stating that Finland’s neutrality and the 
Scandinavian cooperation should be respected. These notes did not impress the 
Soviet side much. In case of the US, Molotov in a public speech told Roosevelt 
to focus on the independence of the Philippines and Cuba and in the case of the 
Scandinavian ambassadors, Molotov did not receive them (Jakobson 1961, 112–
113).  
The government recognised the external threat and started balancing against 
it: on 6 October military units were moved to the border and on 10 October the 
government called for extra reserve trainings, which in practice meant a partial 
mobilisation. It also urged city residents to move to less exposed locations and 
                                                     
63  Hence on 7 October, two days after presenting the invitation to Moscow, the Russian 
ambassador called Erkko to press for an answer stating that Finland’s attitude “was different 
from that of the Baltic countries”, to which Erkko, according to Tanner, replied that “he did 
not know how the Baltic countries had acted but that the Finnish government had not lagged 
in preparing and dispatching its answer; rather, it had considered the matter in the normal 
course of business” (Tanner 1957, 22). 
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air raid warnings and blackouts were practiced in Helsinki. Also, on 13 October 
the government extended its support base by including two representatives of 
the Swedish people’s party in the government (Tanner 1957). The changed in-
ternational conditions were recognised publicly, for example Minister Tanner in 
his speech on 8 October 1939, just after the invitation had been received, stated 
that “one now has to put away the idea that we live under ordinary circum-
stances” (Tanner 1956, 295).  
5.1.3. Policy after receiving the demands 
The negotiations between Finland and the Soviet Union lasted around one 
month and involved three visits to Moscow by the Paasikivi-led Finnish delega-
tion. On 14 October 1939, the Soviet Union, whose negotiators included Stalin 
and Molotov, presented demands to the Finnish negotiator Paasikivi. The Sovi-
ets based their demands on the justification that in the changed international 
climate and the freshly begun war the security requirements of the Soviet Union 
were altered and that it required security guarantees from Finland regarding the 
Gulf of Finland. Therefore, the Soviet Union demanded a mutual assistance 
treaty, territorial concessions, such as certain islands in the Gulf of Finland, a 
rather extensive border change on the Karelian Isthmus and the Finnish part of 
the Kalastajasaarento peninsula in Petsamo, the right of Soviet naval forces to 
use Lappohja Bay as an anchorage and the establishment of a naval base with 
Soviet military personnel at the port of Hanko.64 In compensation, the Soviets 
offered some territory in Eastern Karelia.  
After receiving these demands, Paasikivi required further instructions from 
the Finnish government. The latter replied that a mutual aid treaty and military 
bases and border changes or other territorial concessions were out of question as 
these demands would undermine Finland’s neutrality policy and would leave 
Finland defenceless. It allowed the negotiator to negotiate only over some is-
lands in the Gulf of Finland that were closest to the Soviet coast. During the 
                                                     
64  Soviet demands included: leasing the port of Hanko and the surrounding area for a 
period of 30 years in order to establish a naval base with 5,000 Soviet military personnel 
there. Also, in order to guarantee the security of Leningrad, a border change on the Karelian 
Isthmus was requested. It further requested cession of some islands, parts of the Petsamo 
peninsula, destruction by both parties of the fortified areas on the border on the Karelian 
Isthmus and the right of Soviet naval forces to use Lappohja Bay as an anchorage. The 
Soviet side also proposed a reciprocal aid treaty which it later (after the Finnish position that 
it would be out of question) changed to the reinforcement of the nonaggression pact that was 
in effect between the Soviet Union and Finland, by adding a stipulation to the effect that the 
contracting parties bind themselves to refrain from participation in such groupings or 
alliances of powers as may be directly or indirectly hostile to the other contracting party. 
During these negotiations the question of ceding the port of Hanko was the key issue for 
both delegations, with the Soviet Union constantly demanding it as their military base and 
Finland constantly opposing ceding Hanko (Tanner 1957, Manninen and Salokangas 2009). 
For Finland, this would have meant, similarly to Estonia, having a Soviet military base with 
Soviet soldiers on the Finnish mainland, not far from the capital.  
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next meeting with the Soviet negotiators they stated that this offer was com-
pletely inadequate and refused to negotiate on it. Finland’s negotiator then re-
turned to Helsinki to receive further instructions.  
After receiving the demands, Finland’s government tried to achieve a com-
promise with the Soviet side by working out a counterproposal that could in 
their opinion satisfy the Soviet ‘security needs. The key issue for the Finnish 
government from the beginning of the process was that the port of Hanko, one 
of the demands by the Soviet Union, could not be ceded as allowing foreign 
military base to Finnish territory would undermine its neutrality policy and 
Scandinavian orientation and would make it very difficult to Finland to defend 
itself. During the negotiations, which lasted around one month and involved 
three visits by the Finnish delegation led by Paasikivi to Moscow, the official 
position of the government on which the instructions to the negotiators were 
based did not change significantly. During the second round of negotiations 
Stalin claimed that the Soviet demands were minimal, and therefore non-nego-
tiable. Also, the Soviet side continued to emphasise the need for the military 
base at Hanko. Although the government agreed that some territorial cessions 
could be discussed65, it maintained that cession of the Hanko port was out of the 
question and did so with the approval and support from all the political party 
groups represented in parliament (Tanner 1957). 66 
5.1.4. Increasing external pressures 
There were two developments which from an external pressures and material 
capabilities angles should have influenced Finland’s foreign policy decision-
making. The first was the question of Swedish military aid that the Finnish  
government had high hopes for. However, already in the second half of Octo-
ber, the government was aware that assistance from Sweden was highly un-
likely.67 Nevertheless, this did not change the course of the Finnish state to keep 
                                                     
65  The concessions in question were: a few small islands in the Gulf of Finland and the 
option to discuss the Southern part of Suursaari and Ino and also Kalastajasaari. The 
Government was also ready to make minor concessions regarding the Karelian Isthmus 
(Manninen and Salokangas 2009, 261, Tanner 1957). 
66  On 29 October 1939, the Government had a meeting with the chairmen of Parliament 
factions. Prior to that the preparatory committees of all party factions had discussed the 
content of the demands and the government’s counterproposal it had presented to the 
chairmen of the factions on 28 October. At the meeting of 29 October, the heads of the 
factions expressed their satisfaction with the negotiations and the government’s counter-
proposal. According to Tanner all party groups stated that cession of Hanko is totally out of 
question (Tanner 1957, 52–55). 
67  In the beginning of the negotiations Finland started looking for balancing against a 
possible Soviet threat by asking Sweden for assistance. This was done just after the first 
round of negotiations on 18–19 October 1939 when Finland’s President Kallio and foreign 
minister Erkko flew to Stockholm to a regular meeting of the Nordic heads of states and 
foreign ministers. Although publicly the meeting was a success, during the meeting with the 
Swedish leaders Prime Minister Hansson said rather bluntly that Finland should not expect 
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its neutrality policy and Scandinavian orientation. The second development, 
which from an external threat perspective had a high potential to change the 
government’s policy, or at least have them very seriously reconsider it, was 
Molotov’s speech on 30 October 1939. In it, he outlined in detail all the 
demands made to Finland, which the latter had kept in strictest secrecy. 
Preceding that speech, the Finnish foreign minister Erkko had stated on 16 
October that there was no danger as long as the content of the proposals was not 
made public, but the situation would be different if it would become a prestige 
question for Stalin (Manninen and Salokangas 2009, 253). Hence, Molotov’s 
speech could have increased the Finnish motivation to reach a settlement, 
because the Soviet Union now also had to save face and the option that it would 
just drop the demands decreased after making them public. Nonetheless, neither 
this development, nor any other Soviet’s attempts to increase the pressure, such 
as incidents at the border and anti-Finnish radio propaganda (Nevakivi 1976, 
30), created substantial changes in the government’s instructions for their 
negotiators in Moscow. A crucial moment arrived during the third round of 
negotiations, as the government’s instructions for the Finnish delegation fore-
saw that if the Soviet Union did not agree to the Finnish offer, the negotiators 
were allowed to break off the talks as the Finns could not go further in their 
concessions. During the negotiations the Soviets kept requesting the port of 
Hanko and stressed that their demands were minimal. The new instructions 
came from Finland on 8 November stating that Hanko could not be discussed 
and that Stalin’s alternative option (for a group of islands to the east of Hanko) 
was out of the question too. The delegation left Moscow on 14 November. 
Nevertheless, the Finns did stress their readiness to continue the talks (Nevakivi 
1976, 35).  
After the negotiations broke down, Finland’s government started discussions 
on demobilising some of the soldiers. This action, supported mainly by Foreign 
Minister Erkko and Finance Minister Tanner was strongly opposed by Field 
Marshal Mannerheim, the Chairman of the Defence Council and by Defence 
Minister Niukkanen. However, this discussion was interrupted by the incident 
that later became known as “the shots of Mainila”. On 26 November, the Soviet 
side accused Finland of firing on the village of Mainila, which was on the So-
viet Union’s side of the Karelian Isthmus, and demanded that the Finnish army 
withdrew 20–25 kilometres from the border. Finland argued that it could not 
have fired on the village as there was no Finnish artillery in the area and sug-
                                                                                                                                  
any military assistance, as the Swedish nation wished to stay out of the war as long as 
possible. It has been later argued that Erkko was not entirely clear about this outcome to the 
other government members, who remained publicly optimistic about Scandinavian help and 
told the Parliament’s delegation that Sweden would make its decision only after the war had 
started (Manninen and Salokangas 2009, 259–260, also see Tanner 1957). However, other 
government ministers, such as the Social Democrat Finance Minister and second Finnish 
negotiator Väinö Tanner (Tanner 1957) and Defence Minister Juho Niukkanen were also 
aware of Sweden’s position through the information received from their party counterparts in 
Sweden. 
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gested that both sides would withdraw. In reply, the Soviet Union regarded the 
1932 Finnish-Soviet non-aggression pact void. The Finnish government sug-
gested setting up a joint committee to settle the issue, but before that proposal 
had reached the Soviet side, the latter had broken off its diplomatic relations 
with Finland. On 30 November 1939, the Red Army launched a military attack 
on Finland, which was the beginning of Winter War of 1939–1940.  
5.2. How was Finland’s foreign  
policy behaviour possible? 
The aim of this outline of Finland’s foreign policy behaviour in the autumn 
1939 was to show that despite increasing systemic pressures and a growing ex-
ternal threat, Finland’s foreign policy did not change significantly in autumn 
1939. The behaviour of Finland during that period has been called inflexible, 
stubborn and unrealistic (Kirby 1979; Vital 1971b; Soikkanen 1983; Paasikivi 
1958)68. The British Ambassador to Helsinki, T.M. Snow, called Finland’s 
stance in autumn 1939 “purely fatalistic” (cited in Nevakivi 1976, 30). This 
raises the question how the Finnish government could ignore the international 
situation of 1939. Did it understand the seriousness of the situation and the pos-
sibility of a war in case no agreement was reached? At the war cabinet meeting 
on 16 October 1939, negotiator Paasikivi defined the possible options in case no 
agreement with the Soviets could be achieved in the following terms: “1) war 
would break out; 2) nothing would happen (although the demands would not be 
officially dropped), or 3) the Russians would drop their demands” (emphasis 
original, Tanner 1957, 31). Foreign Minister Erkko called Soviet pressure a 
bluff and argued that the Russians were fighting a war of nerves. Therefore, 
Erkko strongly argued that Finland had to stick to its foreign policy line and 
stay firm (Manninen and Salokangas 2009). These issues were discussed also at 
the meeting with the chairmen of the factions in Parliament on 29 October. The 
chairmen of the Parliament’s factions all stated that their parties supported the 
government’s policy line. Field Marshal Mannerheim and negotiator Paasikivi 
disagreed with Erkko’s optimism and argued for more extensive concessions 
(Paasikivi 1986a; Tanner 1957). Also, Finnish military options were seen dif-
ferently by Field Marshal Mannerheim, who argued for greater concessions as 
he felt that the Finnish army was not in a position to fight, and therefore that a 
conflict should be avoided, and Defence Minister Juho Niukkanen who argued 
that Finland would be able to resist until mid-spring (Tanner 1957). Hence, al-
though some of the government members favoured greater concessions than 
others, the possible implications of not finding a settlement with the Soviets 
were considered. Defence Minister Niukkanen stated that “since Finland had 
agreed to keep to its absolute neutrality position through international agree-
ments and since ceding any military bases to a large state would contradict the 
                                                     
68  For example, Kirby (1979, 122) states that one reason for the breakdown of the talks was 
“the obduracy and unrealistic attitudes of the Finnish politicians.”  
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aforementioned neutrality policy, it was clear that we were about to get into a 
most difficult crisis situation” (Niukkanen 1951, 81).  
How could the Finnish government have had such a rigid position consider-
ing the great disparity in the military capabilities of Finland and the Soviet Un-
ion and the volatile situation in the rest of Europe? Why did the increasing sys-
temic pressures, such as the Soviet side suddenly making the content of the ne-
gotiations public, fail to influence Finnish foreign policy? After the negotiations 
broke off and in the aftermath of the war, the answer of some Finnish statesmen 
to this question was that it was the unrealistic expectations of some Finnish 
politicians and their failure to conduct a comprehensive foreign policy analysis, 
as they were convinced that the Soviets were bluffing, that took Finland to war. 
This thought was further strengthened by the aspect that a part of Finland’s 
military, most notably Mannerheim, had been a strong supporter for greater 
concessions based on the dangerous international situation and the great dis- 
parity between Finland’s and the Soviet Union’s military capabilities. Manner-
heim was also backed by Paasikivi, the Finnish negotiator. Nevertheless, these 
concerns did not change the government’s decision that it is impossible for 
Finland to allow Soviet military bases on the Finnish mainland. 
The current section showed that Finland’s foreign policy did not signifi-
cantly change in spite of high systemic constraints in 1939. It also showed that 
there were moments where the external threat increased, but these did not ef-
fectively affect the foreign policy either. Hence, focusing only on systemic fac-
tors does not explain the state’s foreign policy behaviour even under very high 
systemic constraints. Likewise, the simple assumption that decision-makers had 
idiosyncratic beliefs that made them fail to understand the extent of the sys-
temic pressures does not explain this state’s foreign policy behaviour either. In 
terms of Finland, the factor that Finnish politicians relied on some broader so-
cietal understandings and public support was mentioned already in the sources 
written in the 1950s-1970s, which mainly operated within the realist under-
standing of material capabilities and systemic constraints. For example, Kirby, 
who otherwise focused on Finland’s failure to solve the long-term security 
problems with the Soviet Union, argues that the government’s behaviour  
“echoed the feelings of the nation” (Kirby 1979, 122). Jakobson also draws on 
the Finnish historical experiences with Russia and states that when a Finnish 
delegation had its first meeting with the Soviets in Moscow, it was an informal 
one without an agenda. “And yet, in a historical sense, the meeting did not take 
place in a vacuum; it was not the beginning of something unknown, but rather 
one more in a long series of Finnish-Russian encounters stretching back several 
centuries” (Jakobson 1961, 114).  
The current study argues that the state’s decision-making cannot be fully ex-
plained by focusing only on the external constraints or the private beliefs of the 
statesman, but domestic discourses and understandings do have a role to play. 
Hence, in order to understand how this foreign policy decision became possible, 
the study will first focus on the national identities and dominant discourses in 
Finland. What were these “feelings of the nation”, how had they emerged and 
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developed? Why was the question of letting the Red Army base into Finnish 
territory so unacceptable within the domestic understandings? Was there a con-
sensus between different societal groups in this question and how had that been 
achieved? In order to answer these questions, the next chapter will explore the 
dominant national discourses and identities in Finland in 1939, their emergence, 
development and interaction, with a focus on the understanding of Russia and 
Russian-Finnish relationship within these discourses. 
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CHAPTER 6. 
FINLAND’S SOCIETAL DISCOURSES 
The previous chapter showed that focusing only on external factors does not 
explain the Finnish foreign policy decision in 1939; therefore, other factors 
must be explored. In line with the approach presented in the theoretical part, the 
next chapter will focus on the domestic factors and understandings. The aim of 
this chapter is to analyse the development and dynamics of dominant domestic 
discourses and interaction with relevant Other(s). Hence, to understand how 
Finland’s foreign policy decision in the autumn of 1939 became possible for the 
state, both domestic identity construction and interactions between the state and 
external actors must be considered. It will be shown that from the identity for-
mation angle, the most significant external Other for Finland was Russia; inter-
actions and confrontations with Russia ran through Finland’s history since the 
emergence of the Finnish national identity in the nineteenth century. Therefore, 
while focusing on dominant identity discourses within the society, the chapter 
will look how the emergence and development of dominant domestic identity 
discourses were influenced by the interactions with Russia and how it shaped 
the understandings of Self and Other. Hopf’s notion that there can be multiple 
Others who are not all necessarily state actors, and that the relationship between 
the Other and Self must not always be conflictual and that there can be multiple 
kinds of Others, will be followed (Hopf 2002, 2005). The chapter will show that 
there were six broad understandings that had developed in the process of shap-
ing the Finnish national and state identity and its relations and confrontations 
with Russia, with other relevant external actors and with each other during this 
process.  
6.1. The emergence, development and  
interaction between the main dominant discourses  
in Finland  
The aim of this chapter is to focus on the main domestic identity discourses 
present in Finland in 1939. It will be shown that the main domestic discourses 
relevant for this study are the following: 1) Constitutional; 2) Conciliation; 3) 
White Finland; 4) Red Finland; 5) Radical-nationalist; 6) Lawfulness front. The 
relevance was determined by the following aspects: 1) the discourse was domi-
nantly politically oriented. 2) The discourse had a broad and nation-wide 
reach – although certain understandings were more dominant in either urban or 
rural areas or among certain societal classes, all these six discourses spread 
nation-wide and were not just understandings from a small circle (although they 
might have started like one). 3) The discourse was present in state and societal 
understandings in 1939.  
These six discourses are presented as three chronological debates or cleav-
ages (1–2 Constitutional-Conciliation, 3–4 White and Red Finland, 5–6 Radi-
cal-nationalist and Lawfulness front). Although they are presented as three 
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pairs, it does not mean that the previous discourses had disappeared by the time 
the next one had evolved: although the importance of different understandings 
varied at different times, all six were present in 1939. Hence, earlier discourses 
did influence the development of later discourses and interacted with them. It is 
important to note that although some of these discourses are conflictual and/or 
developed as a reaction to another discourse, some are closer to each other and 
have overlapping characteristics. However, this does not mean that one deve- 
loped into another. For example, the White Finland and the Radical-nationalist 
discourses had much in common, but still both had their own distinguishable 
characteristics and narratives and interactions with the Others.  
6.2. Constitutional-Conciliation debate  
6.2.1. Introduction 
The beginning of Finnish political existence started in 1809 when Finland went 
from Swedish rule, under which it had been since the twelfth century, to 
Russian rule and became an autonomous Grand Duchy under the Russian Em-
peror. Before that, Finland “was a concept, but it was neither administratively, 
economically nor culturally, a definite unit” (Klinge 1982, 181) as different 
regions had separate connections to the administrative and economic centres. In 
March 1809, the Diet of Finnish estates convened in Porvoo69. Finland’s auto- 
nomy was extensive: Finland had its own senate (a body appointed by the tsar, 
composed of Finns), direct representation to the tsar, its own legal system and 
bureaucracy and in the second part of the nineteenth century also its own cur-
rency, postal system and customs border with Russia. The separation from 
Sweden and the 1809 Diet became increasingly seen by Finnish national 
activists as the beginning of the Finnish state (Jussila 1999). Although at first 
the meaning of the state was a “finance state” with a focus on its administrative 
role, soon after, Finnish national enthusiasts, who mainly consisted of Swedish 
civil servants, came to interpret the meaning of these events and the term ‘state’ 
in broader terms. This started in the 1840s through the writings of Professor 
Israel Hwasser who applied the natural law theory of the origins of the states to 
the act of pledging allegiance to the Tsar in 1809. Thereby he argued that at the 
Porvoo Diet Finns made a bilateral state treaty with the emperor and thereby the 
Finnish state had been founded (Jussila 1989 and 1999). By the 1860s these 
ideas developed into an understanding, popular among the Swedish speaking 
                                                     
69  The Porvoo Diet of Finnish estates that convened in 1809 was the birth of the concept of 
the Finnish state, as there Tsar Alexander I pledged to “confirm and ratify the religion and 
fundamental laws of the land as well as the rights and privileges which each Estate of the 
said Grand Duchy, in particular, and all the inhabitants, in general, both low and high, have 
hitherto enjoyed according to the constitution: We promise to maintain all those privileges 
and laws strongly and inviolably in full force” (cited in Huxley 1990, 83). The Diet consisted 
of four Estates: the Burghers, the Peasants, the Clergy and the Nobility.  
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civil servants and intelligentsia, that Finland was a state of its own, although not 
a sovereign one, governed by Finnish constitutional laws which had been af-
firmed by the Emperor at the Porvoo Diet. The Constitutional laws were the 
1772 and 1789 Swedish Constitutions and accompanying protocol. At the same 
time, a cultural awakening, led by the Fennoman movement70, was taking place 
in Finland. The political ideology of the Fennomans, largely developed by 
J.V.Snellman, was commonly considered a young-Hegelian stream, centred 
around idealism and nationalism and focusing on the strengthening of the im-
portance of the Finnish language (Klinge 1993 165, 199; Klinge 1982, 200).  
In the 1880s in Russia the sentiments of national chauvinism and aspiration 
to develop into a “one and indivisible” state were on the increase (Jussila 1999). 
Under circumstances where Russian media was increasingly attacking Finland’s 
special status, Leo Mechelin, a Finnish university professor and liberal politi-
cian, published in 1886 a book titled Précis du Droit public de la Grand-Duché 
de Finlande (The Features of the Grand Duchy of Finland’s Constitutional 
Law). Mechelin further emphasized the understanding that the Finnish constitu-
tional laws formed the basis of Finnish government and that these laws had 
been affirmed by the Emperor at the Porvoo Diet (Jussila 1999). These two un-
derstandings, the one in Finland that argued that Finland had gained a special 
status in 1809 and the understanding of Russia that strived for one centralised 
Russian state71 collided.  
This was followed by Russification periods (1899–1905 and 1909–1917), 
known in Finland as the Years of Oppression (sortovuodet). The period started 
with the Emperor’s February Manifesto of 1899, which stated that Finnish leg-
islation was subordinate to imperial legislation. It changed the role of the Fin-
nish Diet into merely an advisory one, which meant that the Senate could not 
reject legislature coming from Russia. The Manifesto was followed by the 1900 
language act, which made Russian the administrative language in Finland, and 
by the new conscription law, which incorporated the Finnish army into Russia’s 
army. The February Manifesto and the following period gave an impetus of 
emergence and development of two significant domestic discourses in Finland, 
the Constitutional and Conciliation lines, which sharply contrasted with one 
                                                     
70  By 1860s the Fennoman movement had gradually transformed itself into the Finnish 
Party, which was a political party group, loosely organised around its leaders and news-
papers (Soikkanen 1984a, 28; Mylly 1984, 15). 
71  Russia’s dissatisfaction with this Finnish understanding of its special status grew 
gradually. Although the Russification policies were implemented during the reign of 
Nicholas II, they were initiated already by the previous emperor, Alexander III who reigned 
from 1881–1894. He did not accept that Finland seemed to consider itself fully separated 
from Russia with all separate institutions, such as army, postal service, custom tariffs. 
Therefore, he started the Russification program when he understood that “the Finns, 
especially the Senate, regarded Finland as a separate country” (Jussila 1999, 64). In his 
answer to a communication from the Finnish senate on the issue of customs, the postal 
service and currency, he wrote “Does Russia belong to Finland or Finland to Russia?” 
(Jussila 1999, 64). 
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another and produced ideas and understandings that were still present in the 
political debates and public understandings in the autumn of 1939.  
6.2.2. Constitutional discourse 
The Constitutional discourse (perustuslaillisuus) was built on ideas that had 
been circulating since Hwasser’s writings in the 1840s: that Finland was a state 
with rights of its own, albeit not a sovereign one, and that its governing system 
was based on its constitutional laws. Although Constitutionalism is mainly as-
sociated with the Russification periods from 1899 onwards, the roots of this 
thinking can be found in the liberal reaction to the April Manifesto of 1861 
(Hyvämäki 1960; Huxley 1990). With this Manifesto, tsar Alexander II, in an 
attempt to compromise between the attitudes of Russia and Finland, declared 
that instead of convoking the Finnish Diet (which had not been convoked since 
1809) in order to adopt necessary legislation, a Committee composed of the re-
presentatives of the Estates would be convoked. This mobilised the early libe-
rals, the oppositional group in the emerging Finnish political scene,72 who saw 
that as a violation of constitutional laws. As a response, the liberal senate mem-
bers organised a signature collection to protest, addressed to the tsar, and the 
first mass political demonstration in Finland was organised by students in Hel-
sinki, where the demonstrators shouted, “Long live the constitution” (Huxley 
1990, 96). As argued by Huxley, “1861 set the pattern for future Finno-Russian 
political confrontations. It is no mere coincidence that many of those who 
adopted the ideology and methods of passive resistance at the turn of the his-
tory, as well as those who opposed them, had their first experiences of political 
action in 1861” (Huxley 1990, 97). These actions were followed by concessions 
from the tsar and the Finnish Diet was convened in 1863.  
In the 1880s, liberalism was growing in importance within Finland’s politi-
cal and cultural debate as the focus switched from Snellman’s political idealism 
to empiricism and positivism (Luukanen 1994, 23). As a result, two new politi-
cal groups emerged in addition to the Fennoman movement that by that time 
had gradually developed into a political group called the Finnish Party 
(Suomalainen puolue). The first group, called ‘Suecomania’, were pro-Swedish 
liberals who did not focus only on defending the role of the Swedish language, 
but also on the threat that the Finnish national movement presented to the old 
Swedish upper class. A second opposition group emerged within the Finnish 
Party in the 1880s. The group, called Young Finns (Nuorsuomalaiset), consisted 
                                                     
72  In 1861, no official political parties existed. The two general groups were called the 
“opposition”and the “government party”. “The border between the two was not clear and the 
opposition contained many disparate elements including a variety of still politically 
unorganised liberals and nationals. The opposition could be characterized by its adherence to 
certain principles such as freedom of speech and the press, lingual equity and the awakening 
of constitutional and national spirit. The term “government party” generally signified 
conservatives, which were by no means unified. Both terms, reflecting the politics at the 
time, were extremely vague” (Huxley 1990, 94).  
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mainly of urban intellectuals and was a liberal urban bourgeois political group. 
The split between Young and Old Finns (as the rest of the Finnish party came to 
be called) took place in 189473 (Soikkanen 1984b, 61, 63). It was the liberal 
Young Finns group, together with the Swedish Party and some workers groups 
(later the Social Democrats) who became the supporters and developers of the 
Constitutional discourse. 
The main idea of the Constitutional discourse was that Finland’s governing 
system was based on the Finnish constitutional laws, hence these laws held su-
premacy in Finland. According to the Constitutionalist understanding, the rela-
tions between Finland and Russia were regulated at the Porvoo Diet where the 
Emperor gave Finland a special status, regulated by the Constitutional laws. 
Therefore, the meaning of the February manifesto of 1899 that provided that 
Finnish laws became subordinate to Russia’s legal system was seen within the 
Constitutional understanding as a one-sided violation of the previous agreement 
by Russia and therefore perceived as “perjury”, “coup d’état”, “the instigation 
of military law” and “the murder of Finland”, (Jussila 1999, 70; Huxley 1990, 
145; Luukanen 1994, 33). Therefore, the relationship between Finland and Rus-
sia became one of mistrust for Constitutionals, as the existing agreement had 
been broken.  
Within the Constitutional discourse, compliance with the Finnish laws was 
seen as a sort of guarantee for the existence of Finland’s special status. As the 
1906 programme of the Young Finns party, the forerunners of the Constitu-
tional movement, stated: “The strongest support for the preservation of the Fin-
nish people’s sense of justice, the national independence based on it and the 
condition for peaceful reforms, is strict compliance with lawfulness and legal 
procedures” (quoted in Kulha 1989, 18). Finnish laws were seen as something 
that made Finland as worthy of being a state. As J.H. Erkko, a poet and Consti-
tutional activist wrote in 1900: “Law is the finger of justice. The sentinel of 
civilisation. Protect Finnish law” (Erkko 1900, 5).  
Since for the Constitutionalist discourse Finland’s national identity was 
based on constitutional laws and Finland’s special status, it was argued that law 
had always to be followed, regardless of the political situation. As Klinge points 
out, the constitutionalists were very strict in their formal legalism, which “re-
jected on principle any appeal to nationalism. Its opposition to ‘illegal’ legisla-
tion, espionage, bureaucracy in general and other expressions of authorita- 
rianism and autocracy was unrelenting” (Klinge 1993, 256). This was because, 
as historian Eirik Hornborg wrote in 1907, for constitutionalists following the 
law and not recognising orders that were against the Finnish law was not “a 
                                                     
73  The foremost focus of the Young Finns was the prioritisation of the Finnish consti-
tutional laws and legal system. They also stood for the reforms in the political system, such 
as extending the franchise and improving the conditions for the workers and women. In 
contrast to the Old Finns, the language issue was not the foremost priority. Because of their 
focus on election reforms and broadening the franchise, they also participated in giving 
impetus to the beginning of the Finnish labour movement (See: Luukanen 1994, Mylly 1984, 
16, Soikkanen 1984b, 63–65). 
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political program that the party could change according to the circumstances. It 
was a principle based in the end on the sentiment of individual values and 
dignity, for what one stood for and fell” (quoted in Paasikivi 1986a, 33). As the 
Constitutional publication Fria Ord/Vapaita Sanoja wrote: “those of our poli-
tical rights which we voluntarily allow to be taken from us cannot be retrieved, 
but those which are seized from us by violence can be redeemed” (quoted in 
Huxley 1990, 188).  
Therefore, refusing an order that they perceived to be illegal was not a 
choice for Constitutionalists, since they stressed the obligation of taking action 
for the principles of the movement. As constitutional activist professor Edvard 
Westermarck said in 1913: “It is often said as a consolation that justice will win 
in the end, but this is only a small consolation, since it is not true. There are no 
hidden powers taking justice to its victory. […] There is only one way; that we 
ourselves will help justice to the victory” (quoted in Paasikivi 1986a, 37). Com-
pliance with Constitutionalist principles meant exercising passive resistance. 
The popular definition of this concept was stated by legal scholar Rabbe Axel 
Wrede74 who argued 
Moreover, there exist certain means, which we have not only the right, but also 
the duty to use. It has often been said that we must set ourselves on the sturdy 
foundation of legality, never on any conditions departing from it. Thus, we must 
always, when need be, defend our fundamental laws [grundlagar] in word and 
deed; we must always obey the law ourselves, even in apparently insignificant 
matters. We must never cooperate with the violation of our constitution 
[författning] and never recognise illegal measures as legal or justified (cited in 
Huxley 1990, 139). 
The practical principles of passive resistance were stated by activist Viktor 
Theodoer Homén: 
“1. Consistent refusal to cooperate with any illegal or violent act committed 
by a stronger party; 2. That these violent commands not be obeyed, followed or 
advanced in any degree; on the contrary, the realization of the schemes against 
which passive resistance is aimed must be hindered through all legitimate 
means; 3. That the enforced system of violence never be recognized. Thus in 
short: non-cooperation, disobedience, nonrecognition” (Huxley 1990, 167).  
The way to comply with Constitutionalist principles for political groups and 
institutions carrying the constitutional identity was passive resistance: public 
servants who practiced it did not follow laws given by the governor-general as 
these were perceived as unconstitutional, and constitutional Senate members 
resigned from the Senate when they felt that they were forced to work on laws 
or issues that they deemed unconstitutional (Jussila 1999, 77). In 1901, some 
radical Constitutionalists formed an organisation called Kagal, with the aim to 
mobilise different parts of society to practice passive resistance. Kagal formed 
                                                     
74  Wrede’s statement became popular as in 1900, it was reprinted in constitutional 
underground press and circulated in thousands copies (Huxley 1990, 137). 
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special branches which worked with clergy, women, students, workers etc. For 
example, in order to hinder the implementation of the new Conscription Act, 
which was deemed unconstitutional, “priests could refuse to fulfil their duty to 
promulgate the imperial decree from the pulpits of the local parishes […]; doc-
tors could refuse to carry out the mandatory examination of conscripts” (Huxley 
1990, 149). In 1900, the constitutionalist press took up a “boycott of all things 
Russian”, such as peddlers, stamps, language and products. The constitutionalist 
battle was also fought on an international level, further increasing the awareness 
of Finland and its special status. The constitutionalist activists wrote articles for 
publications throughout Europe and many prominent European figures were 
asked to join in the protest. As a result, twelve “Pro Finlandia” addresses to the 
tsar were produced, signed by nearly 1,050 members of the European intelli-
gentsia, such as Max Weber, Herbert Spencer, Henrik Ibsen, Anatole France, 
Émile Zola, Florence Nightingale and Thomas Hardy (Huxley 1990, 148). In 
1903 many leaders of the Constitutional movement were banished from the 
country (Luukanen 1994, 33). 
Conciliation thinkers, most prominently the later president Paasikivi, have 
called the constitutional principles politically naïve as they reject the realpoliti-
cal power distribution (Paasikivi 1986a, 1986c). However, as was shown in the 
examples before, the constitutional discourse in its ideas and practices was 
wider than simply repeating the common slogan of Constitutionalism that “jus-
tice will win in the end”. Furthermore, one could argue that the passive resis-
tance as the means to comply with the constitutionalist framework was designed 
explicitly to address this power disparity. Huxley discusses Homén’s frame-
work on passive resistance, where the latter argued that “passive resistance pro-
vides a weapon by which a weaker people can defend itself against a stronger 
oppressor. It is, as he defined it, a method which requires just as much perse-
verance, manliness and love as armed struggle and which cannot be equated 
with either mild or radical protests which end in compliance with the 
oppressor’s demands” (discussed in Huxley 1990, 166–167). 
Huxley has also argued that Paasikivi, in his criticism, neglects how multi-
faceted the constitutionalist literature was, and therefore also the practical side 
of it. For Huxley, the focus of Constitutionalists was not merely to “preach right 
and justice but to put resistance into action” as “Finnish Constitutionalism was 
above all a movement and not merely a philosophy. […] For its part, the duty to 
resist was not derived merely from abstract principles, but from practical con-
siderations; in fact, in Finnish resistance principle and practice were interlinked 
and they could not be properly understood in isolation from one another. ‘The 
Great Question’75 for the resisters was that of survival or defeat and of resis-
tance or submission; the question of rightness and justice was therefore highly 
pragmatic” (Huxley 1990, 187).  
                                                     
75  Huxley points out that “the works of the resistance writers are abudantly entitled with 
rhetorical existential questions; “The Great Question” is from Toppola 1903 (Huxley 1990, 
187). 
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An important contribution of the Constitutional movement was that it took 
the concept of existence of the Finnish state, governed by the Constitutional 
laws, to the masses in Finland. During the nineteenth century, political aware-
ness and understanding of the implications of the Diet of Porvoo was shared 
only by a limited group of political elites, such as Swedish speaking civil ser-
vants and intelligentsia. Although awareness did increase during the reforms of 
Alexander II in the 1860s, it was the Constitutional movement during the Russi-
fication periods that rapidly increased the public awareness of Finland’s politi-
cal status in a broad cross-section of the Finnish society. The movement initi-
ated several mass actions such as the “Great Petition”, where half a million sig-
natures (nearly half of the adult population of the time) were collected and taken 
to St Petersburg by a delegation of 500 citizens all over Finland to deliver the 
“Great National Address” in protest against the Manifesto (Jussila 1999, 76). 
One of the most significant and popular symbols of that period is a painting by 
Edvard Isto called “The Attack” (see Figure 1. Hyökkäys) from 1899. The 
painting portrays a Finnish maiden on a stormy beach, attacked by a Russian 
two-headed eagle that is tearing the book of laws (“LEX”) away from her. 
Jussila has referred to the book of laws in the maiden’s hands as the “shield” 
(Jussila 1999, 76), as the law was the protection or weapon she had against the 
eagle. Thousands of copies of this painting were printed and spread fast to many 
Finnish homes.  
Therefore, the February Manifesto and the subsequent Russification policies 
gave an impetus to the further development of Finnish political identity. As said 
by contemporary Johan Jacob Ahrenberg, “[i]t was the railways and Bobrikov76 
that created an integrated Finland: the railways economically and Bobrikov 
politically” (quoted in Jussila 1999, 76). A contribution of the constitutionalist 
movement to Finnish political thought was the idea that during a period of cri-
sis, things will be sorted out in the end, as long as one complies with the law 
and keeps the ‘papers clean’. For the constitutionalist movement, the Finnish 
independence from Russia in 1918 proved this idea. It gave rise to the idea that 
in the time of crisis one absolutely must not compromise on one’s principles, 
since these are the basis for one’s existence. Constitutionalist thinking on the 
supremacy of the law over everything else was strongest among the urban intel-
ligentsia and the political elites.  
 
                                                     
76 N.I. Bobrikov who became the new Governor-General, Emperor’s representative in 
Finland, became the ‘face’ of the Russification period. 
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Figure 1. Hyökkäys77 
6.2.3. Conciliation side 
Conciliation discourse (myöntyväisyyslinja) stood in sharp contrast with the 
Constitutional approach. It was advocated by the Old Finns, a conservative part 
of the Finnish party, as the Fennoman movement had been known since the 
1860s. The Conciliation side argued that in Finno-Russian relations Finns had 
to acknowledge realpolitik and Finland’s dependence on Russia. The central 
figure in developing Fennoman’s, and hereby Old Finns’ political ideology was 
J.V. Snellman. By the 1860s, when the Fennoman movement had gradually 
transformed itself to a pressure group called the “Finnish party”, it adopted 
                                                     
77  See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Suomineito.jpg accessed on 14 September, 2012. 
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Snellman’s view of a state and society based Hegel’s theory (Soikkanen 1984b, 
58). As for Snellman, the obstacles for the Finnish national movement were 
associated with extensive Swedish influence. He therefore associated the ad-
vancement of Finnish culture with loyalty to the Russian tsar (Soikkanen 1984b, 
59)78. A state, according to Snellman, “[i]s the development of nation with the 
help of patriotism; a state is not a few sheets of paper which are called the con-
stitutional law or regulation” (cited in Jussila 1994, 44). A central theme in 
Snellman’s writings was the notion of national survival, which must be secured 
through the cultural development of a nation. For Snellman “in international 
conflicts national survival, the capacity of national defence, is proportional to 
cultural advancement”79 (Huxley 1990, 102). Therefore, for Snellman a Finnish 
nation could not protect itself from the Russian threat with violence, but only by 
cultural development (Huxley 1990, 103).  
Hence, during the Russification period the Conciliation side argued that 
flexibility towards new Russian policies and partial concessions was necessary 
(Klinge 1993, 166; Soikkanen 1984b, 65). The discourse was based on the un-
derstanding that a state’s foreign policy options are determined by its capabili-
ties and therefore realpolitik must be prioritized over legal and patriotic ques-
tions. Juho Kusti Paasikivi, a prominent Old Finn, a Conciliation activist, politi-
cian and diplomat in independent Finland and the head of the Finnish delegation 
during the negotiations with the Soviet Union in autumn 1939, explained the 
conciliation/Old Finnish principles in the following way: “We Old Finns saw 
the Russian-Finnish conflict less from the legal state-law perspective, but 
mainly from the political and international perspective” (Paasikivi 1986a, 39).80  
The Conciliation line followed the realpolitik understanding of the interna-
tional world: the relationship between Finland and Russia was determined by 
their extensive power disparity (See Paasikivi 1986a, 1986b, 1958). Therefore, 
as argued by Paasikivi: “if the difference between the powers is monumental, 
one has to avoid conflict altogether” (Paasikivi 1958, 184). The constitutionalist 
line argued that as it was a geopolitical reality that Russia is Finland’s neigh-
                                                     
78  Subsequently, Russian authorities who had considered the Fennomans radicals in the 
1840s realised by the late 1850s and the early 1860s “that the Finnish nationalists could 
serve to counter Scandinavism and liberalism in Finland and the threat they posed to 
Finland’s relations with Russia” (Soikkanen 1984b, 59). Hence in the early 1860s several 
positive developments took place for the Finnish National movement. The Diet was 
convened in 1863 for the first time in more than fifty years and after that started meeting 
regularly. The same year, Alexander II issued a language decree by which Finnish would 
gradually become an official language (Soikkanen 1984b, 60). 
79  Huxley points out that Snellman’s understanding on culture is a very broad one here, 
“signifying a society’s whole sociopolitical and economic way of life” (Huxley 1990, 102).  
80  It is important to note that Paaskivi wrote these memoirs in a post- World War II 
environment, in a context of justifying his own political thought, the Paasikivi line. Huxley 
has argued that the memoirs “can be seen as a political act in which the master diplomat 
carves out his own line in distinct contrast to what he persuasively, with the deadly empathy 
of Realpolitik paternalism, depicts as the ruins of idealistic and unpragmatic Constitu-
tionalist resistance politics” (Huxley 1990, 8).  
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bour and as the power disparity between the two countries was extensive, 
Finland could not afford a conflict with Russia. Paasikivi argued that the aim of 
Old Finns/conciliation side was “avoidance of disagreement with Russia. Our 
argument was simple. Finland was the neighbour of the Russian power. […] 
Russian supremacy was monumental” (Paasikivi 1958, 175). Therefore, the 
conciliation line advocated for tactical co-operation with Russia, since for them 
in order to ensure the continuation of the cultural and national development of 
Finland, Russia’s new policies had to be accommodated. As explained by 
Paasikivi, “[w]e had to find a modus vivendi and have good relations, so that 
Russia would not only accept/tolerate Finland’s special status, but also consider 
it the best choice for itself” (Paasikivi 1958, 175).  
The Conciliation side, to whom in the international world the material capa-
cities (power politics) mattered most, regarded the constitutionalist arguments 
as unrealistic, naïve and not the foremost priority. Paasikivi stated: “As long as 
there is no success with enforcing the implementation of the international law, 
the physical and material power and size will unfortunately mean more within 
the relations of states than one often wants to think” (Paasikivi 1986a, 45). The 
understanding that “clean papers” and following the law would not help against 
a brutal external force was developed by J.R. Danielson in his 1901 publication 
titled “In which direction?” (Mihin suuntaan?). He wrote:  
We Finns have a beloved proverb: ‘Justice will inherit the land’ (Oikeus maan 
perii). That’s where we seek protection, on that we have used to build our future, 
individually and as a nation. […] For long we have been too tolerant towards the 
approach that as long as our papers are right and we have festive affirmations of 
the monarch on our side81, then final victory of our cause is certain. One forgets 
that history with its unmerciful hand will cast aside all these formal rights, if they 
are not any longer suitable for the present circumstances. Therefore, in the end 
our relations with Russia will not depend on the content of old declarations, but 
on to which extent our special position within the empire advances the essential 
interests of our own country, but also of the whole empire (quoted in Paasikivi 
1986a, 46).  
When the Conciliation side criticised the Constitutionals for ignoring the politi-
cal reality, the Constitutionalist side responded that the Conciliation side served 
Russian rather than Finnish interests and one of their reasons to co-operate with 
the Russian authorities was that many of them were in high positions in the 
administration. Since many civil servants and political activists representing the 
Constitutional side resigned from their positions or (in the case of civil servants) 
were dismissed, they were replaced by the Conciliation side (Soikkanen 1984b, 
65). During the second Russification period (1909–1917) the division between 
the Constitutional and Conciliation lines were reduced. This was partly because 
of the successful co-operation experience during the general strike of 1905, the 
main aim of which was “to restore the lawful conditions” (Jussila 1999, 79) and 
                                                     
81  Reference to the Porvoo Diet in 1809 and the declaration by Alexander II. 
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because the revolutionary sentiments brought the bourgeois groups closer 
together. Also, Russia’s Russification policies in 1909–1917 were considered to 
undermine Finland’s special status so severely that even the Conciliation/Old 
Finn side could not agree to them.  
6.2.4. Conclusion 
The Constitutional-Conciliation debate created and developed two narratives to 
the political-societal thought in Finland: one where the decision-making was 
associated with the domestic norms and values and one where it was determined 
by the capabilities. The Constitutional discourse was based on the idea that the 
starting point for the state’s behaviour is within the state’s domestic legal sys-
tem as this is what carries the national principles and determines the relation-
ship with external actors. In contrast, for the Conciliation line the state’s be-
haviour was determined by its material capabilities and geopolitical realities. 
Through this debate “the ‘Russian question’” became the most important politi-
cal dichotomy in Finland (Jussila 1999, 78). The debate brought the under-
standing that Finland was given a special status in 1809 and was a state, albeit 
not a sovereign one, governed by Finnish constitutional laws, to the masses. 
Also, since the dominant perception was that the constitutional laws and thereby 
the status of the Finnish state, were threatened by the Russification policies, 
Finnish nationalism increased. As Jutikkala has argued, during the interwar 
period the Russification times were dominantly seen through the lenses of the 
Constitutional discourse (Jutikkala 1984, 208, cited in Huxley 1990, 7). As will 
be shown in the following sections, the narratives created by the Constitutional-
Conciliation debate strongly influenced the perceptions on what was considered 
‘legitimate’ and therefore socially possible in Finnish politics between the two 
World Wars. Apunen and Rytövuori point out, “Since the legal defence of 
Finland’s autonomy, Finns had a tendency to judge political problems in the 
framework of legal principles and norms” (Apunen and Rytövuori 1982, 71). 
6.3. White and Red Finland 
6.3.1. Introduction 
During the Russification period the Russian question formed the main division 
in Finnish political life. This divided the conservative Old Finns, carrying the 
conciliation discourse and the Constitutionalists: the Young Finns, the Agrarian 
Union, the Swedish Party and the Social Democrats. However, the general 
strike of 1905 and the revolutionary sentiments that spread from Russia to Fin-
land started creating a gap between the Social Democrats and the bourgeois 
sides of society and in turn brought the bourgeois forces together (Jussila 
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1999).82 The overwhelming victory of the Social Democrats during the elections 
of 1907, where they received 80 seats out of 200 and in 1917 when they re-
ceived 103 out of 200, further increased tensions between the bourgeois and 
non-bourgeois side of Finland. This was because in the context of the develop-
ments in Russia, their electoral victories were perceived as a threat by the bour-
geois side. The gap between the bourgeois and socialist sides widened rapidly 
after the overthrow of the Russian provisional government on 7 November 
1917. The aim of the bourgeois side was to become independent as soon as pos-
sible and their policy was German oriented. The aim of socialists was also to 
become independent but to do it by a manifesto for the new Russian govern-
ment (Hentilä 1999, 101).  
In early December 1917 the Finnish Senate, dominated by the bourgeois 
parties, declared Finland an independent country and the Russian Bolshevik 
government recognised Finnish independence in late December 1917. However, 
a central concern for the Finnish government was the presence of Russian sol-
diers in Finland (Hentilä 1999).83 The rapidly increasing tensions between bour-
geois and non-bourgeois groups were complemented by an uncertain situation 
in Russia. Combined with both sides having been forming paramilitary groups, 
the White and Red Guards, this led to the Finnish civil war. The civil war took 
place from January to May 1918 and was fought between the ‘White’ bourgeois 
army assisted by Germany and the ‘Red’ army assisted by Russia. Although it 
was short, with actual fighting lasting only two to three months, it resulted in 
more than 30,000 deaths, more than 25,000 of these being on the Red side 
(Hentilä, 1999, 110). The civil war left Finland deeply divided between the 
“White” bourgeois as winners and the “Red” working class as the defeated. The 
beliefs and understandings that developed during the war and in the aftermath 
of it had a very strong influence both on political and societal life in the inter-
war period. The next section will explore the emergence of two sides, the de-
velopment of the Red and White discourses and how they interacted in the 
interwar period.  
6.3.2. White Finland 
White Finland united the bourgeois (porvari) side of society. For the White side 
of Finland the meaning of the 1918 war was a liberation war, a struggle to get 
Russian troops out or war against a Red rebellion and coup (Klinge 1993; 
Hentilä 1999). The main unifying characteristics of White Finland were the 
                                                     
82  For example, although the Finnish political parties started their campaign for a general 
strike with the aim to change the existing political system together, in the end of the strike 
there was disagreement on the process of change between the Constitutionalists, who wanted 
the legal option and the Diet to enact a new Parliament act, and the Social Democrats who 
argued for a revolutionary constituent assembly (Jussila 1999, 80). 
83  Although the number was on the decrease, there were still around 42,000 Russian 
soldiers present in Finland in January 1918 and the Russian side did not show great interest 
in solving the question (Hentilä 1999, 106). 
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strong anti-Russian and anti-communist sentiments and the acute awareness of 
the Soviet threat. Finland became seen as the border between East and West, “as 
the outpost of western civilization” (Paasi 1997, 47). Within this discourse the 
Reds were traitors as they fought with Russian army and White Finland be-
lieved that if the Reds would have won Finland would have not achieved its 
independence from Russia (Hentilä 1999, 113). The non-bourgeois part of the 
society, which had fought with the Finnish enemy were seen as untrustworthy 
and subsequently as an extension of the Soviet threat. Mannerheim, the head of 
the White Army in 1918 stated that “socialists are incapable of defending demo-
cracy” (quoted in Rintala 1961, 85). Consequently, the values of the non-
bourgeois side of society, the ones of the labour movement, were seen as of 
criminal nature in White Finland (Hentilä 1999, 120). Therefore, it was accept-
able within this discourse for the bourgeoisie to work against the strengthening 
of trade unions and to set up organisations such as Vientirauha OY, which was 
an employer-financed strike-breaking organisation84 (Alapuro and Allardt 
1978).  
The key symbols of White Finland were centred on the victory of the libera-
tion war. For example, the memorial day of the war of liberation in May was at 
first considered a more important celebration than the Independence Day in 
December (Hentilä 1999, 119). Another important symbol of the civil war was 
seen in the Jäger battalion. This light infantry battalion of around 1,000 men85 
fought on the German side during World War I and later in the White army 
where they significantly enhanced the fighting strength of the army (Hentilä, 
1999, 110). After the civil war, former members of the Jägers held many high 
places in the Finnish army and, as Ahto points out, “the spirit of the army was 
expressly the Jäger’s spirit” (Ahto 1989, 17). The idea that the Jäger movement 
brought into the Finnish society, one that was strongly promoted by right-wing 
political forces during the interwar period, was that a small group, when extre-
mely motivated, can achieve improbable goals. As the newspaper Suomen 
Sotilas explained in 1927: “Our archenemy is still in his external power rela-
tions superior to us. Nonetheless, we are looking towards the future bravely. 
The fact that the Jägers, who dared anything, are heading our armed forces is 
suited for creating a feeling of safety in us” (quoted in Ahto 1989, 18). 
                                                     
84  Vientirauha OY had up to 43,000 men on its list and it enabled companies to break many 
strikes and disputes (Alapuro and Allardt, 1978, 129). The working class called the strike 
breakers ‘blacklegs’ and they were seen as contributors to the proletariat’s difficulties. 
However, strike breakers themselves saw their activities within a White Finland discourse, 
hence they were protecting their country and defending the rights of the “willing ‘White 
Worker’ against the Communist terror in the workplace” (Hentilä 1999, 152). Another 
organisation was the Civil Guard, founded in 1923 with the aim to safeguard White Finland, 
and it called on “all patriotic citizens to join its anti-Communist activities” (Hentilä 1999, 
148–149).  
85  The size of the battalion was actually 1,400 men, but about 400 remained in Germany, 
“not wanting to fight the Reds because of their own working-class background or ideological 
convictions” (Hentilä, 1999, 110). 
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The most unifying aspect of the White bourgeois side of Finland was their 
attitude towards the Russian question and the Soviet Union. However, in other 
aspects it was not a monolithic block, but represented different political ideolo-
gies and understandings. These differences had been frozen during the time of 
acute external threat, but reappeared in the immediate aftermath of the civil 
war.86 Although the whole bourgeois side condemned communism, the left 
wing of the National Progress Party (the former Young Finns) and a part of the 
Agrarian Party differentiated between the communists and the social demo- 
crats/labour movement. Although this wing of White Finland still saw the 
Soviet Union as the main external threat, it became gradually possible for them 
to co-operate with the Social Democrats and also to work on issues of social 
reform and national reconciliation. One of the important signs of the focus on 
the national reconciliation among some bourgeois circles was the decision by 
the Agrarian President Relander to install a Social Democrat minority govern-
ment in late 1926. His justification for that was that the exclusion of the Social 
Democrats was unhealthy for the society and that the events of 1918 should not 
play a role in the handling of the politics of the day (Tanner 1966, 78–79).  
The conservatives (Coalition party) and the radical right wings of White 
Finland (Lapua, Patriotic People’s Movement) focused on the need for a strong 
government in order to protect the country against external and internal 
threats.87 For this part of White Finland, the Reds were seen as a monolithic 
pro-communist bloc and considered an internal threat to Finnish values, which 
within this understanding were the values of ‘White Finland’. It came as a 
shock to them when the social democratic government, led by Väinö Tanner 
came to power in December 1926. Iltalehti wrote: “It is rather telling about our 
situation that only nine years after the socialist coup the socialists can be the 
                                                     
86  For the conservative side, consisting of Old Finns (who became a Coalition Party in 
1919), the Swedish People Party and some of the Young Finns, one of the causes for the civil 
war was the universal suffrage of 1906. Therefore they argued that the focus of the new state 
should be on a strong government authority and aimed at introducing a monarchy in Finland. 
They claimed that according to the 1772 constitution Finland, by law, already was one. The 
more liberal centrist understanding, advocated by the Agrarians and some Young Finns (this 
part of Young Finns became a liberal National Progress Party in 1918), argued for a 
parliamentary democracy, for social reforms they had supported before and for national 
reconciliation (Soikkanen 1984b, 71–72). The Social Democrats were not part of the 
parliament at the time (as many elected members had fled, some had been executed and 
many were in prison camps) and had no opportunity to participate in political decision-
making from May 1918 to February 1919 (Hentilä 1999, 121). The plan to introduce a 
monarchy failed because of consistent resistance from the Republican side (Agrarians and 
part of the Young Finns) and because of a change in the international arena after Germany 
collapsed militarily (Hentilä 1999, 124–125, Kallenautio 1985) This conservative/liberal-
centrist division of the bourgeois kept growing in the interwar period.  
87   In the late 1920s, the Coalition party moved towards strong right wing nationalism as the 
party supported the right-wing Lapua movement and in 1933 contested the elections together 
with the Patriotic People’s Movement (IKL), which was the successor of the Lapua 
movement. The conservative conciliation principles were carried on by the moderate wing of 
the party, led by Paasikivi (Soikkanen 1984b, 82). 
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supreme executor of state power, even though accidentally. This is no victory of 
popular sovereignty, but it is caused by temporary party groupings, based on 
short-term governments established by chance. When people [emphasis mine] 
can choose, then supremacy of power will be in other hands than Mister Tan-
ner’s; this society is still that much bourgeois” (Tanner 1966, 89–90). This arti-
cle is a good example of the understanding of the ‘winning’ side of the society, 
stating that the only reason why the Social Democrats were in power was as a 
result of political games, as Finland’s society could not possibly be behind it. 
The article claimed to argue in the name of the ‘people’, but ignored the fact 
that a large part of the Finnish people voted for the Social Democrats, as it was 
the largest party in parliament since 1907 and continued to be so most of the 
interwar period. However, for this part of the bourgeois, the Social Democrat’s 
popularity and election victories were not an argument. As argued by the vice-
chairman of the Coalition Party Edwin Linkomies in a speech in 1936: “It has 
been claimed that if people give their votes to socialists, then these are also 
good enough for governing. Logically, then also the communists should be eli-
gible for inclusion in parliament and government. The actions of socialists are 
dangerous for the state and society. This is why their access to the government 
must be prevented” (quoted in Soikkanen 1983, 102). Following a similar logic, 
that socialists and their values are an internal threat, President Svinhufvud did 
not allow the Social Democrats to form a government with the Agrarians in 
1936 despite the election victory of the Social Democrats. Svinhufvud argued 
that “Finland is in too dangerous position for Social Democrats to govern it” 
(Soikannen 1983, 102). Svinhufvud stressed that social democrats are against 
national defence and that their inclusion in the government would have a de-
pressing effect on the bourgeois circles. He did not believe that social democrats 
had truly given up the revolutionary cause and if they “would secure the upper 
hand in society, they would focus all their programs towards the revolutionary 
aims” (Soikkanen 1983, 102). As White Finland had won the civil war with 
German military help and as Jägers had been fighting in Germany, the later was 
seen as a balancer of the Soviet Union by the conservative part of White 
Finland in the interwar period. President Svinhufvud stated in 1937 that “Rus-
sia’s enemy must always be the friend of Finland” (quoted in Jakobson 1961, 
20).  
Another issue where opinions of the bourgeois parties differed was language. 
The Finnicization movement (aitosuomalaisuus) argued for further rights of the 
Finnish language and disputed the status of the Swedish language as a official 
state language. This issue enjoyed wide public support, and one of its main fo-
cus points was the demand, initiated by the Academic Karelian Society (AKS) 
in 1924 that language of the academy at the University of Helsinki should be 
unilingual instead of bilingual. The AKS’s activities gained support in the 
Agrarian Party who had language reform as one of its priorities since 1925. 
Within the conservative Coalition party the more right-wing argued for Finnish 
to become the only state language in its programme in 1929. The language de-
bate allowed for co-operation between the otherwise sidelined Social Democ-
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ratic Party and the Swedish People’s Party, as the Social Democrats were  
neutral in language issue (see Soikkanen 1984b, 74–76).  
The increasingly volatile international climate in the mid-1930s made White 
Finland focus more on raising the defence will of the whole society and there-
fore on the need to increase the spirit of national unity in Finland. As historian 
Danielson-Kalmari writes in a Civil Guard publication in 1932, “We cannot 
close our eyes from that truth, that Russia, as one can see in advance, will try to 
reconquer Finland sooner or later. If we are then still fighting these petty fights 
[…] then we are not able to combat the danger” (quoted in Ahto 1989, 21). In 
order to create this unity within White Finland, the bourgeois ideologues fo-
cused on changing the attitudes towards the Reds in the late 1930s. The Civil 
Guard ideologue Aarno Karimo wrote in 1937 that “the majority of the Red 
Guards were certainly people who in good faith, and fully misguided, partici-
pated in this sad rebellion” (quoted in Ahto 1989, 11). Ahto points out that that 
was a major change compared to the previous ‘traitor’ discourse towards the red 
side of the civil war (Ahto 1989, 11).  
6.3.3. Red Finland 
For the Red side of the society the civil war of 1918 was largely a class war 
where the bourgeoisie and the working class fought each other (Hentilä 1999, 
114–115). As within the discourse of White Finland labour values were consid-
ered unpatriotic, the working class was politically powerless in the 1920s and 
early 1930s (Alapuro 1980, 87–88). The trade unions were weak and working 
class salaries were significantly lower in Finland compared to the Scandinavian 
countries. The Social Democratic Party (SDP) recovered fast after the civil war. 
This was possible since there had been a revisionist group, led by Väinö Tanner, 
who had not gone along with the revolution and therefore was able to restart the 
party, at a time when many socialist leaders either had fled, were killed or were 
in prison. Tanner was clear from the beginning that in his opinion the revolu-
tionary attempt of the Reds was a mistake. In a speech at the 1919 party confer-
ence he stated “Only a few years ago the working class had the keys in their 
hands for state and societal reforms [...] This strong position was however de-
stroyed by the hopeless coup based on wrong calculations” (Tanner 1956, 72). 
The SDP took a clear orientation towards the Scandinavian social democratic 
parties immediately after the civil war. The main division among Red Finland 
was thus between the moderate wing, which saw their role model in Scandina-
vian social democratic movements, and the Soviet orientated communist wing. 
The left wing of the social democrats split from the SDP in 1919 and estab-
lished in 1920 the Finnish Socialist Labour Party, which had a communist pro-
gramme (Tanner 1966, 21). This party was able to operate, albeit with some 
difficulties, in the 1920s, although their actions were effectively curbed by the 
bourgeois side. During the peak of the Lapua movement in 1930, the parliament 
passed anti-Communist laws, which excluded communists from the political 
sphere. However, the activities of communists helped to feed the fears within 
122 
some bourgeois circles that the entire non-bourgeois side of Finland should be 
seen as an internal threat.  
The Social Democratic Party was the largest group in parliament for most of 
the interwar period. When in the aftermath of the civil war bourgeois Finland 
did not consider Red Finland trustworthy to govern, it was also out of question 
for socialists themselves to participate in the government of a bourgeois society, 
and even “speaking about a minister’s socialism was labelled betrayal” (Tanner 
1966, 77). Although it was impossible for the Social Democrats to enter the 
government in the early 1920s, they, being also the largest party in the parlia-
ment, had a pivotal ‘balancer’ role and mainly supported centre-based coali-
tions, obtaining concessions on important matters in return (Hentilä 1999, 135). 
This also further established the tradition of co-operation with centrist parties 
such as the Agrarian and the National Progress Party. One of the signs of this 
co-operation, and also that the sentiment for national reconciliation was on the 
increase within the liberal side of the bourgeois, was that following the proposal 
by Agrarian President Relander, the Social Democratic minority government 
came to power in December 1926 and governed for a year.88 Despite some co-
operation between the liberal wing of bourgeois parties and the Social Demo- 
crats, the latter still stood outside of the mainstream discourse of Finland’s so- 
ciety in 1920 as that remained White Finland’s. 
The prevalence of the understanding that White Finland’s discourse was the 
‘correct’ and official societal discourse was showed by the decision of conser-
vative president Svinhufvud in 1936 to prevent the Agrarian League from 
forming a coalition government with the Social Democrats. Therefore, in a 
speech before the presidential elections in 1937, Tanner stated that the Coalition 
party is the “number one enemy of the nation”. Tanner argued that the right 
wing tried to carry out “some kind of home grown parliamentarism” within 
which “one does not have to give any significance to the results of the parlia-
ment elections while forming the government, but these can be coldly ignored. 
[…] We, social democrats, have been labelled as second class citizens” (Soik-
kanen 1983, 113). 
The situation gradually changed in the second half of the 1930s and particular-
ly with the broad centre-left, so-called Red-Earth (punamulta) coalition govern-
ment, formed in 1937.89 One of the most divisive issues between the bourgeois 
and non-bourgeois Finland had been the different prioritization of the national 
                                                     
88  In December 1926 President Relander proposed Tanner as the Chairman of the largest 
parliamentarian faction to establish a government. Tanner negotiated with the Agrarian 
Union, the Progress Party and the Swedish left to form a coalition, but all parties rejected the 
offer. President Relander urged Tanner to continue, arguing that the nation was divided and 
the events of 1918 still played a role in the handling of politics. Thus, “[i]f social democrats 
are willing to go to the government, ready to take the responsibility even alone, then, in my 
opinion, this is an act, that event solely must awaken society” (Tanner 1966, 78–79). In 
December 1926, President Relander installed the social democratic government. 
89  The Red Earth (punamulta) coalition government consisted of the Social Democrats, 
Agrarians and the National Progress Party.  
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defence question. National defence was one of the most important questions for 
White Finland, whereas for the Reds it was first of all a bourgeois question and 
secondly, through the civil war connotation, this issue was considered working 
class-hostile. The attitude of the Social Democrats on the question of defence 
policy started changing in the second half of the 1930s. One of the reasons was 
that the working class’s living standards had improved, and as stated by the 
head of Social Democrats Väinö Tanner in 1937, that “the conditions of the 
working class have improved and it now has something to defend” (Tanner 
1956, 156, 259). Another reason was the changing international climate, and 
Hitler’s rise to power in particular. SDP politician J.W. Keto observed in 1937 
that “this changed situation forces us to some extent to think differently than 
before about defence politics [...] The defence establishment is unavoidable in 
order to safeguard our borders and defend our neutrality in the power battles of 
the big states, which currently looks almost inevitable” (quoted in Ahto 1989, 
17). Consequently, in May 1939 the Social Democrats adopted a national 
defence program.  
6.3.4. Conclusion 
The current section discussed the deepest cleavage within Finland’s society in 
the interwar period, the one between White and Red Finland. The 1918 civil 
war left the country deeply divided between winners and losers, where White 
Finland’s understanding of the civil war and subsequently of the societal values 
and priorities became the dominant state understanding. The extent of this divi-
sion is shown by the aspect that although the gap was significantly reduced in 
the 1920s and 1930s and the external threat in the late 1930s made both sides 
move closer to each other and find some common ground, the dominant under-
standing of the meaning of the civil war remained the one of White Finland: it 
was a war of liberation against a Red coup.  
6.4. Radical-nationalism and the lawfulness front 
6.4.1. Radical-nationalism 
Although the bourgeois side of the society had several important unifying 
characteristics, such as seeing the Soviet Union as the foremost threat to 
Finland’s independence, it was not a homogenous group. While the centrists, 
liberals and some moderate conservatives saw themselves as nationalist, patri-
otic and anti-Russian, they also prioritised national reconciliation and social 
reforms and gradually started distinguishing between the Finnish labour move-
ment and communism. However, a separate discourse existed within White 
Finland, whose perception of an acute Russian threat saw any kind of compro-
mise with the left as unpatriotic and against national interests. This discourse 
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was carried by several activist organisations, created in the aftermath of the civil 
war, whose aim was to protect Finland from the perceived Soviet threat.90  
The current section focuses on the two extreme-right wing movements in the 
interwar period, the Academic Karelian Society (Akateeminen Karjala-Seura, 
AKS) and the Lapua movement and their role in interwar identity formation. 
The Academic Karelia Society is significant as it was explicitly focused on 
shaping and promoting certain discourses on the type of patriotism that Finland 
needed in order to be prepared for war. The significance of the Lapua move-
ment is on prioritising the patriotism and anti-Communism over the rule of law 
and how this idea interacted with other existing political discourses in Finland. 
6.4.2. Academic Karelia Society 
The Academic Karelia Society (AKS) was the most important student union in 
interwar Finland. The reason why the AKS is relevant to understand the radical-
nationalist discourse is because it was explicitly focused on developing and pro-
moting ideas about patriotism and anti-Russianism within the Finnish society 
and because of the historical importance of the academic organisations in the 
process of idea formation in Finland.91 The AKS was founded in 1922 by 
                                                     
90 The roots of the radical-nationalist discourse lie in the first Russification period when 
certain parts of the Finnish national movement decided that the conciliation advocated by the 
Old Finns and the passive resistance promoted by the constitutional movement was not 
enough to fight Russia’s oppressive policies. As a result, a stream of Finnish nationalism 
with a strong focus on activism that gradually adopted a strong right-wing ideology was 
born. The movement, consisting of Swedish-speakers and some of the Young Finns, 
established the “Activist Party of Finland” in 1904. This party was a small underground 
movement, which believed that a “vigorous, active and unscrupulous front against tyranny 
was justified” (quoted in Soikkanen 1984b, 66). In 1906, Voimaliitto was founded. This was 
a nationally-based Civil Guard opposed both to Russian anarchism and to the ‘oppressive 
measures’ of the Russian government. […] However, this early right-wing activism died 
down in 1910” (Jussila 1999, 83). During the First World War, Russian pressure increased 
and the topic of active resistance was raised again. The Jäger movement, which had sent 
1,000 Finnish young men, mainly university students, illegally to Germany to fight on the 
German side during World War I, “reflected the growing appeal among Finns for some form 
of active resistance to Russian violations of Finland’s autonomous status” (Soikkanen 1984b, 
68). After independence, the other right wing organisations followed, such as the Finnish 
Protection League, the anti-trade union organisation Vientirauha, the Academic Karelia 
Society, the Independence League, the Civil War Veterans’ League, the Kinship Soldiers’ 
League, Suomen Lukko, the Lapua Movement and the Patriotic People’s Movement (IKL) 
(Hentilä 1999, 143). 
91 The academic circles had, since the times of the Fennoman movement, held an important 
role in Finland in terms of developing and spreading the political and societal ideas. Helsinki 
University students had traditionally considered themselves “the representatives for the 
Finnish people” (Alapuro 1973, 118). This was emphasized by AKS, with a slogan formed 
by one of their ideologists, Niilo Kärki, stating that “what the students are today, the nation 
is tomorrow” (mitä ylioppilaat tänään, sitä kansa huomenna) (Klinge 1982, 225). The AKS 
had held the majority at the Helsinki University student body since 1926 until World War II 
and was undoubtedly the most important institution in student politics (Alapuro 1973). 
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students who participated in the battles for the independence of Eastern-Karelia. 
As the idea to unify Eastern-Karelia with Finland failed, the AKS’s program 
first centred on the idea that Eastern-Karelia and Inkeri are part of Finland and 
should be liberated (Kallenautio 1985, 79–80). One central idea of the AKS was 
that national unity can be built on focusing on the enemy figure, hence on 
spreading the ryssänviha (hatred of the Russian) within the Finnish society. In 
the aftermath of the civil war, Russophobia promoted by the AKS aimed at 
strengthening the feelings of national unity (Klinge 1972). As argued by Lu-
ostarinen, Russophobia directly served the purposes of national integration. The 
Civil War was explained as caused by a ‘Bolshevist plague’, which had spread 
from Russia” (Luostarinen 1989, 129). The AKS describes its mission in the 
following terms: “But we, who once drove the Russians out of the country, we, 
who know what marks they have stamped on this land, we must learn and teach 
others to hate the Russian so deeply and strongly that the roots of that hate will 
not wither even at the moment of death” (quoted in Klinge 1993, 239).  
One of the approaches of the Vihan veljet (Brotherhood of Hate), secret or-
ganisation of AKS, was to stress historical roots of ryssänviha within the Fin-
nish society. The AKS’s discourse, expressed through articles and speeches, 
was creating a narrative that ryssänviha “was a spontaneous Finnish sentiment 
with strong popular roots” (Klinge 1993, 247).92 Building and spreading this 
narrative was necessary for the AKS to build the defence will within the socie-
ty. As one Vihan Veljet article stated: “People and country must wake up and 
realize what an infinite strength hatred is. The French won the World War 
through their fierce hatred of the Germans. The hatred multiplied their strength. 
How important hatred for us is, a small and weak country, is self-evident. If we 
hasten in rage to the eastern frontier, when the order sounds, the Russian will 
never be able to destroy our independence” (quoted in Klinge 1993, 246). 
Therefore, as argued by Klinge “Hatred of the Russians, as part of the ‘psycho-
logical preparedness for war’, was seen as one means of arming for the defence. 
At the same time, ‘the provocation of anti-Russianism would serve to 
strengthen the national identity; a new patriotism was needed to replace the 
                                                     
92  An extensive body of literature exists on the subject of Finno-Russian relations and its 
role on Finnish identity (for example: Harle 2000, Klinge 1972, 1982 and 1993, Tarkiainen 
1986, Luostarinen 1989, Karemaa 1998, Immonen 1987, Paasi 1997, Paasi 1999, Moisio 
1998, Browning and Lehti 2007, Browning 2002, Kangas 2011), which consists of debates, 
numerous conclusions and categorisations on the understanding of Russia, and the origins of 
these understandings. The primordialists see Russia as the Finnish eternal archenemy, in the 
line of the approach advocated by the Radical-Nationalist discourse in the interwar period 
(for example Tarkiainen 1986). The second school, labelled instrumentalists by Kangas 
(2011), argue that negative understandings of Russians were developed and promoted for 
advancing certain political agendas, such as the Academic Karelia Seura constructing the 
narrative of eternal Russian-hatred (Klinge 1972, Immonen 1987, Luostarinen 1989, 
Karemaa 1998). (For example Klinge analysed Finnish proverbs and claimed that “there was 
no deep-seated, ‘natural’ hatred of Russians before 1917” (Klinge 1993, 247)). The third 
understanding sees the Finno-Russian relationship as socially constructed (Harle 2000, 
Moisio 1998, Browning 2002, Kangas 2011).  
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traditional patriotism of the nineteenth century, which consisted essentially of 
trust in and love of the tsar […]. The new patriotism must be active and aggres-
sive, even expansionist, in contrast to the old patriotism, which had been based, 
after the fashion of Saarijärven Paavo, on quiet perseverance and peaceable 
improvement of one’s condition93” (Klinge 1993, 247).  
In the second half of the 1930s, the AKS intensified its activities in building 
up the nation’s defence will with the focus on improving the national unity and 
the willingness of the non-bourgeois part of the society to defend the country. 
Already in 1934, the AKS organized a fund-raising project titled “Planes to the 
army”, where donations were collected to buy a training plane for the army. The 
large-scale defence propaganda planning started in the autumn of 1936, and the 
organisation for it was built and tested in 1937. A proper operation was carried 
out with the help of defence forces and civil guards in 1938 when 560 meetings 
were held, which tens of thousands people attended (Mertanen 2005, 466). In 
April 1939, the AKS established an organisation called Rajan Turva (Border 
Security), which, over the summer of 1939 organised fortification works in the 
Karelian isthmus. For the AKS, fortifying the Karelian isthmus was considered 
much more important than fortifying the Åland islands that were the govern-
ment’s priority. As one of the AKS newspapers wrote in 1938: “The borders 
have to be protected, independence guaranteed, the Karelian isthmus has to be 
fortified” (cited in Haataja 1997, 153). Over 1,000 volunteers took part in the 
activity, which lasted for twelve weeks and was implemented in cooperation 
with the defence ministry. Collecting funds for the fortification works became a 
national level event and around 260,000 Finns donated a one day salary for this 
cause. Haataja points out that this collection showed the divisions in the Finnish 
society, as the Agrarian president, Agrarian ministers and parliamentarians and 
oppositional right-wing Coalition and IKL parties’ parliamentarians donated for 
the fund-raising, whereas the Social Democrats and National Progress Party 
ministers and parliamentarians did not (Haataja 1997, 153–154). Nevertheless, 
as the AKS became gradually more focused on strengthening national unity in 
the late 1930s, one of the aims of Rajan Turva was to reduce divisions between 
Reds and Whites. Mertanen points out that “because of the insecure situation, 
the AKS wanted partly to enhance the unity of the nation, which had been in-
sulted by the AKS’s own statements throughout the 1930s” (Mertanen 2005, 
466).  
This activist discourse, focused on preparedness and the will to defend one’s 
country, was also promoted in the literature of the period. First of all, literature 
about the fight of a small group against the bigger power was included in his-
tory books. For Ahto, the basic example of that were the horrors from the Iso-
viha (Greater Wrath) period.94 The first authors to write these historical patriotic 
                                                     
93  Saarijärven Paavo was “a peasant figure created in 1831 by the poet J.L. Runeberg and 
embodying the strength, persistence and trust in God imagined as typical of the ideal Finn” 
(Klinge 1993, 246). 
94  Isonviha is a Finnish term for the Russian occupation in Finland from 1713–1721 during 
the Great Northern War (1700–1721). 
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books were the Fennomans in the nineteenth century. The newspaper Finnish 
Soldier demanded already in 1919 that historic books by Topelius should be 
available in the barracks, and the Civil Guard was promoting The Tales of 
Ensign Stål (Vänrikki Stoolin tarinoita95) written by Runeberg. Youth literature 
discussed these topics as well. According to Ahto, a shared feature of these 
books was that they were all about fighting for one’s freedom against the pre-
dominant power, with the enemy commonly being Russian (Ahto 1989, 19). 
Furthermore, the activist movement of the early twentieth century, which had 
been a marginal and short-lived development at the time “was now praised in 
popular historical movies as an example of national heroism and resistance” 
(Browning and Lehti 2007, 700).  
6.4.3. Lapua movement 
The Lapua movement, an extreme-right movement, was not a political party but 
did enjoy the support of the Coalition Party and, until the Mäntsälä Coup, also 
the majority of the Agrarian Union, and its leaders came from these two 
parties.96 The main aim of Lapua was the destruction of communism, under-
stood in rather broad terms, and it did not consider the existing rule of law or 
political system while pursuing its aims (Alapuro and Allardt 1978, 130). Ideo-
logically, Lapua built directly on the ideas of activism, Jäger movement and 
Academic Karelia Society. Klinge points out that Lapua activists belonged to 
“the so called Jäger-generation”.97 This part of the Finnish society’s identity 
formation was not formed at the times of “lawful reform politics of 1905–
1907”, but their “crucial experience” was within the context of “conspirational-
violent patriotic action.” Because of these social experiences, “the starting point 
of Lapua was the approach that within exceptional circumstances the normal 
law and state apparatus will be replaced by other actors. According to the foun-
ders of the movement, the communist ‘provocations’ had gone so far that for 
their perception these were not the normal circumstances anymore.” Hence, “the 
legal government and parliamentarian powers was to be replaced by the nation’s 
‘direct‘ action, sort of direct democracy. The law was replaced with ‘Lapua 
law‘, according to which the virtue of actions was evaluated only based on 
whether they supported or opposed the anti-communist actions” (Klinge 1972, 
                                                     
95  The Tales of Ensign Stål is a Finnish classical epic poem by Runeberg about Finland’s 
war of 1808–09. Although the war ended in defeat, Runeberg transformed it into patriotic 
praise of its known and unknown figures. All of them are eager to die in the name of the 
fatherland. See http://www.kirjasto.sci.fi/runeberg.htm accessed on 14 September 2012. 
96  The beginning of the Lapua movement is usually placed at the end of 1929, when anti-
Communist riots led by farmers broke out. Two main causes for the Lapua movement were 
the economic depression that had hit the farmers in 1928 and the increasing popularity of the 
Communists (Alapuro and Allardt 1978).  
97  The Jäger movement consisted of was based students who went to Germany illegally to 
fight on the German side, and who had been trained there from 1915–1917 and had gained 
front-line experience against the Russians on Germany’s Eastern front (Hentilä, 1999, 110).  
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167–168). The radical wing of Lapua argued that “when a choice had to be 
made between ‘fatherland’ and legality, then legality had to give way: a ‘patrio-
tic revolt’ was better than ‘legality without fatherland’” (quoted in Hentilä 
1999, 159). As expressed by one of Lapua leaders Vihtori Kosola: “We are told 
that we have disregarded the law. I say that the law has disregarded the nation. 
If our legislators have made such laws that in following them society, the nation 
and the fatherland would be harmed, and faith in God destroyed, then it is our 
duty to fight against them” (quoted in Kasekamp 1999, 592). The support for 
Lapua waned after the failed Mäntsälä coup in 1932 and the movement was 
subsequently banned. Its predecessor Patriotic People’s Movement (IKL) never 
achieved a similar kind of mass support.98 
6.4.4. Lawfulness front 
The Lawfulness front emerged during the peak of Lapua in order to stand for 
the preservation of the rule of law in the country. It consisted of the National 
Progress Party99 (successor of the Young Finns), the Social Democrats, the 
Swedish People’s Party and part of the Agrarian Party. As the Lapua movement 
started as a reaction to communist activities, and strong nationalist and anti-
Russian sentiments were essential elements within the White Finland discourse, 
many politicians from the bourgeois parties first shared the anti-communist 
feelings of the Lapua movement. However, when Lapua started attacking the 
existing Finnish legal system, the centrist and liberal political groups, whose 
political roots were in the Constitutional movement, gradually denounced their 
activities. Together with the Social Democrats, liberals and centrists formed the 
                                                     
98  The peak time for Lapua was the summer of 1930. During that summer, hundreds of 
members of local government bodies, Social Democratic party branches, trade unions, 
newspaper editors, former members of parliament etcetera were abducted and driven to the 
border of Russia and dumped there. Lapua’s most important demonstration of strength also 
took place in the summer of 1930 when they organised the ‘peasant march’, with twelve 
thousand members of the Lapua movement, mainly farmers, marching on the capital to 
present their demands to the government. General Mannerheim, Prime Minister Svinhufvud 
and President Relander were all present at the main demonstration, listening to Lapua’s 
demands. 
99  The small liberal National Progress Party, successor of the Young Finn party that were 
followers of the Constitutional line played an influential role in the interwar period despite 
its gradually decreasing electoral support. The new Finnish constitution had been drafted by 
the liberal Constitutional/Young Finn Ståhlberg and therefore followed the National Progress 
Party’s Programme (Soikkanen 1984b, 72) and Constitutional and Young Finns’ discourse. 
Furthermore, Constitutional activist Ståhlberg became the first president of Finland. During 
the interwar period, the National Progress Party participated in the thirteen governments and 
often held the position of prime minister. This was because in the aftermath of the Finnish 
civil war, right wing and left wing parties could not govern together and therefore the 
Progress Party was often a frequent partner in the coalition government. Also in autumn 
1939, the Progress Party held both the positions of Prime Minister (Aimo Kaarlo Cajander) 
and Foreign Minister (Eljas Erkko).  
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so-called Lawfulness front in order to maintain the political order. The Lawful-
ness front built on the constitutional ideas on the importance of complying with 
the rule of law. The former president of Finland, the constitutionalist Ståhlberg, 
wrote in 1932 that lawlessness cannot be defended in an organized society even 
if it helps to prevent other crimes. By doing that, “one lowers itself, through 
one’s actions, to the level of the society’s adversary, taking the nation’s condi-
tions, viability and the chances of success far back, from where one has to start 
from the beginning the arduous path towards the basis of legal order and rule of 
law” (quoted in Kulha 1989, 157). The second important aspect that contributed 
to the failure of the Lapua movement was the behaviour of the Social Democ-
rats, who firmly opposed Lapua, but avoided clashes with the movement and 
worked towards maintaining and defending the rule of law and the state system 
(Alapuro and Allardt 1978, 131–132, 136).  
The co-operation between the Social Democrats, Agrarians and the National 
Progress Party paved the way for the Red-Earth (punamulta) coalition govern-
ment, which was formed in 1937.100 By 1938, due to international develop-
ments, the focus of the political parties and the government had turned from 
domestic issues and disputes to foreign and defence policy. “Increasingly, do-
mestic policy was viewed via the prism of external security, and in practice this 
meant the isolation of the radical Right and an emphasis on national reconcilia-
tion” (Soikkanen 1983, 528). Hence, in the late 1930s, the focus shifted from 
internal Othering between Reds/Whites towards the external Othering.  
6.5. Conclusion 
The aim of this chapter was to explore the dominant political and societal 
discourses in Finland in 1939, their emergence, development and interactions. 
The chapter showed that the role of central Other was held, since the beginning 
of Finland as a state concept, by Russia. The chapter defined six dominant dis-
courses: 1) Constitutional, 2) Conciliation, 3) White Finland, 4) Red Finland, 5) 
Radical-nationalist, 6) Lawfulness front. The discourses and debates varied in 
their scope, both time wise and in the extent of their direct influence on societal 
                                                     
100  In the 1937 presidential elections, the centre and leftist parties campaigned against the 
incumbent, President Svinhufvud from the Coalition party, seeing the elections as a fight for 
“democracy and parliamentarism” against “the non-democratic” and “presidentialist” stream 
(Soikkanen 1983, 113). The government with the participation of Social Democrats became 
possible after the Agrarian Kyösti Kallio replaced the conservative Svinhufvud as the 
President in 1937. Although it was the first time for left and centre parties to govern together, 
the basis for this government had been established through a long-term co-operation between 
the Social Democrats and the centre parties, from the times of the centre-minority 
governments. The parties had also stood for maintaining the political order during the Lapua 
times within the so-called Lawfulness movement. In the July 1939 elections both main 
government parties gained seats, the Social Democrats now having 85 seats and the Agrarian 
Union 56 seats, which was considered a clear win for the government (Hokkanen 1986, 228–
229). 
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life. For example, the constitutional-conciliation debate mainly took place 
within educated urban circles and was less known in rural areas, whereas the 
Red and White Finland discourses deeply influenced all spheres of Finland’s 
social and political life in the interwar period. However, all these six discourses 
produced important societal ideas that influenced the domestic understandings 
of the situation in 1939, therefore are relevant for the how-possible question this 
study is interested in. 
Within the Constitutional discourse it is the existing domestic system that 
determines a state’s external behaviour. For this discourse, it was not a choice to 
follow the laws, but an obligation as national progress depended on it. This was 
demonstrated during the peak of the Lapua movement where many bourgeois 
politicians whose political roots were in the constitutionalist movement shared 
the anti-communism feelings of the Lapua movement, but denounced their ac-
tivities when Lapua started attacking Finnish laws. In contrast, for the concilia-
tion line the state’s behaviour is dependent on the state’s material capabilities 
and the interests of the power actor. An important contribution of the constitu-
tional-conciliation debate was that it firstly took the understanding that Finland 
is a separate state, although not a sovereign one, governed by its own constitu-
tional laws, to the masses. Secondly, as a result of this debate Finnish-Russian 
relations were seen through the lenses of mistrust, since within the Constitu-
tional thinking Russia had one-sidedly broken the previous existing agreement. 
The White and Red Finland discourses emerged during and in the aftermath of 
Finland’s civil war. White Finland’s discourse was strongly anti-Russian and 
saw the external threat in the Soviet Union, and Finland’s Reds as the internal 
threat that could not be trusted. As a result of the civil war, the Red side of the 
society was politically powerless in the 1920s and early 1930s. The extreme-
right movements in the early 1930s stressed the continuous deep division be-
tween Red and White parts of the society, but also forced the progressive bour-
geois groups and the Social Democrats to redefine its priorities and focus on 
national reconciliation. It also brought back into focus the old constitutionalist 
understanding that following the law is not a choice depending on the current 
political interests, but a prerequisite for the development of the nation.  
An important similarity between the constitutionalist and radical-nationalist 
discourse was that although both recognized the power disparity between 
Finland and Russia, this was not an ending but a starting point for their respec-
tive frameworks on how to handle the conflict situation with Russia. In the con-
stitutionalist discourse one had to operate within the existing domestic legal 
framework, whereas the radical-nationalist discourse, that could not envision a 
Finland that would co-operate with the Soviet Union, focused on shaping the 
national discourse in a way that every citizen would be prepared to protect the 
country. In the late 1930s, with the increasing instability on international level, 
it started prioritizing national unity. It should be noted that these six domestic 
discourses were overlapping. The contrasts were between different pairs (con-
stitutional/conciliation), but within different debates it was much more fluid, 
such as politicians from the bourgeois side who were strongly anti-communist 
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and nationalist but turned against the Lapua movement when it started to attack 
the existing legal system.  
‘The Russian question’ had a central role within all three debates. However, 
within these debates three different ways how to “handle Russia” emerged: 1) 
compliance with domestic norms and values of the Constitutionalist movement; 
2) active resistance exercised by different Radical-nationalist movements, 
which argued that radical measures are justified in case of a threat to the  
nationalist values and 3) the Conciliation line, which focused on the need to 
negotiate and accommodate the power actor in case of conflict. The next 
chapter will focus on how these domestic discourses in interaction with the 
external pressures and with each other made it possible for the Finnish decision-
makers to not agree to the Soviet demands in the autumn of 1939.  
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CHAPTER 7. 
DECISION-MAKING PROCESS IN FINLAND  
IN AUTUMN 1939  
The aim of this chapter is to explore how Finland’s foreign policy decision not 
to accept the Soviet demands in 1939 became possible for Finland’s govern-
ment. How did the course of action, that Finland cannot accept demands that 
would mean allowing Soviet military bases on the Finnish mainland, become 
commonsensical for the decision-makers? The current study argues that focus-
ing only on the existing domestic discourses does not give a full picture of the 
decision-making dynamics. This is because the decision-makers do not have a 
fixed set of domestic discourses at their disposal; there are always tensions be-
tween the domestic discourses and, besides, these discourses are not static: they 
change depending on external and internal events. As was shown in the case of 
Finland, with the increase of volatility of the international situation, Red and 
White Finland started to redefine their understanding of each other in terms of 
internal threat and focused on the external threat. Hence, the decision-maker 
must balance between external and internal pressures, while also processing the 
on-going tensions and dynamics between the domestic discourses. However, 
this process does not happen in some vacuum of objectiveness, but the decision-
maker’s own social construction regarding the domestic discourses also matters. 
This is why in order to explain how the decision became commonsensical for 
the decision-maker, his or her own social construction must be explored. There-
fore, the first part of this chapter will focus on the primary decision-maker, his 
social construction and how his understanding of the situation translated into his 
policy line.  
The second part of the chapter will focus on the societal constraints on the 
decision-making process and how they were processed by the decision-makers. 
When certain social ideas are out in the public sphere, they will introduce social 
constraints to the decision-makers, hence makes certain practices acceptable and 
therefore possible and other practices unacceptable. The chapter will look at the 
interaction between the state, hence the decision-makers, and the society. The 
aim of the chapter is to analyse how the decision-maker processed and nego- 
tiated between the external pressures and the different domestic understandings 
and how this understanding on the balance of domestic and external pressures 
translated into a foreign policy decision. 
7.1. Social construction of the decision-maker 
This section explores the social construction of Finland’s primary foreign policy 
decision-maker in 1939, the Finnish foreign minister Eljas Erkko. First, the 
circle of decision-makers will be discussed and the choice for the primary 
decision-maker will be explained. Next, the section will explore how the deci-
sion-maker was positioned within the dominant domestic discourses, how this 
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influenced his understanding of the situation in autumn 1939 and how this  
understanding developed into his foreign policy line. 
The main discussions and Finnish government’s plans leading to the deci-
sions on the Soviet demands in autumn 1939 were made at the Foreign Affairs 
Committee of the Cabinet that handled the foreign policy issues in the Govern-
ment, and in the War Cabinet in consultation with President Kyösti Kallio101. 
The Foreign Affairs Committee at that time consisted of Prime Minister Aimo 
Kaarlo Cajander (National Progress Party), Foreign Minister Eljas Erkko (Na-
tional Progress Party), Defence Minister Juho Niukkanen (Agrarian League), 
Minister of Finance Väinö Tanner (Social Democratic Party) and Minister of 
Education Uuno Hannula (Agrarian League). The War Cabinet consisted of 
Cajander, Erkko, Niukkanen, Tanner (Soikkanen 1983, 336), and its main aim 
was to work on the government’s counterproposal to the Soviet demands and to 
discuss the different options Finland had in the current situation. General Gus-
tav Mannerheim, some other representatives of the army and negotiator Juho 
Kusti Paasikivi often attended the meetings of the War Cabinet and the Foreign 
Affairs Committee. The circle of people aware of the content of the negotiations 
was kept so limited (until 30 October when Molotov made the demands public), 
as the aim was to keep it in secrecy, in order to not to disturb the course of the 
talks or to irritate the Soviet side. This study will focus on foreign minister Eljas 
Erkko as the primary decision-maker regarding the Soviet demands. However, 
the positions of other main political actors and interaction of different positions 
will be discussed in the second part of the chapter. 
7.1.1. Foreign minister Erkko as the primary decision-maker 
Eljas Erkko, foreign minister since 1938, had a central role in Finland’s foreign 
policy decision-making in 1938–1939. Before accepting the foreign minister’s 
post, Erkko had requested that he would be the only focal point in the 
government on foreign policy. With Erkko’s predecessor to the foreign minis-
ter’s post, Rudolf Holsti, foreign policy decision-making had been rather scat-
tered within the government. Erkko replaced it with a centralised model (Soik-
kanen 1983, 241), for example Virkkunen called the way Erkko took over for-
eign policy ‘a coup’ (Virkkunen 1994, 156). Also, President Kallio left the ini-
tiation and implementation of foreign policy issues to the government and the 
minister of foreign affairs (Pakaslahti 1970, 49). One of the reasons behind 
Erkko’s central role and the acceptance of it within the government was because 
Holsti’s policy line had been criticised as vague and scattered and not concrete 
                                                     
101  Foreign policy in Finland falls to the responsibility of the Finnish President. For 
important matters, such as questions of war and peace, changing Finnish borders, and state 
treaties that require legislative changes or entail economic responsibilities, Parliament’s 
consent is needed. Important foreign policy questions are handled at the Foreign Affairs 
Committee of the Cabinet, which consists of the Prime Minister, the Foreign Minister and 
three other members of the government. The President makes the decisions based on 
presentations of the Foreign Affairs Committee (Suomi 1973, 356).  
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and strong enough considering the increasing volatility of the international cli-
mate. Therefore, Erkko’s decisive, concrete policy line was seen as a positive 
development and Erkko’s position as a foreign minister and member of govern-
ment became “exceptionally strong during the critical phases that preceded the 
winter war” (Soikkanen 1983, 241). Erkko’s leading role in the decision-
making process regarding the Soviet demands is also shown by the blame that 
he received after the Soviet’s military attack. Paasikivi, the negotiator with 
Moscow and a post-World War II Finnish president famously called the winter 
war “Erkko’s war”, meaning that he thought Erkko to be responsible for it 
(Pakaslahti 1970, Manninen and Salokangas 2009). Also, Mannerheim com-
mented after the negotiations had failed that if Erkko would be man enough, he 
would go to the forest and shoot himself (Virkkunen 1994, 49). In the post-
World War II literature Erkko’s behaviour has been often explained through his 
personal characteristics, such as that he was naïve, reckless and above all, “an 
optimist by nature” (Jakobson 1961, 122, also see Rautkallio 1990, 30, Paasi-
kivi 1986c, 1958, Tanner 1957 57–58). Yet regarding the decision-maker, the 
current study focuses not on his personal characteristics, but on his social 
construction: his political ideas and understandings determined how he under-
stood the existing situation. Hence, the aim of this section is to discuss Erkko’s 
social construction within the framework of Finland’s dominant societal dis-
courses, and his understandings on international system and foreign policy.  
7.1.2. Introduction 
Eljas Erkko was a prominent member of the National Progress Party.102 He had 
served in parliament from 1933–1936 and in 1932, he was minister without port-
folio for two months and vice-minister of interior affairs for 3 weeks. Neverthe-
less, until 1938 his first and foremost priority was running the biggest Finnish 
newspaper, Helsingin Sanomat, as the editor-in-chief and majority owner103, 
which he successfully changed from a National Progress Party newspaper to a 
more broad nationwide newspaper. In 1938 Erkko became Minister of Foreign 
Affairs, 43 years old at the time. Prior taking up this post Helsingin Sanomat 
                                                     
102  Erkko was a member of the party’s Committee from 1928–1936 and also a treasurer 
from 1928–1930. He was a member of Parliament from 1933–1936. 
103  Eljas Erkko started working for Helsingin Sanomat as the second editor-in-chief in 1927, 
with foreign and economic issues as his main responsibilities. Gradually Erkko’s family 
obtained a majority ownership of Helsingin Sanomat and took control over it. On 1931, he 
became the only editor-in-chief of the newspaper and in 1932, he established another 
newspaper, Ilta-Sanomat. Helsingin Sanomat had started as a newspaper of the National 
Progress Party, but after Erkko became the sole editor-in-chief, one of his strategies was to 
expand the range of readers by developing a journalistic product (Manninen and Salokangas 
2009). Although since 1931 Erkko was in full control of the Helsingin Sanomat, as 
Manninen and Salokangas point out, this made the newspaper independent from the National 
Progress Party, but still committed to its views. However, since 1931 Helsingin Sanomat was 
clearly firstly standing for Eljas Erkko’s views and only secondly for the Progress Party’s 
opinions (Manninen and Salokangas 2009, 187). 
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had been critical to the foreign policy of Erkko’s predecessor Minister Rudolf 
Holsti. In 1938–1939 Helsingin Sanomat consistently supported government’s 
foreign policy and it was perceived both in Finland and by foreign services to 
reflect Finland’s official foreign policy line (Kulha 1989, 339). Erkko held that 
post until the beginning of the Winter War on 1 December 1939. During the 
Winter War, Erkko worked as the Chargé d’affaires at the Finnish embassy in 
Stockholm. After the war, Erkko returned to his newspaper empire. He died in 
1965. 
7.1.3. The decision-maker’s understanding  
of the dominant societal discourses 
Born into one of the most prominent Constitutional families in Finland, Eljas 
Erkko’s political ideas and societal understandings were strongly influenced by 
his family background. Erkko’s father Eero Erkko was an influential political 
figure for the Young Finns’ and Constitutional movements since the beginning 
of the 1880s and later a politician for the National Progress Party, the successor 
to the Young Finns. In 1889 he was one of the founders of Päivälehti, the then-
newspaper of the Young Finns movement and in 1909 became editor-in-chief of 
the newspaper, which had then changed the name to Helsingin Sanomat. He 
was also a member of parliament and minister from 1918–1920 (Manninen and 
Salokangas 2009, 159; Kulha 1989)104. Also, Erkko’s mother Maissi Erkko and 
his uncle poet J.H. Erkko were constitutionalist activists. As Eero Erkko fol-
lowed the constitutionalist policy of passive resistance, he was banished from 
Finland by the Russian authorities in 1903. Erkko himself explained his princi-
ples through his childhood experiences. As Erkko wrote to President Kallio in 
December 1939: “Since I was a small child I have been living under circum-
stances, where one has been ready to sacrifice everything for the fatherland” 
(cited in Manninen and Salokangas 2009, 301).  
Erkko was also strongly anti-Russian and anti-social democratic. The emer-
gence of these strong anti-Russian sentiments can also be explained through his 
childhood and youth experiences. According to the Soviet NKVD agent Jelisei 
T. Sinytsyn, who visited Finland disguised as a diplomat and presented his ac-
creditation to Erkko on 12 November 1939, Erkko emphasized his family ex-
perience with Russia during their conversation. When Sinytsyn had stated that 
the Soviet Union will treat Finland with propriety, similar to tsarist Russia, 
Erkko had replied that his father had fought against Russian imperialism, and 
subsequently had been imprisoned and banished from the country (Rautkallio 
2002, 78). Furthermore, during the civil war, the Red side imprisoned Erkko’s 
father, while Erkko himself was fighting in the White army (Manninen and Sa-
lokangas 2009). In 1926, when arguing that building a Finnish defence capacity 
must be a priority, Erkko drew on his personal family experience by stating that 
“Here certain persons, who themselves did not participate in the fighting and 
                                                     
104  On Eero Erkko see Zetterberg 2001. 
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did not sit in prisons, still do not understand the nature of our new responsibili-
ties” (cited in Manninen and Salokangas 2009, 53).  
In the red/white division that characterised the Finnish society in the inter-
war period, Erkko clearly represented the side of White Finland. As he had been 
serving as an officer on the White side in the civil war and as his father had 
been banished by the Russians and imprisoned by the Reds, Erkko had a nega-
tive attitude towards socialism and the social democrats in Finland. After the 
nomination of Väinö Tanner’s social democratic minority government of 1926–
1927, Erkko wrote to his father that it reminded him of the events of 1917 and 
1918 and stated that the smallest incautiousness on behalf of the government 
“can foster the agenda of these people and circles who would also gladly see 
Finland under a fascist-type command” (cited in Manninen and Salokangas 
2009, 54). Erkko had the rather typical White Finland’s perception of Social 
Democrats as being untrustworthy. In 1927 in a letter to his father he expressed 
a concern of the possibility that the left side would get a majority in the elec-
tions as then the social democrats would “show their claws”. He stated that “if 
this is a fascism that one wants to prevent the 1917–18 events from happening 
again, then I am also a fascist. I don’t trust socialists” (cited in Manninen and 
Salokangas 2009, 55).  
A good example of how Erkko negotiated between his key principles,  
Constitutionalism and the anti-communist/socialist/Russian sentiments, can be 
seen in his behaviour and arguments during the Lapua movement. Initially, 
Helsingin Sanomat understood the actions of Lapua, as they were seen as a 
reaction to communist provocations. However, after Lapua departed from the 
lawful framework, Erkko through his newspaper Helsingin Sanomat denounced 
it (Kulha 1989, 206, 212). In March 1930 after Lapua destroyed the communist 
newspaper’s printing press, Helsingin Sanomat expressed its deep concern for 
the “lawful and law-based social order” (cited in Kulha 1989, 154). When the 
newspaper was accused of being too left-friendly and unpatriotic, Helsingin 
Sanomat replied: “For forty years Helsingin Sanomat and its predecessor has 
fought for lawfulness, democracy and progress. These principles it has wanted 
to faithfully follow also in the current situation. We have always rigorously 
opposed communism and socialism and will do so in the future, but while re-
maining on the side of the rule of law” (cited in Kulha 1989, 162). The newspa-
per firmly kept to this principle, lecturing on the law in its editorials both to com-
munists and the right-wing movements, such as Lapua and the IKL. Furthermore, 
within the circumstances during the times of Lapua where the centre/left 
political groups saw the rule of law threatened, Erkko actively co-operated with 
the social democrats through the Lawfulness front, despite denouncing them as 
untrustworthy only few years before that. Erkko served as a representative of 
the National Progress Party in the Lawfulness front, which was formed by the 
Progress Party, the Swedish Party, part of the Agrarian Party and the Social 
Democrats in order to preserve the rule of law (Kulha 1989, 157). In autumn 
1931, the centre-bourgeois and social democratic newspapers warned about the 
danger of a coup. Helsingin Sanomat concentrated on the issue all season; their 
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main focus was on the protection of law and order (Manninen and Salokangas 
2009, 174–175). During the Mäntsälä rebellion in 1932105, the first edition of 
Ilta-Sanomat urged the people to comply with law and order and stated, “What 
is happening now is by our criminal law called a rebellion and the authorities 
are required to use the force of arms to solve it” (cited in Manninen and 
Salokangas 2009, 145). Hence, one could argue that it was Erkko’s strong 
constitutional beliefs about the importance of the rule of law that made it pos-
sible for him to co-operate with the Social Democrats in 1930s.  
7.1.4. Erkko’s understandings on foreign policy 
In the aftermath of the war Erkko was criticized for not understanding the 
geopolitical realities and for his unrealistic attitudes also regarding international 
help that led Finland to war. His statement to the negotiator Paasikivi before the 
third round of negotiations, “Forget that the Soviet Union is a big country”, was 
cited by Paasikivi to show that Erkko underestimated the power distribution 
between Finland and the Soviet Union (Paasikivi 1986c, 58). The next section 
will discuss Erkko’s understandings of international affairs and Finnish foreign 
policy. It will be argued that Erkko’s foreign policy line was not based on idea-
lism, but that he consistently stressed the untrustworthiness of international 
guarantees, such as the League of Nations, and that he was aware of the Finno-
Russian power disparity. 
Foreign policy was the central and consistent focus of Erkko’s political in-
terests. From 1922–1927, Eljas Erkko worked as a diplomat in Finnish embas-
sies in Paris (1922–1923), Tallinn (1924) and London (1924–1927). While 
working in Paris, Erkko started writing on international affairs. Throughout his 
career as a diplomat Erkko used Helsingin Sanomat in order to discuss the  
foreign policy questions he found important and to avert “wrong” politics (Man-
ninen and Salokangas 2009, 45). After returning to Finland and establishing his 
career in Helsingin Sanomat, foreign affairs and policy remained one of his 
main priorities. Foreign policy was also the central topic in his election pro-
grammes. For example, when running for parliament in late 1929, the article on 
candidate Erkko’s views focused mainly on foreign policy. Erkko argued that 
“good foreign policy is cheap defence, which can save both money and the lives 
of ten thousands men” (paraphrased Manninen and Salokangas 2009, 172, 189).  
In the 1920s Erkko argued for strengthening the army as, in order to get any 
external aid, the country had to show willingness to protect itself. In 1926 Erkko 
argued that “The only thing that will save us is that we are militarily prepared so 
that to attack us will be as expensive as possible. No one wants to help someone 
who does not try to help himself” (cited in Manninen and Salokangas 2009, 53). 
His argument was that only if the state takes strong initiative to protect itself, 
external help would come forward. Writing to his father in 1926 that Finland 
                                                     
105  The Mäntsala rebellion was a failed coup attempt orchestrated by Lapua movement to 
overthrow the Finnish government. 
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should turn down the non-aggression treaty offered by the Soviet Union he ar-
gued: that the focus has to on the defence forces. If the defence forces are in 
order “then it is possible to get support for example from England. [...] For our 
foreign policy position; it is simply inevitable that Finland will take care of this 
issue [non-aggression treaty] alone and calmly. Our position will come to de-
pend from this test in a significant way” (cited in Manninen and Salokangas 
2009, 52). 
Erkko emphasised the need to focus on realpolitik in foreign policy. In 1929, 
when he ran for parliament, Erkko in his elections presentation stated that in the 
opinion of Helsingin Sanomat, Finnish foreign policy for the last couple of 
years has been more a politics of emotions than a politics of reason; not Finnish 
politics, but a politics of individuals. He also emphasized the need to permanent 
alertness of the Soviet threat, by referring to an interview with Estonian general 
Johan Laidoner in the Chicago Tribune that one has to remember that Russia’s 
border states “still live on the edge of the volcano, which can erupt at any mo-
ment either for internal or external circumstances and can bring ruin to its 
neighbours” (cited in Manninen and Salokangas 2009, 189). Erkko had a strong 
life-long orientation towards Western countries; he was considered an ang- 
lophile. This was partly attributed to his marriage with a British woman, partly 
to his childhood exile in the United States and his diplomatic career abroad, and 
also to his life-long interest in foreign policy (which probably was also linked to 
the former aspects). However, despite of being an anglophile and well-informed 
on British politics (and probably also because of that) he did not have many 
illusions about the priorities of British foreign policy. In 1927, he wrote to his 
father from London that “Finland will not get guarantees from England. Only 
by stabilising and further improving our economic well-being and by working 
on our defence issues, we can become an actor in Europe whose existence will 
be considered” (cited in Manninen and Salokangas 2009, 53). With the help of 
diplomacy, England could be made “to feel a certain responsibility towards us”, 
but still “All England’s politics are based on cynically and calculatedly working 
for its own material benefits, and therefore the existence of a small state like 
ours does not matter anything if there are bigger benefits at stake” (cited in 
Manninen and Salokangas 2009, 53). His opinion had not changed much in 
autumn 1939 when he stated that the Brits were behaving as usual: letting others 
“bleed for their interests” (cited in Manninen and Salokangas 2009, 232–233).  
Erkko had always been tough on Russia and was against any course of action 
that could be seen as appeasement or conciliation. He strongly criticised  
Foreign Minister Holsti in the autumn of 1937 when Finland voted in the Coun-
cil of the League of Nations in favour of Spain’s membership. Rumour had it 
that Holsti had done that in order to respond to the wishes of the Soviet Union, 
which supported the Spanish legal republican government, and made a deal 
about it with Litvinov (Manninen and Salokangas 2009, 191; also Soikkanen 
1983). In autumn 1934 Erkko visited London to search for a “foreign policy for 
Finland”, because France was moving closer to the Soviet Union. One possibili-
ty he considered was for Finland to move closer to Germany, on the condition 
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that its foreign policy be kept separate from National Socialism, a possibility 
that he soon rejected. When Mannerheim in January 1935, in order to make 
arms procurement easier for Finland, asked Erkko to put out [in Helsingin 
Sanomat] “some friendly words out of necessity about Germany”, Erkko said 
that it is difficult to differentiate between Germany and Nazism (cited in Man-
ninen and Salokangas 2009, 190).  
Erkko’s orientation on realpolitik as opposed to the idealism of 1920s is well 
shown through his consistent criticism in Helsingin Sanomat on the foreign 
policy line of diplomat and long-term foreign minister Rudolf Holsti. Holsti’s 
foreign policy was based on the belief into international norms and guarantees 
and he therefore argued that Finland had to focus on the League of Nations and 
on Baltic-Scandinavian co-operation. Erkko strongly disagreed with Holsti’s 
Baltic orientation as he did not believe in the ability of the Baltic States to de-
fend themselves in the case of a military intervention from the Soviet Union. In 
April 1934, Helsingin Sanomat demanded that Finland should “keep its hands 
free” from the Baltics and to get support from the West (Manninen and Salo-
kangas 2009, 190). Erkko believed that in case of crisis Finland would not be 
saved by the League of Nations, and therefore argued that Finland should fol-
low Sweden in rejecting the unconditional principle of League of Nations sanc-
tions. In 1937–1938 Helsingin Sanomat systematically attacked foreign minister 
Holsti’s policy for putting too much hope on the rapidly weakening League of 
Nations and not focusing enough on the Scandinavian orientation (Manninen 
and Salokangas 2009, 191–194). 
In late October 1937 the newspaper of the left wing of the Agrarian party ar-
gued that Helsingin Sanomat’s line on rejecting the unconditionality of the 
League of Nation sanctions contradicts constitutional principles. The writer 
argued that it was in the interests of small states that international law should 
not be abandoned the moment when the dictatorships turn to the path of vio-
lence. The writer stated that Finland was committed to the principles of legal 
battles of the oppression times (the Russification period), and the policy line 
Helsingin Sanomat is supporting means turning one’s back to these principles. 
Helsingin Sanomat’s reply illustrates Erkko’s understanding of the constitu-
tional principles in foreign policy. Helsingin Sanomat wrote: “The several dec-
ades old principles from the times of legal battles require one to do its part in 
order to be able to protect justice and freedom, not to hide one’s inactivity be-
hind some practically powerless offences” (quoted in Soikkanen 1983, 187–
188). Therefore, for Erkko constitutional principles meant showing initiative 
and willingness to protect one’s country, an idea that was present in his writings 
on foreign policy already in the 1920s. 
The main line on Erkko’s foreign policy that developed in early 1930s and to 
which he would remain fully committed throughout 1930s was the Scandina-
vian orientation and the neutrality policy that came with it. On 28 September 
1938, at the time of the Czechoslovakian crisis, Erkko formulated in Helsingin 
Sanomat the Finnish Nordic neutrality course. In his letter to the prime minister 
(and his fellow party member) Cajander he clarified the meaning of this  
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editorial: when Finland gets involved in an international conflict, it should not 
show solidarity with Germany but should stay neutral. A Russian interference 
could also be avoided “if we would go with England and France [in terms of 
neutrality], which would be morally right and which law requires” (cited in 
Manninen and Salokangas 2009, 194). To Paasikivi Erkko said that Czecho-
slovakia was a good lesson to Finland in defence issues (Manninen and 
Salokangas 2009, 194). 
To conclude, Erkko did not believe in the League of Nations coming to 
Finland’s aid in time of crisis, but his foreign policy was based on a firm Scan-
dinavian orientation and the strict neutrality policy that came with it. He 
stressed the Soviet threat and was unsentimental about Baltic co-operation, 
arguing that the Baltic states would not be able to protect themselves in case of 
conflict. He did not have high hopes for foreign aid, but at the same time that 
did not mean that one should not actively ask for it. Erkko believed that ac-
cording to Constitutional principles one has to first show initiative and be able 
to defend oneself and that could bring about the possibility of external help. In 
International Relations theory terms, Erkko’s foreign policy framework was 
realist: it operated within the realist self-help system where states, such as  
Britain, are selfish power-maximizers, and therefore international guarantees are 
powerless in case of international conflict. However, these systemic constraints 
were not a reason not to act, rather vice versa: taking initiative was the only 
option for a small state if it wanted to have any influence over its fate. Next, 
Erkko’s foreign policy line in autumn 1939 will be explored. 
7.1.5. Erkko’s policy line in autumn 1939 
Erkko summarised his policy line during the negotiations in the following 
terms: 
1. The negotiations were initiated by the Soviet Union; 2. Finland cannot have a 
[foreign] garrison on its mainland without violating its neutrality policy; 3. The 
same goes for an island when rent is in question; 4. Russia will first aim at 
limited goals in order to get a better position to present new demands; 5. If we 
have this clearly in front of us, we only have to keep a strict course and prescribe 
these borders that we do not extend; 6. The Soviet Union does not want a 
military conflict, as it does not want the hassle that it would bring along; 7. The 
world is of the opinion that Finland will sell its position if it conciliates. Our 
future really is in our own hands; 8. Everything that our international situation is 
based on […] is now under threat (These points were drafted by Erkko on 26 
October 1939; Manninen and Salokangas suggest that his aim was to outline the 
Finnish policy for foreign representatives (cited in Manninen and Salokangas 
2009, 264–265)). 
The central element of Erkko’s policy line was his full commitment to the 
Scandinavian orientation and the neutrality policy, which was one of his main 
reasons for not ceding Hanko for a Soviet military base since this would have 
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ended Finland’s neutrality policy. He wrote to Tanner on 31 October 1939, be-
fore the negotiators’ third trip to Moscow: “We must not budge on Hanko or on 
any other locality in that neighbourhood, since if we do, our plight is plain, and 
Scandinavia is out (Tanner 1957, 57–58). The neutrality policy was based on 
the understanding that Finland had to stay within the limits of international law.  
Erkko’s other main point was that the Russians were bluffing and playing a 
war of nerves. He stated “If Finland takes a firm, rigid stand on Hanko, the Rus-
sians will give up. The Soviet Union will keep after it to the last, as it could be 
used to squeeze out other concessions, but the Soviet Union would not let mat-
ters to come to a break” (Tanner 1950, 55). He also stated in his letter to Tanner 
on 31 October 1939 that “It should be kept in mind that [their claim to] Hanko 
is the top trump in their hand, as they know how little we like it. By exploiting it 
they can squeeze out of us what they will, and they will give up only at the very 
end (Tanner 1950, 57–58). Also on 1 November, Erkko sent a wire to Paasikivi 
and Tanner to Moscow which said “Molotov’s speech is regarded here as a tac-
tical manoeuvre to frighten us. Similar tactics have been used successfully 
against Estonia. We are calm. The Russians must be shown a firm front” (Tan-
ner 1957, 62). 
Was Erkko’s inflexibility based solely on his belief that the Soviets were 
bluffing? As was shown in the first part of this case study, Finland’s policy did 
not change significantly when the external pressures increased, when it became 
clear that there were no immediate guarantees that Finland would get external 
military aid and when Molotov made the demands public on 30 October 1939. 
Since before that speech Erkko had stated that there was no danger as long as 
the content of the proposals was not made public, but the situation would be 
different if it would become a prestige question for Stalin, the question is, if 
Erkko acknowledged that the situation is different, why did he not alter his po- 
licy? Erkko argued that this was not because he failed to understand the serious-
ness of the situation. In his letter to President Kallio from December 1939 
Erkko wrote: “I have not all these times let my feelings loose, but done what I 
could to maintain my calm under very difficult circumstances. I have also been 
all the time aware of the extraordinary responsibility” (quoted in Manninen and 
Salokangas 2009, 301).  
Both Erkko himself and the main critic of his policy line, Paasikivi106, have 
stated that Erkko’s policy was based on his constitutional principles. As 
                                                     
106  Paasikivi’s criticism towards Erkko was written after World War II, within the frame-
work of the Cold War Finnish identity. Browning argues that this narrative, developed and 
promoted extensively by Juho Paasikivi (president 1946–1956) and Urho Kekkonen 
(president 1956–1981) claimed that “it was the Finnish national identity of the inter-war 
period which was responsible for Finland’s wars with the Soviet Union. This inter-war 
identity, it was claimed, had been characterized by widespread Russophobia in Finnish 
society and the depiction of the Soviet Union as the hereditary enemy” (Browning 2002, 51). 
The Cold War narrative saw Soviet security concerns as legitimate: “Indeed, the notion that 
Soviet interests in Finland were purely strategic, defensive and legitimate was inscribed into 
the national memory through historical texts that drew an historical continuity between the 
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Paasikivi stated: “Erkko was raised in a climate of ‘passive resistance’ where 
the meaning of formal, legal rights are considered greater than these unfortu-
nately still are” (Paasikivi 1986c, 58). In 1942, in his letter to Cajander (from 12 
May 1942), the Prime Minister in autumn 1939, Erkko justified his policy along 
the same lines. He argued that “law had to be kept indisputable”, and no mis-
takes should have been made that would give Russia a weapon against Finland 
(Manninen and Salokangas 2009, 301). Erkko’s focus on Constitutional ideas is 
also well demonstrated in his statement that “[t]he law is on our side and in the 
eyes of the whole world Russia is bound by them” (Paasikivi 1986, 58). He also 
wrote to his diary in autumn 1939 “I cannot give up my principles. What is 
given up, without a battle, to a violent threat or attack, can never be demanded 
back” (cited in Manninen and Salokangas 2009, 279). This thought, that politi-
cal rights that one allows to be taken away without putting up a fight cannot be 
retrieved, is another Constitutional principle from the Russification period.  
Since Erkko saw Finnish positions through a constitutional understanding, 
he also assessed the demands of the Soviet Union within the same framework. 
Therefore he and the Finnish government, when discussing the Soviet security 
demands, focused on legitimate, not political demands. The Finnish military had 
stated that Hanko was actually not absolutely necessary for the Soviet Union’s 
legitimate security requirements, as the Gulf of Finland could also be closed in 
other ways, such as with a minefield or using another island. For Erkko this was 
another sign that Russia’s claims on Hanko were not based on legitimate secu-
rity claims, but rather used as a tactical weapon, a trump card to be traded 
against something else (Manninen and Salokangas 2009). 
Within the constitutional discourse it was the obligation of Finland to protect 
its neutrality, and therefore it could not agree to demands that would weaken the 
Finnish defence line to the extent that the country would not be able to protect 
itself (Niukkanen 1951, Manninen and Salokangas 2009). On 1 November 
Erkko stated in a public speech: “It is impossible for Finland to agree to a solu-
tion that would deprive us of a possibility to protect our independence and neut-
rality. Every independent and free country has that right […] These two princi-
ples, neutrality and the right to self-defence, form the basis for the Finnish posi-
tion. If Finland wants to keep its independence and freedom it has to follow 
these principles” (Helsingin Sanomat, 2 November 1939, 8). He argued that 
“The cornerstone of the Finnish state is that we adhere to the agreements we 
have signed. […] We also have this understanding that the trust that Finland has 
and the international position that it has achieved are based on this principal 
position that Finland will fulfil its contractual obligations. At the present mo-
                                                                                                                                  
concerns of the Soviet leadership and those of Russia’s tsars, all the way back to Peter the 
Great. Of particular importance in this new narrative was Paasikivi’s appropriation of the 
scientific language of the Enlightenment as a description of his own policies. The 
appropriation of terms such as realism, rationalism and pragmatism as intrinsic elements of 
the language of the new narrative essentially delegitimized both inter-war foreign policy and 
current contending views as irrational and therefore as irresponsible and non-viable” 
(Browning 2002, 52). 
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ment when new agreements are demanded from us, it is our right to ask which 
guarantees will we get that these new agreements will be respected” (Helsingin 
Sanomat, 2 November 1939, 8). In the same speech Erkko also spoke about the 
lessons Finland has learned from history: “There are values that even the  
smallest state cannot sacrifice. When these fundamental values are in question, 
then Finland knows which road it has to choose, however difficult this road will 
be. While making its choice, Finland has to make sure that it is aware of its right-
eousness. From the lessons received from history Finland knows that justice will 
always prevail in the end” (Helsingin Sanomat, 2 November 1939, 8).  
For Paasikivi, Erkko’s inability to understand the power disparity and in-
creasing external pressures was related to his constitutional thinking: “For 
[Erkko] it was difficult to adapt to the idea that a small state and a big state that 
can be legally on the same level, but hold a different status in real life” [empha-
sis mine]. For Paasikivi, his ignorance manifested itself in Erkko’s letter to 
Paasikivi, which the former handed over before Paasikivi left for the third and 
last trip to Moscow. Erkko wrote, “forget that Russia is a big state” when for 
Paasikivi he should have written “don’t forget that Russia is a big state” 
(Paasikivi, 1986c, 58). As was discussed before, Erkko believed that in foreign 
policy one had to show a strong willingness to protect one’s country. This cor-
responds to the constitutional idea argued by constitutionalist activist Edvard 
Westermarck in 1913 that justice does not win by itself, but “we ourselves will 
help justice to the victory” (cited in Paasikivi 1986a, 37). Therefore, one could 
suggest that Erkko’s idea was not about actually forgetting the size of Russia, 
but rather argued that if you want to negotiate within a situation where the 
asymmetry between two parties is so extensive you cannot take this disparity as 
the basis of your negotiations, because then you could also simply drop the ne-
gotiations. 
7.1.6. Conclusion 
The current section discussed the social construction of the primary decision-
maker, foreign minister Eljas Erkko. It was shown that Erkko’s understandings 
on Finland’s society and external threats were based on constitutional and 
White Finland discourses. Erkko understood foreign policy according to consti-
tutional principles that prioritised self-initiative and responsibility. The section 
on Erkko’s policy line showed that his policy line on Nordic orientation and 
strict neutrality policy was based on his constitutional principles. Could this 
lead one to conclude that Finland’s policy decision was made possible because 
of the beliefs of the person who happened to be the foreign minister of the time? 
What would have happened if for example Paasikivi would have been the for-
eign minister of Finland? Would that have meant a different decision-making 
process and a different result? As was mentioned in the previous chapters, al-
though Erkko’s central role in the decision-making process is commonly recog-
nised, it is also recognised that Erkko’s opinion was backed by the majority of 
the government and enjoyed strong societal support. In order to understand 
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what that meant and how the state and society relationship constructed the ba-
lance between the domestic and external pressures on the state, the next part of 
the chapter will focus on the interaction between the state and society in autumn 
1939.  
7.2. Domestic discourses and interactions between them 
regarding the decision-making in autumn 1939 
This section will explore how the dominant discourses and their interaction 
influenced the decision-making process in Finland in 1939. It will focus on the 
societal constraints on the decision-making process in 1939 and how these con-
straints were processed by the decision-makers. The current study argues that in 
the decision-making it is not simply about the private beliefs of the decision-
maker, whether one believes in power or that in the end justice wins. Social 
ideas in the public sphere do empower and constrain the decision-makers as 
these ideas make certain social practices acceptable and possible, and others 
unacceptable. It has been stated that the government’s policy in 1939 had the 
support of the majority of the Finnish society and that the government knew that 
the majority of people would not agree to the Soviet demands (Soikkanen 1983; 
Paasikivi 1958, 1986c; Manninen and Salokangas 2009; Kirby 1979; Ahto 
1989; Hentilä 1999). How did they know what people wanted? What were the 
societal domestic pressures and how did the interaction between the state and 
the society happen? The next section will focus on the societal pressures on the 
government and on the interaction between the government and the society. The 
section will first look at the different opinions within the circle of decision-
makers. Next, it will look at the understandings of the situation within the soci-
ety and on the interactions between the state and the society. 
7.2.1. Understandings in the government 
The discourses that were institutionally empowered and therefore present in the 
government were the Constitutional discourse (most prominently through the 
National Progress Party, but also through the Agrarian Union, the Social 
Democrats and the Swedish People’s Party), White Finland (the Agrarian Union 
and the National Progress Party) and Red Finland (the Social Democrats). A 
majority of the government agreed that Finland had to stick to its foreign policy 
based on a Scandinavian orientation and neutrality and that ceding Hanko was 
out of question. The “hard-liners” of that approach were Erkko and defence 
minister Niukkanen. Also, Prime Minister Cajander, who at the first meetings 
mainly acted as facilitator, started expressing his support for this line, which 
was shown by his public speeches in November. President Kallio did not take 
an active role, but aligned himself with Erkko’s line (Soikkanen 1983, 336). In 
addition, all factions in the parliament agreed with the government’s position 
and when the chairmen of the factions were asked “how far the government 
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should go in making concessions”, all factions stated that cession of Hanko is 
completely out of question (Tanner, 1950, 52–55). Furthermore, some of the 
parties found it difficult to accept even these limited concessions the govern-
ment was ready to make. Both the Agrarian Party and the Coalition Party had 
been worried prior to the government reporting to the heads of party factions on 
the content of the demands and the counterproposal, that the government would 
be too prone to compromise. These two parties and the Patriotic People’s 
Movement had difficulties agreeing to the limited concessions the government 
proposed (Soikkanen 1983, 341; Tanner 1950, 52–55). 
The Constitutional understandings can be also observed in the positions of 
other government members. As was argued by the Finance Minister and mem-
ber of the Finland’s delegation to Moscow, Social Democrat Väinö Tanner, 
ceding the port of Hanko would have not been “in harmony with Finland’s  
international position nor with the unconditional neutrality it had espoused and 
which the Soviet government itself had approved” (Tanner 1957, 65). The dis-
course also implied that complying with the law and justice is particularly im-
portant for a small state. As argued by President Kallio, the government could 
not accede to agreements that violated the constitutional laws such as the con-
cession of mainland territory. When negotiator Paasikivi had pointed out that 
this was not an assessment or debate on legal aspects that the country was get-
ting into, but adjusting to the great power’s interests, Kallio replied that the 
justification for a small state’s existence was based on the belief in law and jus-
tice (Hokkanen 1986, 272).  
Since the government saw Finnish positions dominantly through a constitu-
tional understanding, it also assessed the demands of the Soviet Union within 
the same framework. Therefore, when discussing the Soviet security demands, 
the government’s focus was on the legitimate, not political demands. Further-
more, within the Constitutional understanding it was the obligation of Finland 
to protect its neutrality, and therefore it could not agree to the demands that 
would weaken the Finnish defence line to the extent that the country would not 
be able to protect itself (Niukkanen 1951). Also, the government argued that 
Hanko was actually not absolutely necessary for the Soviet Union’s legitimate 
security requirements, as the Gulf of Finland could also be closed in other ways. 
As Prime Minister Cajander argued in a radio speech on 4 November 1939: 
“The security of St. Petersburg does not require dismantling the defence fortifi-
cations on the Isthmus as these are made only for defence, not attack, as are all 
other fortifications in our country. […] One has to consider Finnish security and 
defence possibilities. […] The Soviet base in Hanko is not necessary to increase 
St. Petersburg’s security” (cited in Ahto 1989, 66). Therefore, the government 
maintained that it went as far as it could to satisfy Soviet Union’s “legitimate 
aspirations” (Tanner 1956, 322). 
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7.2.2. Radical-nationalist discourse 
The Radical-nationalist discourse was not explicitly represented in the govern-
ment. Nevertheless, both right-wing political parties present in parliament such as 
the Coalition party and the Patriotic People’s Movement (IKL, successor of 
Lapua), or the organisations, such as Academic Karelian Society (AKS), carrying 
the ideas of the discourse, supported government’s policy line. Sampo Ahto 
points out that the steps that the government took in October 1939 were similar to 
the demands that the right-wing organisations had made for years. Ahto states that 
this was not because Finnish society had suddenly become extreme-right, but 
because as “IKL had throughout its existence been in a mental war situation with 
the Soviet Union and communism”, this “mental mobilization” spread to the other 
groups in Finland’s political sphere when in the autumn of 1939 the threat from 
the Soviet Union became real (Ahto 1989, 31). Although, IKL and the Coalition 
party had some difficulties accepting these limited concessions the government 
was ready to make, they did support government’s policy. On 14 October 1939 
the newspaper of the right-wing Coalition party wrote that “the Coalition party 
will give its support to a government’s politics that is focused on protecting the 
country’s neutrality and inviolability and Nordic cooperation” (cited in Soikkanen 
1983, 361). One external factor that influenced Radical-nationalism’s interactions 
and dynamics with other discourses was Germany’s behaviour in autumn 1939, 
with the signing of the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact in particular. Germany’s 
decision to sign the agreement led the radical-right to redefine their priorities 
(Soikkanen 1983, 345) and to stand behind the government and agree to limited 
concessions. The head of the AKS, Vilho Helanen, stated in a speech in early 
November: “Many of the external factors some of us had built their faith on for 
the future have collapsed in the last weeks and months, and we feel that they 
cannot be restored” (cited in Soikkanen 1983, 346).  
For the Radical-nationalist discourse, the need to protect the country was a 
given, which for a small state meant that there had to be national unity and pre-
paredness to defend the country. Therefore, the organisations carrying this dis-
course had started their activities for building up the nation’s defence determi-
nation already in 1934. AKS had been building up their organization for war-
time propaganda purposes since 1937 and in the summer of 1939 conducted a 
project where more than thousand volunteers performed fortification works in 
the Karelian Isthmus (Ahto 1989). In October 1939, AKS’s delegation led with 
its head Vilho Helanen met with defence minister Niukkanen and foreign minis-
ter Erkko and offered its network and experience to establish an organisation 
called Maan turva (Country’s Protection), that would strengthen the solidarity 
and unity and the overall defence motivation within the Finnish society. It was 
also a wartime propaganda tool and gathered information on the dominant 
moods in society, producing the mood reviews to the government (Mertanen 
2005; Haataja 1997).107 This co-operation between Helanen, the developer and 
                                                     
107  The organisation covered the entire country and by mid-October they had 160 emplo-
yees, which increased into the thousands very fast. One of the roles of Maan Turva was to 
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promoter of the radical right ideology, and liberal-constitutionalist Erkko has 
been seen as surprising by Manninen and Salokangas (2009). However, it is not 
that surprising if one considers Erkko’s White Finland background and also the 
principles that Constitutionalist and Radical-nationalist discourses shared, such 
as their perception of Russia as the main threat to Finland. In addition, the solu-
tion for the Soviet threat was seen similarly by these societal understandings, as 
both argued for continuous and persistent resistance (although the nature of this 
resistance differed), where one has to take initiative, not remain in a reactive 
role.  
7.2.3. Conciliation discourse 
The Conciliation discourse, that focused on the power disparity between the 
Soviet Union and Finland and the limited material capabilities of Finland, was 
also present in government circles. Finnish negotiator Paasikivi had himself 
belonged to the Conciliation/Old Finns’ movement during the Russification 
period and therefore his foreign policy understandings were based on the Con-
ciliation principles. The leading principle stated that if there is a considerable 
power discrepancy between two states, the weaker state has to avoid conflict: 
“The old ‘Old Finns’ principle is that in international affairs one has to consider 
the power relations and when weighing them, one has to use the little sense that 
God has given to this person. This principle is still correct” (Paasikivi 1986c, 
10). “If the difference between the powers was monumental, one had to avoid 
the conflict altogether” (Paasikivi 1958, 184). Therefore Paasikivi did argue 
within the government circles for greater concessions. Also, Mannerheim ex-
pressed his concern about the limited military capabilities of Finland and argued 
that as the army cannot fight, war must be avoided (Tanner 1957). Also, Tanner 
advocated for more flexibility. However, an important aspect here is that none 
of them argued publicly for more flexibility or greater concessions (Soikkanen 
1983, 336). Soikkanen brings out that during the five days that were between 
the second and third round of the negotiations, the politicians who argued for 
greater concessions within governmental circles did not try to actively influence 
the opinions outside of the government. Tanner did not try to influence his own 
party faction, but on the contrary tried to prevent the left-wing of his faction to 
get information about the talks and the Soviet demands. Paasikivi did give a 
pessimistic view to the Coalition Party’s (where he himself belonged to) par-
liamentary faction and argued that the Soviet Union would not drop its demand 
for Hanko. However, the Coalition Party had difficulties accepting even these 
limited concessions the government had proposed (Soikkanen 1983, 341), and 
therefore did not support Paasikivi’s view. Paasikivi admits that government’s 
                                                                                                                                  
use the AKS’s extensive network to survey opinions among the people. The effectiveness of 
the organisation that the AKS had prepared for a while was shown by the aspect that the first 
mood review report was received by the ministers already on 15 October (Manninen and 
Salokangas 2009, 240–241). 
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position enjoyed the support of the parliamentary factions: “I would have ex-
pected that the bourgeois members of parliament could have seen things with 
sensible reality. But actually this kind of thought barely existed in these circles” 
(Paasikivi 1986c, 75).  
Mannerheim expressed his concerns to the Coalition Party’s parliamentary 
faction and stated that in the worst case Hanko must be given up. Nevertheless, 
during the third round of negotiations, when Erkko stated that ceding Hanko can 
be discussed if Mannerheim would give his recommendation in writing, Man-
nerheim refused (Soikkanen 1983, 338–339; Pakaslahti 1970, 146). After the 
Winter War began, Tanner in his private letters stated that he should have 
fought more actively for greater flexibility and concessions. However, as Soik-
kanen points out, Tanner came to that opinion only after the “inflexibility  
policy” had failed (Soikkanen 1983, 341). Likewise, Paasikivi’s strong public 
criticism towards Finland’s behaviour in autumn 1939 was written after World 
War II in a very different political environment.  
7.2.4. Unanimity 
Politicians who argued for greater concessions did not have the option to 
publicly promote that idea, partly because of the narrative of unanimity, rooted 
in the constitutional/lawfulness understandings and through the understanding 
of Soviet threat in the White Finland/Radical-nationalism discourses. The under-
standing that societal unity was absolutely necessary during this period of 
international crisis was an idea shared by all main parliamentary factions in 
autumn 1939. The narrative of unanimity had been promoted by the Lawfulness 
front and the Red-Earth government in the 1930s in order to consolidate the 
society, in regard to the White/Red division, firstly in the aftermath of Lapua 
movement and secondly because of the increasing volatility of the international 
climate. The Radical-right had been calling for societal unanimity in response to 
the communist and Soviet threat throughout the interwar period. The external 
situation of 1939 allowed for these two understandings of unanimity to overlap. 
This idea of unanimity was promoted by all main political groups throughout 
the autumn of 1939 with the understanding that divisions between Red and 
White Finland still existed in the society. As Prime Minister Cajander stated in 
his speech after the military exercises on 12 August 1939: “In 1918 we were 
divided in two, a broken nation, whose resilience against a serious external 
threat would have been limited. Now we are more or less an integral nation, of 
which every member considers Finland his fatherland and is equally ready to 
defend it. […] It would be naive to claim that our national unanimity would be 
already on steadfast ground. It requires, like military armament, continuous 
strengthening” (cited in Kalela 1985, 459).  
From the Red Finland part of the society, the leader of the Social Democrats 
Väinö Tanner had a speech at his party’s 40th anniversary celebration on 8 Oc-
tober 1939, a few days after Finland had received the Soviet invitation for talks, 
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in which he focused on the necessity for full unanimity within the society. He 
argued that  
it is important now that our nation will remain unanimous. The disagreements, 
which until now have put their mark on our state, have to be put aside for now. 
These are after all small issues when the nation’s independence and future are at 
stake. If danger threatens from outside, we cannot afford these disagreements. 
Outside pressure commonly ties different layers of a nation into a strong entity. 
[…] The Finnish people have in this respect demonstrated admirable calmness 
and self-control (Tanner 1956, 295).  
The Social Democrats kept a close eye on the more leftist stream within their 
ranks and expelled radical-left parliamentarians from its parliament faction 
(Soikkanen 1983). On the radical-right side, Helanen, the head of the AKS, was 
in the light of the Karelia fortifications and its fund-raising action, where the 
Red part of the society participated less than the White part, worried that there 
might be a similar kind of problems with mobilisation. Therefore, one of the 
main aims of Maan Turva was to promote and strengthen national unity 
(Haataja 1997, 160).  
President Kallio in his speech in front of parliamentarians on 2 September 
stated: “It must be hoped that having forgotten the disagreements between dif-
ferent parts of society we can appear unanimous as a nation. This is a serious 
obligation of this moment” (Kallio 1942, 310). Prime Minister Cajander from 
the centrist National Progress Party stated in a radio speech on 4 November that 
“language, party, class and ideological differences have faded” (quoted in Soik-
kanen 1983, 366). Also, before the negotiators left for their third (and last) 
round of talks to Moscow on 31 October, the government advised the press to 
emphasize the “‘total unanimity’ of the government, parliament and the army 
leadership” (Soikkanen 1983, 344). The newspaper of the radical-right AKS, 
Suomen Heimo, in November 1939 argued: “The democratic state regime has 
decisively influenced the unanimity of the Finnish nation. This regime has 
committed the whole nation to be responsible for important political solutions. 
[…] No outsider can alienate the nation and its government to take different 
opinions in important existential questions” (cited in Soikkanen 1983, 364). 
Nevertheless, while emphasizing this idea of unanimity and the necessity of 
standing behind the government, it was also clearly stressed which principles 
this unity represented. The Coalition party newspaper stated that the govern-
ment will be supported if its policy is focused on protecting Finland’s neutrality, 
inviolability and the Nordic cooperation (Soikkanen 1983, 361).  
The Right-wing side was also clear on whose line it followed in the govern-
ment. As the IKL newspaper Savon Suunta wrote: “In the government there at 
the moment sitting two men who have the support and trust of the Finnish na-
tion: Erkko and Niukkanen” (cited in Soikkanen 1983, 345). The oppositional 
right was thus behind the government but only as long as the government did 
not opt for greater concessions. Since some politicians from right-wing parties 
and from the centrist Agrarian Union (defence minister Niukkanen’s party) 
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considered the government’s limited concessions already too extensive, there 
was a possibility that they would withdraw their support from the government’s 
policy line if greater concessions were argued for in public, which would have 
undermined the unity (Soikkanen 1983, 342). For example, after the third round 
of negotiations the Coalition party was looking for votes to prevent a Finnish-
Soviet pact to be handled in parliament as an extraordinary matter (in case there 
would have been an agreement it would have had to be ratified by the parlia-
ment) (Soikkanen 1983, 342). Soikkanen gave the example of the social democ-
rat Tanner, who, as a representative of the moderate wing of Social Democrats, 
had a left-wing opposition within his own party and parliamentary group. If he 
had promoted bigger concessions among them, this could have undermined the 
unity and the position of the Social Democrats within the country (Soikkanen 
1983, 341)108. Therefore, the narrative of unanimity can be seen as a social  
constraint on Finnish politicians in 1939. It also functions as an example of how 
social constraints on decision-makers can be of their own making, created 
through their own actions and statements. At the root of the unanimity narrative 
were the ideas promoted by the Lawfulness front and later the Red-Earth coali-
tion throughout the 1930s, which were based on the need to focus on national 
reconciliation and on external Othering instead of internal Othering. As national 
unanimity was considered a safeguard for a small state in times of crisis and the 
government’s position was based on the principles of Nordic cooperation and 
strict neutrality policy, this focus on unity constrained the government’s possi-
bilities to adjust its policy. Also, as argued by Mercer, the process does matter: 
“For example, how people experience a war can determine its outcome” (Mer-
cer 2010, 21). In this case, the period between the invitation to the talks and the 
Red Army attacking took two months. During this period, the interactions be-
tween the decision-makers and the society focused on emphasizing the neces-
sity of unity and demonstrating the unity between these principles. Hence, this 
process itself, consisting of interactions between decision-makers and society, 
created a kind of unanimity-trap for the decision-makers. The behaviour of the 
radical-right in autumn 1939 is an example of how external and internal current 
events can influence the dynamics between discourses and as a result also influ-
ence the decision-making process. In this case, it was not only that the opposi-
tional radical-right (IKL) and right (Coalition Party) parties supported the  
government, but that their vocal support strengthened this unanimity discourse, 
                                                     
108  As the possibilities of the radical-left to participate in the public sphere had been 
severely curbed in the early 1930s their views are not discussed in further detail here. 
However, the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact affected the radical-left in a similar way as it did the 
radical-right. As stated in a state police’s situation review from August 1939: “For many 
communists this agreement was such a bitter ideological blow that they were not able to 
digest it, but publicly reviled Stalin with their peers and proclaimed giving up communism 
entirely” (cited in Nevakivi 1989, 16; also Hentilä 1989, 81). Another reason why Finnish 
communists did not take any visible actions in autumn 1939, and many of them ended up 
following the government’s line, was that news of Stalinist purges, with many peasants 
under its victims, had spread in the country (Nevakivi 1989).  
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which in turn made it more difficult for the government to opt for more exten-
sive concessions. The next section will explore how these principles of neutral-
ity, territorial inviolability and the Nordic cooperation, that the unanimity narra-
tive was based on, became not possible to compromise on for the decision-
makers. 
7.3. Societal understandings and pressures 
The government’s policy in 1939 had the support of the majority of the Finnish 
society and the government knew that the majority of people would not agree to 
the Soviet demands (Soikkanen 1983; Paasikivi 1958, 1986c; Jakobson 1961; 
Ahto 1989; Tanner 1957). The reluctance by the Conciliation side, to publicly 
talk about Finland’s weak military capabilities, geopolitical realities and to 
argue for the need for greater flexibility and concessions, illustrates well the in-
fluence of dominant discourses. Finnish negotiator Paasikivi, although himself 
representing the Conciliation views, admits that Erkko’s and government majo-
rity’s view was based on the broader societal understandings. Paasikivi pointed 
out that the overall public opinion, the government and parliament believed in 
this supremacy of international law and that is applicable to all states. This was 
also why having ‘clean papers’ (full compliance with international law) was 
seen that important (Paasikivi 1958, 185). Therefore, the government knew that 
public opinion would support them only as long as they did not agree to the 
Soviet demands (Ahto 1989). As Defence Minister Niukkanen and negotiator 
Paasikivi himself had pointed out at the War Cabinet meeting on 16 October, 
the domestic political conditions did not allow for agreeing to all Soviet 
demands (Soikkanen 1983, 336). Also, foreign minister Erkko was worried how 
the public would react to these limited concessions the government was 
prepared to make. In his letter to negotiator Tanner, before the latter left for 
Moscow for the third time, Erkko wrote: “I should be grateful if you would ask 
the Russians whether they have anything against our reporting publicly to the 
Parliament, and thus to the people as a whole, what their original demands were 
in their entirety. Otherwise it will become very difficult to handle the matter” 
(Tanner 1957, 57–58). Soikkanen also points out that Erkko asked Mannerheim 
to give his recommendation on ceding Hanko in writing (which the latter re-
fused), as he expected pressure and resistance from the parliament and public 
(Soikkanen 1983). How did the government know what the society wanted, 
especially considering that the content of the negotiations was not public during 
the large period of talks. What were the societal pressures that made Paasikivi 
and Mannerheim, both well-respected Finnish statesmen, to refrain from pub-
licly expressing their concerns? 
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7.3.1. Societal understandings and initiatives 
Maan Turva, the organisation that the Academic Karelian Society (AKS) 
created in co-operation with the government for propaganda and information 
purposes, reported that people had in general a feeling of unity throughout the 
negotiations period. This unity was promoted and spread by newspapers and by 
community leaders, such as pastors (Ahto 1989, 41). Public opinion was neverthe-
less clear about what are the limits of this unity were, and hence what is 
expected from the government. As one mood review stated: “only if not a cen-
timetre would be given to the Russians, not even for rent, then the whole nation 
is behind the government”. Another report brought out the concern of the citi-
zens in Viipuri: “the only aspect that the people I have met are afraid of is that 
the government possibly, without a fight, will cede something to the Russians” 
(cited in Ahto 1989, 47–48). The full spectrum of the Finnish media supported 
the government’s policy. As the newspaper of the Social Democratic party Fin-
nish Social Democrat wrote on 9 October 1939: “If the question would be about 
giving up our sovereignty, the Finnish government nor the people, who are 
united behind the government in this matter, cannot be involved in that” (cited 
in Ahto 1989, 30–31). When the Social Democrat Tanner became a negotiator, 
some people were worried about it, but this was not a dominant feeling. The 
mood reviews were very positive about Erkko and called him “a firm man” 
(cited in Ahto 1989, 48). Although there was a lot of optimism among the peo-
ple, less optimistic notes also existed as one review stated that “we hope that 
negotiations will bring good results. Here the majority feels that it is impossible 
to resist the Russians” (cited in Ahto 1989, 46). In mid-October the mood 
among the people were considered calm and people were apparently used to the 
‘war of nerves’. One mood report stated that “it is believed that the danger is 
over but still there is readiness for all options”. Another report called the overall 
mood even too optimistic (cited in Ahto 1989, 57). Uusi Suomi wrote on 21 
October after Paasikivi returned from Moscow that “the nature of the agree-
ments between the Soviet Union and the Baltic States are such that their neu-
trality has been destroyed and their independence has become questionable. 
Finland cannot go for these political agreements” (cited in Ahto 1989, 57). Af-
ter 24 October, when it was announced that the talks were interrupted again and 
Paasikivi had to return from Moscow, according to the mood reports it did not 
change the overall feeling much (Ahto 1989, 58). Helsingin Sanomat wrote on 
25 October that “one cannot haggle in questions of sovereignty and independ-
ence” (cited in Ahto 1989, 58). That the situation should be considered a war of 
nerves (which was strongly stated by Erkko) was also stated in the newspaper, 
Ilkka-lehti, which wrote on 27 October that “[t]he situation requires nerves and 
composure. Now we can also feel how it is to live in times of a war of nerves” 
(cited in Ahto 1989, 59).  
On 30 October, Molotov’s speech made the content of the Russian demands 
known to the public. As was showed earlier this Soviet move did not change the 
Finnish government’s policy. It also apparently did not create much panic in 
society. Maan turvan’s mood review from 1 November states that “[f]irstly it 
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made us a bit pale, when we heard the news. But it is better that we are no 
longer in the dark. No talk about giving up, the defence idea was even more 
popular than before” (cited in Ahto 1989, 63). On some occasions Molotov’s 
speech rather increased the anti-Russian sentiments as, for example, one known 
leftist activist in Hanko stated that “no damn way could one agree to these de-
mands”. People were more worried that “the negotiators would have papers in 
their pockets where they have promised too much” (cited in Ahto 1989, 63). 
The state police’s report from early November also states that the overall opin-
ion is strong “and the motivation to defend the country has increased” (cited in 
Ahto 1989, 63). On 1–2 November several newspapers (Hufvudstadsbladet, 
Suomen Sosiaaldemokraati) wrote that the demand regarding Hanko was utterly 
unacceptable. The first reaction of Ilta-Sanomat was that the fundamental val-
ues of the Finnish nation are the independence and neutrality of the country and 
that no compromises could be made regarding them. Also other newspapers 
wrote about the need not to compromise on these issues (Ahto 1989, 61–62). 
When it became known that Erkko had required the negotiators to return to 
Finland on 14 October the media wrote that “it is better to be without agreement 
than to have a bad one” (cited in Ahto 1989, 80). On 4 November Prime Minis-
ter Cajander made a speech that focused on the firm line of Finland and the 
impossibility to concede Kannas or Hanko: “[i]f we cannot achieve peace and 
good relations with honourable ways, we are not going to surrender dishonour-
ably [...] the Finnish nation has decided to defend its freedom and independ-
ence. It will stick to this decision”. This speech got very positive feed-back 
from the majority of the society (Ahto 1989, 67). In mid-November some peo-
ple had gotten worried about the duration of the talks. The men at the extra re-
serve trainings (which in reality was a mobilisation) were still in a good mood, 
with one of them stating that “these Russians should finally come, so we can get 
back to work from here” (Ahto 1989, 82). After the negotiators returned and 
nothing seemed to happen, people started thinking that the threat of the war had 
passed and not many believed in a military conflict. In general, people were 
satisfied with the government’s actions (Ahto 1989, 83, 85). 
People also expressed their opinion by taking part in different societal initia-
tives. One of the first reactions from the society when it came out that Finland 
had received an invitation to Moscow, was that thousands of people showed up 
at the Helsinki railway station to send negotiator Paasikivi off. When Paasikivi 
left for his first trip to Moscow (9 October 1939), there were thousands of people 
present, singing patriotic songs. This was significant as there was nothing much 
known about his departure other than a few official sentences (Ahto 1989, 34). 
This gathering was a spontaneous one as no newspaper or organisation had 
called for it (Jakobson 1961, 113). A good example of the songs sung was the 
Val laulu (Oath Song), which said: “Listen to the sacred oath, dear Finland! A 
foreign power must not touch you. We will protect you, defend with our blood. 
Be carefree, your sons are on guard” (Paasikivi 1986c, 4). In addition to the 
people present at the station, hundreds of thousands listened to the occasion on 
their radios (Ahto 1989, 34). Thousands of people gathered at the railway  
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stations throughout Finland every time the negotiators left for Moscow in 
October and November 1939 (Paasikivi 1986c; Tanner 1950). Although the 
content of the talks was not made public, in the second half of October the 
delegations began to call on the government “expressing their intransigent 
opposition to the demands” (Tanner 1957, 33). A good example of that was a 
large delegation representing all parishes of the Karelian Isthmus (border area), 
who came to Helsinki already in mid-October, had meetings with the govern-
ment members and “firmly demanded the rejection of even the least cession of 
Isthmus territory” (Tanner 1950, 33).109 According to Defence Minister Niuk-
kanen, the delegation stated that if “[e]ven the smallest area would be ceded 
voluntarily, Russians and the whole world would conclude that one can do with 
Finland as one likes. At the same time, the nation’s defence will would be 
curbed, and the Soviet Union or any other big country could occupy the whole 
country without obstacles” (Niukkanen 1951, 87). This shows that the public 
knew that certain demands had been presented, and that they were about 
security guarantees including territorial concessions.  
These societal initiatives were not ‘ad hoc’ events, but followed from a 
strong political tradition for societal actions that had started during the Russifi-
cation policies in the 1880s and the subsequent mass political actions. In the 
evening of the war, the summer of 1939, thousands of Finns had spent their 
vacation doing unpaid work in the fortification of the Karelian isthmus, an ef-
fort initiated and organised by the AKS. When a month later the world war 
started, the societal mind-set on how any Russian demands would be under-
stood was already ‘set’. A range of societal initiatives, from building fortifica-
tions in Karelia, the other societal initiatives, such as gatherings at train stations 
to people travelling from border areas to Helsinki to demand that nothing 
should be given away were part of this political tradition. 
According to the mood reviews and media reports, on many occasions  
people referred to the similarities between the current period and the Russi-
fication period. In terms of national unity, one Maan Turva review reported that 
“we have not felt that united since the February Manifesto forty years ago” 
(cited in Ahto 1989, 40). The Uusi Suomi newspaper reported that while 
sending the negotiators off to Moscow, older people said that there was the 
same feeling in this departure “as decades ago when during Finland’s difficult 
moments wishing farewell to the men who left for the fatherland’s affairs” 
(cited in Paasikivi 1986c, 4). This referred to the Great Petition of 1899 where 
half a million signatures were collected to protest against the February 
Manifesto and a large delegation took it to St Petersburg. There were also 
voices that argued that the biggest danger to Finland were the Conciliation-men, 
                                                     
109  The Soviet Union had presented its demands regarding the Isthmus only on 14 October. 
As the content of the talks was not public, the people from the Isthmus might have heard 
something about it through the grapevine or just assumed that it is commonsensical that the 
border area will be one of the main negotiating points. Furthermore, as the regiments had 
moved to the border on 6 October 1939, this probably further encouraged locals to act. 
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referring to the Conciliation side of the Russification period and to Paasikivi as 
the negotiator (Manninen and Salokangas 2009, 281). 
7.3.2. State and society relationship - who influenced whom? 
The previous sections discussed the main understandings of the situation among 
the decision-makers and the society in autumn 1939. It was shown that one of 
the main ideas was the idea of the unanimity of the Finnish nation, which was 
emphasised by all main political parties, media and the members of society. It 
was also shown that this unity was based on the ideas of Finnish neutrality, 
territorial inviolability, Nordic co-operation and strong anti-Soviet sentiments. 
These sentiments were rooted in Finnish domestic discourses, such as the Con-
stitutional discourse, White Finland and Radical-nationalist discourses, which 
enabled the co-operation between the centre-left government and right wing 
parties and organisations in autumn 1939. It was also shown that this narrative 
of unity also constrained the government’s manoeuvring space as it set strict 
borders that had be followed for the unity to last. The government and political 
parties perceived the public opinion as being fully against any kind of territorial 
concessions to the Soviet Union. This was also demonstrated by the mood re-
views gathered from the society.  
Nevertheless, one could argue that the decision-makers themselves in- 
fluenced the public opinion as well, through emphasising the necessity for unity 
and the need to back certain Finnish principles and values in their speeches. The 
government, and Erkko in particular, was directing the public opinion to a 
course favourable for the government, focusing on principles and societal val-
ues and not enough on the possibility of war and the need to avoid conflict 
(Soikkanen 1983; Wunsch 2006). Significantly, Erkko had a powerful tool to 
promote his understandings of the situation in his newspaper Helsingin Sano-
mat. For example Wunsch has claimed that Erkko used Helsingin Sanomat to 
influence the public opinion (Wunsch 2006). Though there was no direct cen-
sorship, the Foreign ministry gave its guidelines and directions to the media and 
Erkko’s own newspaper was carefully followed by other newspapers and also 
by external actors as it was seen as representing Erkko’s, hence the govern-
ment’s, foreign policy line (Wunsch 2006; Soikkanen 1983). This leads to the 
question that if we said that Erkko was manipulating the public opinion to in-
crease support for his own policy line, then where did this policy line come 
from. Why did he prioritize domestic principles over the external constraints? 
The current dissertation argues that the decision-maker is a part of a societal 
fabric and his understandings represent certain societal discourses. Erkko’s 
position, as discussed before, was a societal position, the origins of which were 
traced in the first part of this case study. Therefore, these interactions between 
the state and society worked two-ways, as they were based on societal positions. 
Erkko’s, Cajander’s and Tanner’s speeches strengthened the societal sentiments 
against the territorial demands. At the same time, people waiting at train  
stations throughout Finland when the negotiators passed by train further 
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strengthened these sentiments within the society and among the decision-
makers.  
The societal ideas and narratives promoted by the decision-makers, such as 
Erkko, and by for example right-wing politicians and activists, had their roots in 
Finnish historical discourses. One could argue that the decision-makers that 
represented the Constitutional or Radical-nationalist discourse did not see the 
societal opinions as constraints because they shared the same understandings. 
At the same time, Paasikivi perceived these societal understandings as con-
straints, since the discourse he represented did not enjoy wider public support at 
the time. This enabled him to argue after the war (once again, under different 
circumstances) that the government should have known better. He referred to a 
Finnish soldier who wrote after the war that “the government had not a smallest 
chance to influence the course of events. It knew that it had the confidence of 
the people only as long as it did not agree to the demands, which would have 
meant giving up freedom and the independence of the country” (quoted in 
Paasikivi 1986c, 114). Paasikivi argued that the decision-makers should have 
been wiser than “the man in the street” He stated: “I don’t know whether the 
authority and influence of the state’s government, president, cabinet and the 
parliament had really sunk so low that those who had to have better knowledge 
about the issues than the common citizen […] could not consider what was the 
best way for saving the country” (Paasikivi 1986c, 114). Nevertheless, the in-
stitutions he mentioned did not know better, because the understanding of the 
meaning of these demands came from historically developed societal dis-
courses. Hence, a decision-maker does not choose rationally between different 
options, but mediates between external factors and different domestic dis-
courses, with the baggage of his own social construction. Ylikangas points out 
that there is no real value in discussing “if then” options on whether the war 
could have been avoided if the government would have focused publicly more 
on external constraints and the dangers of military conflict. Because “[i]f 
Finland would have agreed to the terms or if we could have, in general, sensibly 
expected the agreement from Finland of that time, our country’s government, its 
leading circles, in fact, the whole nation would have had to be different than 
they were in reality” (Ylikangas 1986, 196).  
7.3.3. Conclusion 
The aim of this section was to show the interactions between different dis-
courses and how the broader societal understandings played themselves out in 
autumn 1939. It was shown that there was a broad societal consensus on the 
Russian demands. This consensus that reached across the spectrum of all politi-
cal parties and different societal groups was also recognised by Paasikivi in his 
post-World War II criticism of Finnish government policy in autumn 1939. 
Paasikivi states that government’s opinion was shared by different sides of the 
society, and was not only prevalent among young people, but also in the centre 
of circles of responsibility (Paasikivi 1986c, 74–75). However, as was shown 
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before, Paasikivi himself was not prepared to publicly criticize the government 
in 1939, which itself is a good illustration of what were acceptable social prac-
tices and what were the unacceptable ones within Finnish societal under- 
standings in 1939. 
What was possible and acceptable within the social sphere in Finnish society 
was based on how the society understood and perceived the Soviet demands. 
These understandings, in turn, were based on the previous historical experiences 
of Finnish-Russian relationships and public perceptions on these experiences. 
The situation was understood as a question of certain principles, “All the politi-
cal groupings, even those critical of the consensus, recognized that the Finnish 
nation was virtually united in defending certain issues of principle” (Soikkanen 
1983, 530). Next, these principles were based on the Constitutionalist under-
standing of law and justice, complemented by strong anti-Soviet sentiments of 
White Finland and Radical-Nationalist discourses. As stated by Paasikivi, the 
Finnish nation at the time believed in “written laws, documents and agreements. 
Soviet Russia would not attack us because it had no legal right to do so and 
because both general opinion and the sympathy of the world were on our side. 
[…] Faith in the victory of the justice was strong in Finland. According to the 
conviction of the Finnish people, justice, and written justice in particular, will at 
the end of the day always prevail due to an inexplicable and mysterious force 
that prevails in world history. Finnish history from the last decades, during 
which we had always been saved, provided evidence for this belief. So, we 
would also be saved now in one way or another; this was the general belief of 
the Finnish people” (Paasikivi 1986c, 75). This understanding for him was well-
represented by the saying of Foreign Minister Erkko that “[t]he law is on our 
side and in the eyes of the whole world Russia is bound by them” (Paasikivi 
1986c, 58).  
The Conciliation discourse, which understood the situation through systemic 
pressures, material capabilities and power disparity, was present in the govern-
ment discussions. However, this understanding did not have a broader societal 
or political support. The understanding of the situation was based on the nature 
of the historical Russian-Finnish relationship as understood in Finnish society, 
through which Russia had become perceived as the main external threat to Fin-
nish state. This shared understanding on the acute Soviet threat also explains the 
support of the right-wing organisations carrying the Radical-nationalist dis-
course for the centre-left government’s policies. The chapter showed that domi-
nant societal understandings do introduce societal constraints to decision- 
makers, which was shown by the aspect that the decision-makers who argued 
for greater concessions and saw the situation through the prism of material 
capabilities, were not prepared to argue for it in public. This was because 
society at large did not understand the situation through the lenses of power 
disparity, but as a question of certain principles, which were strongly influenced 
by the Constitutionalist principles of law and justice. As these principles were 
complemented by the strong anti-Soviet sentiments, promoted by the Radical-
nationalist discourse and also rooted in the historical confrontations of Finland 
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and Russia, it translated into strong societal pressures, which made it not pos-
sible for the decision-makers to accept the Soviet demands. The chapter also 
showed that societal constraints can be partly the decision-makers’ own making, 
but once they are established in the public sphere, the decision-maker cannot 
escape them. This was shown through the narrative of unanimity, which had its 
roots in the conciliation policies of the Lawfulness front and the Red-Earth 
governments, in their focus on the necessity for the society to reconcile and 
redefine the concept of threat as an external one, instead of an internal one (Red 
Finland).  
The international climate of autumn 1939 enabled also White Finland and 
Radical-Right discourses to join behind the unanimity narrative, as the govern-
ment’s policy opposed the Soviet demands. Nevertheless, the narrative also 
became a social constraint on the decision-makers, as it constrained the govern-
ment’s possibilities to adjust its foreign policy and respond to increasing 
external constraints.  
7.4. Conclusion of the case study 
The current case study focused on the how-possible question regarding the 
foreign policy decision of Finland toward the Soviet demands in autumn 1939. 
The case study comprised of three parts: the first part (Chapter 5) focused on 
the decision from the angle of the systemic pressures and showed that although 
external pressures were high and further increased during the negotiations, this 
did not have a significant influence on Finland’s foreign policy. The second part 
(Chapter 6), explored the dominant domestic discourses, their emergence and 
interactions as the dissertation argues that these domestic discourses influenced 
how the situation in 1939 was understood by the society. It was shown that ”the 
Russian question” had a central role within all three debates and as a conse-
quence, Russia was seen as the main threat to the Finnish state. Within these 
debates three different ways how to “handle Russia” emerged. 1) Compliance 
with domestic norms and values of the Constitutionalist movement; 2) Active 
resistance exercised by different Radical-nationalist movements, which argued 
that radical measures are justified in case of a threat to the nationalist values and 
3) the Conciliation line, which focused on the need to negotiate and accommo-
date the power actor in case of conflict. The important similarity between the 
Constitutional and activist Radical-nationalist discourse was that both saw the 
necessity to take initiative as a solution to the Soviet threat. However, the nature 
of action was seen differently by these two discourses, the Constitutionalists 
emphasising staying within the rule of law framework and Radical-nationalists 
focusing on military action. The Constitutional-Conciliation debate brought two 
approaches to political thought in Finland: one where the decision-making was 
associated with domestic norms and values, such as justice and law, and one 
where it was determined by the material capabilities and power disparity.  
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The third part (Chapter 7) focused on the actual decision-making process in 
autumn 1939. It first explored the social construction of the primary decision-
maker, as it was argued that the decision-maker matters, since it is he who by 
processing the on-going tensions between the domestic discourses, must bal-
ance between external and internal pressures. It was shown that the primary 
decision-maker’s, foreign minister Erkko’s, political understandings were based 
on his strong constitutionalist background and anti-Russian sentiments. Next, it 
was argued that although the decision-maker does have an important role, the 
decision is not determined simply by the private beliefs of the statesman, but on 
the interaction of different domestic discourses and how these are processed by 
the decision-maker. It was argued that dominant social ideas do introduce so-
cietal constraints to decision-makers, which was shown by the aspect that the 
decision-makers who argued for greater concessions and saw the situation 
through the prism of material capabilities, were not prepared to argue for it in 
public. Also, the strong societal focus on unanimity constrained government’s 
space for adjusting the foreign policy line according to the increasing external 
constraints. This was because the society at large did not understand the situa-
tion through the lenses of power disparity, but as a question of certain prin- 
ciples, which were strongly influenced by the Constitutionalist principles of law 
and justice. As these principles were complemented by the strong anti-Soviet 
sentiments, promoted by the Radical-nationalist discourse and also rooted in the 
historical confrontations of Finland and Russia, it translated into strong societal 
pressures, which made it not possible for the decision-makers to accept the So-
viet demands.  
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CONCLUSIONS 
This dissertation explored how a state’s foreign policy practices become so-
cially possible within the framework of the constructivist school of International 
Relations. Constructivism sees the world as socially constructed by shared so-
cial ideas, identities, norms and practices and constructivists explain a state’s 
preferences by focusing on its identities and interests. The dissertation was con-
cerned with the process of a state’s foreign policy decision-making and the role 
the state and society relationship plays in this process. The particular interest of 
the dissertation was to study this state and society relationship under very crude 
power conditions and to find out whether and how the domestic understandings 
influence the state’s foreign policy decision-making while its physical survival 
is at stake under the threat of a military invasion. The dissertation was interested 
in situations where rationalist theories would have clear predictions about the 
behaviour of the state, but these predictions could not fully explain the choices 
of the state. Therefore it focused on the constructivist approach as its aim was to 
show that even in a situation with acute international pressures, we still need to 
consider societal discourses and practices to fully explain how a certain decision 
can become commonsensical for the decision-makers. The dissertation tackled 
the how-possible research question within the framework of societal construc-
tivism: how does the relationship between the state and society make a state’s 
foreign policy practices either thinkable or unthinkable under high systemic 
constraints?  
The dissertation followed and built on the theoretical framework developed 
by the constructivist scholar Ted Hopf. Hopf’s approach proposes societal con-
structivism, which argues that domestic identity discourses influence states’ 
foreign policy actions; therefore, the way a society perceives itself influences 
the way the decision-maker sees another state. The dissertation followed Hopf’s 
approach that domestic discourses explain a state’s foreign policy decisions. 
However, it disagreed with Hopf in how the state and society relationship is 
constructed and its effects on the decision-making process. It argued that politi-
cal decisions are not near-automatic, as Hopf’s approach suggests, but socially 
constructed. This is because at the moment of decision-making the decision-
maker does not have coherent given practices at his disposal, but needs to medi-
ate the tensions between the different formative discourses existing in the state 
and the external pressures. It was further argued that the decision-maker makes 
his decisions based on his interpretation of the domestic and external situation, 
which in turn is based on his understandings on the state and society relation-
ship, hence on how the decision-maker is socialised within the societal debates. 
Next, the theoretical conclusions of this dissertation will be presented through 
the discussion on the findings of the comparative case study. In the end of this 
section the theoretical points this dissertation aimed to make will be summed 
up.  
To explain how a particular foreign policy decision becomes commonsensi-
cal and therefore socially possible for the state, the dissertation followed a 
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three-step model: First, in the first parts of the case studies (Chapters 2 and 5) 
the extent of the external pressures the decision-maker had to process was es-
tablished. The second parts of the case studies (Chapters 3 and 6) explored the 
emergence and development of the societal discourses through the interaction 
with each other and with specific Others. The third parts of the case study 
(Chapters 4 and 7) focused on the actual decision-making: how did the  
decision-maker come to understand the situation the way he did. Primarily, the 
social construction of the decision-maker was explored. Then, it was examined 
how the decision-maker negotiated between different discourses and subsequent 
pressures: external pressures as established in the first part of the case studies 
and domestic pressures as established within the second part of the studies. To 
answer the research question, the theoretical framework, built on Hopf’s ap-
proach on the relation of domestic discourses and foreign policy decision-mak-
ing with an emphasis on the interaction between discourses and the role of the 
decision-maker, was applied to two cases: the foreign policy decisions of 
Finland and of Estonia in autumn 1939 regarding the demands of the Soviet 
Union. The case selection was based on the idea that the study aimed to explore 
situations where resistance would be, within the understanding of rational cal-
culations of material capabilities, particularly problematic. 
Through these two case studies, the dissertation aimed to problematize two 
aspects that Ted Hopf largely brackets in his framework: the social construction 
of the state and society relationship and the way it influences the decision-
making. For Hopf, the relationship between the state and society is uniform and 
nearly automatic: certain identities are embedded within the society, and the 
decision-maker, who is part of the society, will make a decision that is deter-
mined by the dominant state identity. Hence, at the moment of decision-making, 
the decision-maker is likely to have one option in mind, which is determined by 
the dominant discourse. This uniformity is possible for Hopf because he  
brackets the aspect of other discourses that exist in the society and the possible 
influence of the interactions and tensions between the discourses on the foreign 
policy making process. If the societal understandings are multiple and conflic-
tual, as Hopf himself assumes, then the outcome will not be automatic, but the 
decision needs to be negotiated between these different understandings. There-
fore, the dissertation argued that political decision is not given, but socially con-
structed, and it is possible to trace the domestic discourses and their interactions 
to better determine how a certain decision became possible for the decision-
maker.  
In addition to how the tensions between discourses influence the decision-
making, the dissertation also problematized the role of the decision-maker in 
this process. In contrast with Hopf, who argued that the decision-maker, as the 
carrier of the dominant discourse, makes a decision solely based of the under-
standings embedded in this discourse, the current dissertation argued that the 
decision-maker needs to negotiate between different societal discourses and 
external factors, but his understanding on these factors is based on how the 
decision-maker is socialized within the societal debates. 
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However, this process does not happen in a vacuum of objectiveness, but the 
decision-maker’s own social construction determines how he understands the 
external and domestic tensions, and subsequently the particular situation in 
which he needs to make a decision. So, this research argued that in order to 
better understand how a certain decision became commonsensical, hence possi-
ble, for the state, the relationship between the society, carrying these discourses, 
and the state, negotiating between these discourses, must be explored.  
The analysis of the two cases showed that Finland and Estonia reacted dif-
ferently to the Soviet demands because their decision-makers’ understanding of 
these demands, subject to social construction, depended on the dominant do-
mestic discourses and practices and on the construction of the state and society 
relationship that derived from these discourses. The first parts of the case stud-
ies (Chapter 2 for Estonia and Chapter 5 for Finland) explored the foreign pol-
icy situation in autumn 1939 and the decision-making process of the respective 
governments with the focus on external pressures. There were several differen-
ces in Estonian and Finnish behaviour in 1939, some of them tactical, such as 
the Finnish government slowing down the pace of talks while the Estonian side 
tried to reach a solution as fast as possible. However, the major difference the 
first parts of the case studies were interested in was whether systemic or do-
mestic constraints dominated the decision-making and whether foreign policy 
decision-making was influenced by the increasing systemic constraints. 
In the case of Estonia, it was shown that the systemic pressures were the 
central argument in the government’s decision-making process. The decision-
maker perceived the external constraints as dominant and focused on the power 
disparity between Estonia and the Soviet Union, the volatility of the interna-
tional climate and the lack of possibilities for military aid. Therefore, the deci-
sion was based on the aim to avoid military conflict, and the government fol-
lowed the logic of the international system. In the case of Finland, the study 
showed that Finnish foreign policy behaviour in the autumn 1939 did not 
change significantly during the period of talks, in spite of increasing systemic 
pressures and a growing external threat. The case study selection section men-
tioned one difference in systemic pressures for these two states, as the Soviets 
asked territorial concessions from Finland and not from Estonia, which may 
have made it more difficult for Finland to agree with the demands. The Soviets 
requested military bases in both countries manned by Soviet soldiers, which 
became a central issue for the Finnish government (Hanko), as this was per-
ceived to undermine the neutrality policy and the Scandinavian orientation. In 
the end, they were willing to discuss certain territorial concessions, but would 
not agree to have a Soviet military basis in their territory. This again shows the 
constructivist point, as made through examples given by Wendt (1999) and 
Mercer (2010) in the theoretical section, that the state’s understanding on exter-
nal threat is not a ‘given’, but is socially constructed, depending on state’s  
understandings on the situation. 
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The how-possible sections of both chapter focused on setting up the ques-
tions for the following parts of the case studies: how did their decisions become 
possible, hence commonsensical, for the decision-makers? 
The second parts of the case studies (Chapter 3 for Estonia and Chapter 6 for 
Finland) explored the emergence and developments of dominant domestic dis-
courses that were present in the respective states in 1939 and interactions be-
tween these discourses. Although Estonia and Finland both became independent 
in 1918, their experience with statehood differed significantly. Finland had be-
come an autonomous, albeit not a sovereign, state in 1908, after which the so-
cietal understandings of Finnish statehood emerged and started to develop. 
Therefore, ‘state’ was an integral part of Finnish societal discourses. The most 
significant external Other for Finland was Russia: interactions and confronta-
tions with Russia and different understandings on how to handle Russia ran 
through Finland’s history since the emergence of the Finnish national identity in 
the nineteenth century. Through societal debates that were based on this under-
standing of the Finnish state, the understanding that Finland was a state of its 
own, though not a sovereign one, became a central part of the Finnish identity. 
Another characteristic of this identity was that Finland was governed by Finnish 
constitutional laws. Through the Constitutional-Conciliation debate and the 
confrontations with Russia, legal principles and norms became an important 
part of Finnish domestic understandings and within the Constitutionalist dis-
course it was not a choice to follow laws, but a precondition for national devel-
opment. Furthermore, also the other major discourses – the White Finland and 
the Radical-nationalist discourses – saw the Soviet Union as the main enemy of 
Finland and focused on the acute Soviet threat to Finland.  
In the aftermath of the civil war of 1918, Finland’s societal sphere was 
strongly divided between Red and White Finland. When the economic crisis led 
to a rapid growth of the popularity of the radical right-wing movements in Esto-
nia and Finland in the early 1930s, political stability in Finland was ensured by 
the dominance of the Constitutional discourse that led to the formation of the 
Lawfulness front between the centre-left parties. The commitment to legal 
norms became increasingly important within Finnish societal debates. In the 
mid-1930s the focus shifted from internal Othering between the Reds and 
Whites towards external Othering, resulting in a rationale for the need of na-
tional unity within an increasingly volatile climate. The Red-Earth coalition 
government, in place since 1937, supported national reconciliation and empha-
sised its importance. The increase in external threat also altered the position of 
White Finland and Radical-nationalism and made it focus more on the defence 
will of the nation, and therefore on strengthening the unity within the society. 
Although Estonia became independent in the same year as Finland, until 
1918 the state, governed by Baltic German elites, had had the role of the Other 
with regard to the Estonian society. Hence, the Estonian society, where Esto-
nian cultural and social developments happened on the one hand, and the state 
as a decision-making and political sphere on the other, were seen as separate 
entities. As a result, to become an independent state, Estonia had to go through 
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a much more rapid development than Finland. In Estonia, the national move-
ment had limited experiences with what statehood entailed, while Finland had 
been developing its societal understandings on statehood since the early nine-
teenth century. The separation of the societal and decision-making spheres helps 
to explain why the Estonian society at large found a solution in a strong execu-
tive leadership during the devastating economic crisis and the following politi-
cal crisis in the early 1930s, while less emphasis was placed on norms and in-
stitutions, as the dominance of the Radical-national discourse during this period 
illustrates. The Collectivist-nationalist discourse, a state discourse after 1934, 
saw the state and society relationship in terms of the supremacy of national 
collectivist interests over individual interests as a necessary precondition for 
national development. The decision-making sphere and societal sphere were 
seen as separate, as this was considered to ensure more political stability and 
more effective decision-making. Furthermore, the state discourse saw for a 
centralised top-down political and societal organisation. Although an alternative 
discourse, the Liberal-individualist understanding that saw the development of 
the individual as a necessary precondition for the development of the state, ex-
isted, its reach was severely limited and its ideas did not reach the general pub-
lic. Therefore, the dominant state understanding of the state and society rela-
tionship saw the decision-making sphere and the societal spheres separated. 
The third parts of the case studies (Chapter 4 for Estonia and Chapter 7 for 
Finland) focused on how the societal discourses and the state and society rela-
tionship made different decisions possible for Finnish and Estonian decision-
makers in autumn 1939. The dissertation argued that Hopf’s assumption, that 
the action the decision-maker will take is determined by the “pre-cooked real-
ity” of domestic discourses, is over-simplified. This is because a political deci-
sion is not a given, but socially constructed. At the moment of decision-making, 
the decision-maker needs to negotiate between competing societal discourses 
and external factors and the decision-maker’s own social construction deter-
mines how he understands the external and domestic tensions and subsequently 
the particular situation that needs to be decided.  
The Estonian case study showed how the dominant state discourse con-
structed the state and society relationship through the separation of the societal 
sphere and decision-making spheres. The resulting state practices created cir-
cumstances where alternative discourses were neither part of the decision- 
making nor of the nation-wide public spheres. This allowed for a situation 
where the government did not have to negotiate between competing domestic 
discourses and was able to concentrate only on the systemic constraints. This 
illustrated the point made in the theoretical chapter that if there are no tensions 
or interactions between discourses, or if there is only one discourse present, this 
is not because social construction is a priori uniform, but because of certain 
social conditions that made this situation possible. These conditions are the 
results of long term social processes that can be traced to explain how the 
dominance of a discourse that determined the course of action the state took 
became possible. The Estonian case study explored how the separation between 
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the societal and decision-making spheres came to be. The case study showed 
that during the emergence of Estonian societal understandings, Estonian society 
stood largely outside of the decision-making sphere. Therefore, the state repre-
sented by the Baltic Germans and/or Imperial Russia came to be seen as the 
Other with regard to Estonian society and the societal understandings developed 
in separation from the state and the decision-making sphere. So, when Estonia 
became a Staatsnation through independence, Estonians had limited experience 
with what this entailed. The understanding of the state as Other in regard to the 
society and the separate development of the societal sphere helps explain why 
the economic crisis in the early 1930s resulted in the popularity of the Radical-
nationalist discourse that found political stability in a strong executive. This 
understanding, influenced by the separation of the societal and state spheres 
during the emergence and development of Estonian domestic discourses, paved 
the way for the development of the Collectivist-nationalist discourse into a state 
discourse. The Collectivist-nationalist discourse as a state discourse further 
enhanced the understanding of keeping the societal spheres and decision-
making spheres separated. Political organisation and public discussions were 
organised and controlled by the state through censorship, emergency regulations 
and the abolition of political parties. The Liberal-individualist discourse argued 
that this system of “guided democracy”, where individuals were always 
expected to wait for the government’s directions and where political organi-
sations were centrally organised, curbed the alertness of the society and could 
be dangerous in the case of an external threat. However, the public reach of this 
discourse was severely limited on the national level. 
To understand how this separation between societal and decision-making 
spheres emerged and, hence, how these social conditions within which the deci-
sion-makers operated in autumn 1939 came to be, the dissertation focused on 
the social construction of the primary decision-maker. It was shown that in his 
understanding, the stability of the state was ensured by a strong executive, 
which represented the people directly, and that society itself was not capable of 
effective decision-making. These ideas led to institutional practices where the 
decision-making sphere and societal sphere were separated. In turn, these insti-
tutional arrangements determined how the political reality was constructed in 
Estonia. The state discourse prioritised national collective interests over indi-
vidual interests. Therefore, the state system saw for a centralised, top-down 
political and societal organisation, where societal activities were coordinated by 
the state to ensure a focus on the nation’s interests. The idea of ensuring a top-
down political organisation, to ensure the stability and development of the state, 
was then enforced through institutional practices, such as banning political par-
ties, maintaining the state of emergency, regulations that prohibited political 
meetings and censorship regulations. As the decision-making sphere and socie-
tal spheres were kept separate and because alternative discourses were isolated 
from effective decision-making, there were no interactions between the dis-
courses within the public sphere. Therefore, the decision-maker was not con-
strained by societal understandings, such as wide anti-German sentiments, but 
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could choose to base his policy and decision-making on realpolitical needs. 
Subsequently, during the decision-making process in autumn 1939, the govern-
ment was able to focus solely on systemic constraints, not on domestic aspects 
or domestic understandings of these systemic constraints. As the alternative 
discourses were neither part of the nation-wide public sphere, nor of the effec-
tive decision-making sphere, there was no need to negotiate between these un-
derstandings, allowing the government to focus solely on external constraints 
and to effectively implement the decision of avoiding military conflict.  
The Finnish case study showed how societal discourses and their interac-
tions, through societal debates, led to the dominant understandings of the situa-
tion in autumn 1939. Within these debates, Russia was seen as the Other to 
Finland and the concept of the Finnish state had been a central part of the so-
cietal understandings since the nineteenth century. As a result of these debates 
there were three main societal understandings on how to handle Russia in 1939. 
The Constitutionalist understanding focused on legal norms and values. The 
White Finland and Radical-nationalist understanding saw the Soviet Union as 
the ultimate threat to Finland, with the Radical-nationalists focussing on active 
resistance and permanent alertness to the Soviet threat. Finally, the Conciliation 
discourse focused on the power disparity between Finland and the Soviet Un-
ion. These three societal understandings, which had created several nation-wide 
debates on the meaning of the Finnish state and the relationship with Russia, 
influenced how the society perceived the Soviet demands in autumn 1939. It 
was seen through the prism of previous historical experiences of the Finnish-
Russian relationship and public perceptions of what the survival of the Finnish 
state would mean in light of these confrontations. Therefore, the understanding 
of the situation was based on the Constitutionalist, White Finland and Radical-
nationalist discourses. The situation was understood within the Constitutionalist 
understanding of laws and norms, complemented by strong anti-Soviet senti-
ments of White Finland and Radical-nationalist discourses, and a focus on per-
manent alertness for defending one’s country of Radical-nationalism. The Con-
ciliation discourse was present as a counter-discourse, as it was seen as an in-
ternal threat to the set of principles based on the dominant understandings. 
These dominant understandings made up a set of domestic principles, which 
made up the way the society understood the Soviet demands. These principles 
were strict neutrality policy, inviolability of Finnish territory and Scandinavian 
co-operation.  
The dissertation further argued that external events can influence the inter-
actions between discourses, which in turn can influence the societal under-
standings and the decision-making process. In Finland’s case study, a good ex-
ample of that was how the Radical-nationalist discourse, carried by parties and 
groups in opposition with the centre-left government, changed its focus after the 
Molotov-Ribbentrop pact. After this agreement, the Radical-right no longer 
perceived Germany as a balancer of the Soviet threat; hence, it started support-
ing the government’s policy. This created a situation where all political forces, 
including the right-wing opposition, supported the government’s policy. 
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As a result, what emerged from these interactions between different dis-
courses was a narrative of unanimity. This narrative had its roots in the Consti-
tutional/Lawfulness front understandings, and through the understanding of the 
Soviet threat also in the White Finland/Radical-nationalist discourses. Within 
the unanimity narrative the whole Finnish society unanimously supported the 
government’s policy. Nevertheless, while emphasising unanimity and the ab-
solute necessity of it during times of crisis, the narrative was considered as de-
pending on the government’s firm policy towards the demands. Therefore, the 
unanimity can also be seen as a social constraint on the decision-makers, as it 
was built on the understanding of unanimity as an absolute necessity con- 
sidering the external threat and therefore it constrained the government’s space 
for manoeuvring to adjust its foreign policy and respond to external constraints.  
This leads us to the question of the decision-makers. How did this trap of 
unanimity or these societal understandings constrain the decision-makers’ pos-
sibilities to respond to the external constraints? How did they know that society 
was behind them as long as they did not opt for greater concessions? And why 
did it even matter? One could have argued that the state’s survival was at stake, 
there was a great power disparity, and therefore the external constraints had to 
take priority over domestic values and norms. That it did matter was shown 
through the near absence of the Conciliation discourse in the public sphere. 
Although there were politicians who argued for greater concessions within  
government circles, they refrained from publicly arguing for it. Therefore, the 
only presence the Conciliation discourse in the public sphere had was as a counter-
discourse, with people stating that the principal threat to Finland would come from 
Conciliation-men and drawing comparisons between the current situation and the 
Constitutional/Conciliation division of the Russification period. 
So, why were the decision-makers constrained by these societal under- 
standings? This takes us to Hopf’s argument that since the decision-maker is so-
cialised within the same society, he is the carrier of the dominant understanding, 
which determines how he will perceive the situation and which action he will 
take. The current research agreed with Hopf on this aspect and showed through 
empirical analysis that the decision-maker is part of the societal fabric. Never-
theless, it argued that Hopf’s approach is simplified as it does not take into ac-
count the interactions between competing discourses and external constraints 
the decision-maker needs to process. The previous paragraphs discussed how 
these interactions played themselves out and gave an example of how an exter-
nal event can influence these interactions between different understandings. 
Nevertheless, how do the societal factors, such as norms and values, come to 
dominate over external constraints for the decision-maker? The current disser-
tation found the answer in the social construction of the decision-maker, as this 
will influence how he processes the tensions between different domestic under-
standings and external pressures. The dissertation explored the primary deci-
sion-maker’s social construction, to exemplify how this influences how the de-
cision-maker processes external and domestic constraints. It showed that the 
primary decision-maker’s policy line on strict neutrality policy and his Scandi-
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navian orientation was embedded within the Constitutional discourse, comple-
mented with anti-Soviet sentiments of the White Finland discourse. Therefore, 
his motive to follow societal understandings should not be explained through 
instrumental constraints, such as risking his re-election. Instead, the decision-
maker himself was embedded within these understandings. Nevertheless, as was 
shown in the decision-making chapter, the decision-making did not happen in a 
straightforward automatic manner, but was negotiated with the other discourses, 
such as the Radical-nationalist approach. How the decision-maker’s social con-
struction influenced the way he understood external constraints was shown by 
the government’s counterproposal that focused on satisfying the ‘legitimate’ 
security needs of the Soviet Union. As the decision-maker assessed the situation 
through the Constitutional discourse, he concentrated on the legitimate security 
concerns of the Soviets and not on the political ones. Furthermore, it also 
showed, through the unanimity-narrative, how the decision-maker was part of 
creating the societal constraints that would later influence its space for mano-
euvring. To conclude, the case study showed how the domestic discourses influ-
enced the foreign policy decision-making, as at the time of decision-making the 
decision-maker negotiated between different competing discourses and the ex-
ternal events, with the baggage of his own social construction. To sum up the 
comparative case study part, the dissertation showed that in the case of Finland 
the decision was based on long-term societal debates and understandings, which 
created constraints for the decision-maker, whereas in the case of Estonia the 
societal and decision-making spheres were separated so that the government, as 
a result, could focus only on external constraints. 
The focus of the current dissertation was on a small state in an asymmetrical 
conflict situation, as it was interested in showing the role societal discourses 
have in the foreign policy decision-making, and therefore chose case studies 
where the systemic constraints should have been overwhelming. Nevertheless, 
in terms of further empirical research, the insights generated in this dissertation 
could be applied to foreign policy making processes in more internationalised 
conflict cases, where one would be interested in problematizing the state and 
society relationship. One interesting case could be the foreign policy making in 
Serbia in relation to the Kosovo question. Clear external constraints, some tied 
to attractive incentives, exist for Serbia in this regard. Nevertheless, it is clear 
that there are certain ‘given’ domestic societal constraints for Serbia’s decision-
makers. Therefore, it may broaden our understanding to go beyond the existing 
domestic and international preconceptions on what Serbians, or Serbia’s politi-
cians, think and trace the development of the societal discourses and the inter-
action between them.  
Another contribution that this study can offer for future empirical research is 
that it treats the decision-maker as a member of the society, coming with his or 
her own baggage of societal understandings. Therefore, it is suitable for ex-
ploring situations where there are several strong conflicting domestic under-
standings, as in such a situation the decision-maker’s mediation between them, 
subject to her own social construction, becomes important. To give one example 
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here, in Israel’s behaviour regarding Palestine, there are several moments where 
the domestic discourses and the decision-maker’s own socialisation within these 
domestic understandings could be further problematized to better understand the 
foreign policy making. Also, the case of Israel would offer a possibility for a 
longitudinal study within this approach. 
 The aim of this dissertation in theoretical terms was not to develop a theory, 
but to contribute to the literature on societal constructivism by problematizing 
the aspects of the state and society relationship, or the way the decision-maker 
is socialised within the dominant discourses, and how this socialisation influen-
ces the foreign policy making. The main theoretical insights, as were shown 
through the discussion on the comparative case studies, were the following: 
societal domestic discourses and understandings do influence a state’s foreign 
policy making process. As these societal understandings are not static, but 
change and develop as a result of external and domestic events and through 
interactions with each other, tracing the development and interactions of these 
discourses helps to better understand how the situation was understood by the 
state and society at the moment of making a particular decision. In addition, as 
the decision itself is not given but socially constructed, the decision-maker’s socia-
lisation with regard to the domestic discourses must be explored. The decision-
maker’s reading of the situation depends on how he has been socialised within 
the existing societal discourses and how he therefore mediates between the 
different understandings. The dissertation also showed that in case there are no 
conflicts between discourses or multiple discourses present in the public sphere, 
this is not because social construction is a priori uniform, but because of some 
long-term social processes, that are traceable, that made it possible. Therefore, 
to better understand how a foreign policy decision became possible, we need to 
see how these existing social conditions came to be and explore the decision-
maker’s socialisation within these discourses.  
The next possible step in theoretical terms could be to expand on the theore-
tical framework. One theoretical aspect to be explored further would be a more 
detailed and thorough investigation of the relations between the state, society 
and the international system. In the current dissertation, which explored non-
internationalised conflicts, the theoretical focus was on the state and society. 
The international system was discussed through the societal understandings of 
the international system and external pressures. Hence, the notion of the inter-
national system could be further conceptualised to develop a framework with an 
explicit three-fold construct (state, society, international system). The theo-
retical approach could be expanded on how the dominant international level 
understandings on a particular state influence the domestic societal understand-
ings. This would be necessary in case of internationalised conflict, such as Ko- 
sovo, where there are multiple understandings on the Kosovo conflict on the 
international level, for example Russia’s Kosovo conflict or the U.S.’s Kosovo 
conflict, and whether and how these international understandings influence the 
societal understandings could be explored, thereby building an additional di-
mension to the framework. 
170 
In terms of the state and society relationship, the theoretical concept to be 
developed further would be the question of societal constraints. It would be 
informative to explore further the role of societal constraints, hence what is 
socially possible within a particular society within particular moment, to see 
how these constraints develop and change through the interactions between the 
state, society and the international system. 
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SUMMARY IN ESTONIAN 
Riigi ja ühiskonna suhte roll välispoliitika  
kujundamise protsessis 
Käesolev doktoritöö uurib riigi ja ühiskonna suhte rolli välispoliitiliste otsuste 
kujunemise protsessis rahvusvaheliste suhete konstruktivismi teooria raamis-
tikus. Väitekiri uurib, kuidas riigis eksisteerivad ühiskondlikud diskursused 
(societal discourses) mõjutavad riigi välispoliitika protsessi tugeva välise surve 
tingimustes. Uurides riigi ja ühiskonna suhte rolli, kasutab väitekiri konstrukti-
visti Ted Hopfi välja töötatud ühiskondliku konstruktivismi (societal constructi-
vism) raamistikku. See raamistik vaatleb, kuidas siseriiklikud diskursused 
mõjutavad riigi välispoliitilist käitumist ja poliitiliste otsuste kujunemist. 
Ajalooliselt on riigid asümmeetrilistes ja ebavõrdsetes konfliktisituatsioonides 
tihti järginud rahvusvahelise süsteemi ratsionaalset loogikat ning andnud 
suurriigi nõudmistele järele.  Samas on ajaloolisi näited, kus riigid tugeva välise 
surve tingimustes ei ole käitunud vastavalt rahvusvaheliste suhete ratsiona-
listliku lähenemise eeldustele ning on otsustanud välispoliitika kasuks, mille 
esmaseks eesmärgiks ei ole olnud konflikti ärahoidmine või vähendamine.  
Samuti on näiteid, kus kaks sõjaliselt nõrka riiki, olles vastamisi agressoriga 
tugeva välise surve tingimustes, on teinud erinevaid välispoliitilisi otsuseid 
(Ungari ja Poola 1956, Tšehhoslovakia 1938, Holland 1940, Eesti, Läti, Leedu 
ja Soome 1939). Doktoritöös uuriti, miks riigid, kes olid sarnases kriisi-
situatsioonis, sarnaste võimalustega ja süsteemsete piirangutega, jõudsid niivõrd 
erinevate välispoliitiliste valikuteni. Rahvusvaheliste suhete teooria ratsiona-
lismi suund vaatleb riike kui ratsionaalseid ühtseid tegutsejaid (rational unitary 
actors), kelle välispoliitilised otsused on kindlaksmääratud riigi materiaalsete 
võimalustega ning kelle peamiseks eesmärgiks on riigi püsimajäämine. Seetõttu 
ei paku ratsionalismi teooria täielikku selgitust asjaolule, miks nõrgemas 
positsioonis riik peaks agressorile vastu astuma. Seetõttu järgis töö rahvus-
vaheliste suhete konstruktivismi raamistikku, mis keskendub riigi tegevuste 
selgitamisel riigi huvidele ja identiteetidele. Töö otsis vastust konstruktivist-
likule „kuidas see sai võimalikuks“ (how-possible) küsimusele: kuidas riigi ja 
ühiskonna vaheline suhe muudab riigi välispoliitilisi praktikaid võimalikeks või 
mittevõimalikeks tugeva välise surve tingimustes. Töö keskendus kahele 
empiirilisele kaasusele: Eesti ja Soome 1939. aasta sügise välispoliitilisele 
otsusele Nõukogude Liidu nõudmiste küsimuses. 
Konstruktivismi teooria käsitleb maailma sotsiaalselt konstrueerituna, 
kollektiivsete sotsiaalsete ideede, identiteetide, normide ja praktikate kaudu 
(Wendt 1999). Konstruktivistid selgitavad riigi eelistuste kujunemist kesken-
dudes riigi identiteetidele ja huvidele (Wendt 1992, 1999). Konstruktivistliku 
lähenemise järgi  ei saa tulemust seletada ainult keskendudes võimusuhetele, 
vaid rahvusvahelises maailmas toimuvat mõjutavad ka otsustajate ja ühis-
kondlike struktuuride kultuur, normid, protseduurid, reeglid ning sotsiaalsed 
praktikad (Hopf 1998). Konstruktivistide jaoks koosneb rahvusvaheline maailm 
nii materiaalsetest kui ideelistest faktoritest ning identiteedid ei ole mitte ainult 
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individuaalsed, vaid samuti kollektiivsed. Käesolev doktoritöö ei väida, et 
ideelised faktorid on a priori olulisemad kui materiaalsed faktorid, kuid väidab, 
et ideelised faktorid mõjutavad välispoliitika kujundamist ka väga tugeva välise 
surve tingimustes, kuna selle surve olemust interpreteeritakse välise ohu 
sotsiaalse konstruktsiooni kaudu. Konstruktivistlikus raamistikus ei tähenda 
riigi sõjaline võim per se ohtu tema naaberriikidele, vaid ainult sotsiaalne 
kontekst annab sõjalisele võimekusele tähenduse. Näiteks asjaolu, et nii Suur-
britannia kui Põhja-Korea omavad tuumarelvi, ei tee neid Ameerika Ühend-
riikide jaoks võrdseks ohuks, kuna tuumarelvade omamise tähendus USA jaoks 
oleneb sellest suhtest, mis tal antud riikidega on (Wendt 1995). 
Doktoritöö järgis Ted Hopfi ühiskondliku konstruktivismi raamistikku, mis 
keskendub sellele, kuidas siseriiklikud arusaamad mõjutavad riigi välispoliitilisi 
otsuseid. Ühiskonna enesetunnetus (self-perception) mõjutab otsustajate aru-
saamu teistest riikidest ning sellest tulenevalt ka välispoliitika kujunemist. 
Hopfi väitel muudavad siseriiklikud diskursused teatavad diskursused välis-
maailmast võimalikeks ja teised diskursused mittevõimalikeks (Hopf 2009). 
Doktoritöö järgib Hopfi lähenemist, et siseriiklikud diskursused ja identiteedid 
mõjutavad riigi välispoliitilisi otsuseid ning et riik ja ühiskond toimivad samas 
sotsiaalses kognitiivses struktuuris, see tähendab, et otsustaja diskursused on 
seotud ühiskondlike diskursustega (Hopf 2002). Samas, väitekiri lahkneb Hopfi 
lähenemisest osas, kuidas riigi ja ühiskonna suhe on konstrueeritud ning kuidas 
see omakorda mõjutab välispoliitika kujundamist. Hopfi  jaoks tähendab eeldus, 
et riik ja ühiskond toimivad samas sotsiaalses kognitiivses struktuuris, ühtlasi ka 
ühtset (uniform) sotsiaalset konstruktsiooni. Seda väites välistab Hopf  pinged 
erinevate ühiskondlike diskursuste ja arusaamade vahel, keskendudes domi-
neerivale diskursusele. Sellest tulenevalt välistab ta ka konfliktid ja debatid, mis 
eksisteerivad otsuste tegemise hetkel, kuna Hopfi raamistiku järgi on enamikel 
juhtudel otsustajal vaid üks valik, mis põhineb domineerival diskursusel. Sa-
mas, nagu Hopf ka ise on välja toonud, enamikel juhtudel eksisteerivad riigis 
korraga mitu diskursust, mis võivad olla omavahel konfliktsed. Seetõttu ei ole 
otsustaja käsutuses ühtseid valmis ‘praktikaid’, vaid ta peab vahendama erine-
vate ühiskondlike diskursuste ning väliste piirangute vahel. Otsustaja ei ole 
valikutegemise hetkel aga objektiivsuse vaakumis, vaid arvestada tuleb ka 
otsustaja enda sotsialiseeritust erinevate ühiskondlike diskursustega.  Seetõttu 
uuribki käesolev doktoritöö peamisi ühiskondlikke diskursusi ning samuti 
poliitiliste otsuste tegijate endi suhestumist ühiskonnas levinud diskursustega. 
Doktoritöös väidetakse, et riigijuhid teevad oma poliitilised valikud sõltuvalt 
enda sise- ja välispoliitilise situatsiooni tõlgendusest, mis omakorda sõltub aga 
nende endi sotsialiseeritusest riigis eksisteerivate ühiskondlike diskursustega. 
Uurimisküsimusele vastamiseks rakendati doktoritöös Hopfi ühiskondlikku 
raamistikku kahele kaasusele: Eesti ja Soome välispoliitiliste otsuste kujunemis-
protsessid Nõukogude Liidu 1939. aasta sügisel esitatud nõudmistele.  Kaasuste 
valik tulenes sellest, et ratsionaalsetest ja sõjalistest kaalutlustest lähtuvalt oleks 
vastupanu mõlema riigi puhul olnud väga problemaatiline. Samuti sobivad 
mõlemad riigid ja konfliktsituatsioonid analüüsiks, sest mõlemal juhul oli 
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tegemist selgelt asümmeetrilise konfliktiga, milles osaleb ilma liitlasteta väike-
riik sõjaliselt võimsa suurriigi vastu. Väitekiri koosneb seitsmest osast: esimene 
peatükk keskendub töö teoreetilisele raamistikule ja metodoloogiale. Töö 
empiiriline osa on võrdlev uurimus, mis koosneb mõlema kaasuse puhul kol-
mest erinevast osast.  Esimeses osas (peatükid kaks ja viis) käsitletakse välise 
surve ulatust, mida otsustaja pidi arvestama. See on vajalik, kuna väitekiri 
keskendub välispoliitika kujundamisele tugeva välise surve tingimustes. See-
tõttu empiiriliste peatükkide esimestes osades uuritakse, kas ja kuidas väliste 
piirangutega arvestati ning neid tasakaalustada püüti, kas väline surve tugevnes 
otsustusprotsessi kestel ning kas sellel oli mõju riigi välispoliitilisele käitu-
misele. Empiiriliste kaasuste teine osa (peatükid kolm ja kuus) keskendub 
ühiskondlike diskursuste tekkele ja arengule. Kaasuste kolmandad osad 
(peatükid neli ja seitse) keskenduvad otsuste tegemise protsessile: kuidas otsus-
taja selle konkreetse arusaamani jõudis. Seega, esmalt käsitletakse otsustaja 
enda sotsiaalset konstrueeritust ning seejärel protsessi, kuidas otsustaja kaalus 
erinevate ühiskondlike diskursuste vahel ning nendest tulenevalt interpreteeris 
antud välispoliitilist olukorda. 
Doktoritöö kahe kaasuse analüüs tõi välja, et Soome ja Eesti reageerisid 
Nõukogude Liidu nõudmistele erinevalt, kuna otsustajate arusaam nendest 
nõudmistest ning üldisest välispoliitilisest olukorrast olenes ühiskondlikest 
diskursustest ja sellest, kuidas riigi ja ühiskonna suhe oli läbi nende diskursuste 
konstrueeritud. Kaasuste esimesed osad (teine peatükk: Eesti osa, viies peatükk: 
Soome osa) vaatlesid välispoliitilist olukorda 1939. aasta sügisel  ning antud 
valitsuste välispoliitika kujundamise protsessi fookusega välisel survel. Eesti ja 
Soome käitumises olid 1939. aasta sügisel mitmed erinevused, mõned neist 
taktikalised, näiteks Soome valitsuse läbirääkimiste käigu aeglustamine, samas 
kui Eesti valitsus soovis jõuda lahenduseni nii kiiresti kui võimalik. Samas oli 
peamine erinevus, millele töö keskendus see, et Eesti kaasuse puhul olid 
välispoliitika kujundamise protsessis keskseks argumendiks välised piirangud 
(constraints). Otsustajad tajusid väliseid piiranguid domineerivatena ja 
keskendusid Eesti ja Nõukogude Liidu sõjalise võimsuse erinevusele (power 
disparity), rahvusvahelise olukorra keerulisusele ning sellele, et võimalused 
välisabiks puudusid, mille tulemusena põhines otsus eesmärgil vältida sõjalist 
konflikti ning valitsus järgis rahvusvahelise süsteemi loogikat. Soome puhul 
näitas uurimus, et riigi välispoliitiline käitumine läbirääkimiste perioodi jooksul 
oluliselt ei muutunud, kuigi väline surve samal ajal kasvas. Kuidas-sai-
võimalikuks osad mõlemas peatükis keskendusid kaasuste järgmisteks osadeks 
küsimuste sõnastamisele: kuidas antud otsused said otsustajate jaoks loogiliseks 
ja  võimalikuks.  
Kaasuste teised osad (kolmas peatükk Eesti ja  kuues peatükk Soome) 
vaatlesid 1939. aastal eksisteerinud ühiskondlike diskursuste teket ja arenguid 
ning omavahelisi interaktsioone. Kuigi Eesti ja Soome mõlemad saavutasid 
iseseisvuse 1918. aastal, erinesid nende omariikluse kogemused suuresti. Ühis-
kondlikud diskursused Soome omariiklusest tekkisid ja arenesid 19. sajandi 
algusest peale, kuna Soome oli 1908. aastast olnud autonoomne. Arusaam 
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Soome riiklusest sai kasvavalt keskseks osaks Soome identiteedis. Kõige oluli-
sem väline tegur Soome kontekstis oli Venemaa. Vastuolud ja konfliktid Vene-
maaga ning arusaamad, kuidas Venemaaga käituda, olid läbivad Soome ühis-
kondlike diskursuste arengus. Peatükk tõi välja kuus peamist diskursust, mis 
esitati kolme debatina: 1–2) põhiseaduslik diskursus – lepitus-diskursus 
(conciliation), 3–4) valge Soome - punane Soome, 5–6) radikaal-rahvuslik – 
seaduslikkuse rinne (Lawfulness front). Põhiseadus-diskursuse ning lepitus-
diskursuse vaheliste ühiskondlike debattide abil said õiguslikud printsiibid ja 
normid olulise rolli Soome ühiskondlikus arengus ning neid nähti kui riikluse 
arengu eelduseid. “Vene küsimus” oli kesksel kohal kõigis kolmes debatis ning 
tekkis kolm erinevat arusaama, kuidas Venemaaga “toime tulla”: 1) põhi-
seadusliku diskursuse siseriiklike seaduste ja normide järgimine; 2) radikaal-
rahvusliku diskursuse aktiivne vastupanu, mis õigustas arusaama, et radikaalsed 
meetodid on õigustatud juhul, kui rahvuslikud väärtused on ohus, 3) lepituse-
diskursus, mis keskendus vajadusele läbi rääkida ja arvestada suurriigi vaja-
dustega. 
Eesti omariikluse kogemus erines tunduvalt Soome omast, sest kuni ise-
seisvuse saavutamiseni 1918. aastal oli baltisaksa eliidi poolt valitsetav riik 
(provints) olnud Eesti ühiskonna suhtes väline tegur. Eesti ühiskond, kus 
toimusid kultuurilised ja sotsiaalsed arengud, ning riik (provints), kus toimusid 
poliitilised otsustusprotsessid, olid eraldatud. Kolm peamist ühiskondlikku 
diskursust Eestis pärast iseseisvuse saavutamist olid: 1) radikaal-rahvuslus, 2) 
kollektiivne-rahvuslus ja 3) liberaalne-individualism. Iseseisvusele eelnev 
ühiskondliku ja riikliku sfääri eraldatus selgitab, miks osa Eesti ühiskonnast 
nägi majanduskriisi ajal lahendust tugevas täidesaatvas võimus, nagu näitab 
radikaal-rahvusliku diskursuse populaarsus sellel perioodil. Pärast 1934. aastat 
domineeriv kollektiivne-rahvuslik diskursus nägi riigi ja ühiskonna suhteid   
kollektiivsete huvide individuaalsetele eelistamise kaudu, mis pidanuks tagama 
riigi arengu. Otsuste tegemise sfääri ja ühiskondlikku sfääri käsitleti eraldi, 
kuna see pidi tagama poliitilise stabiilsuse ja efektiivsema otsuste tegemise 
protsessi. Kuigi alternatiivne diskursus, liberaalne-individualism nägi üksikisiku 
arengut vajaliku eeldusena riigi arengule, oli selle ulatus tugevalt piiratud ja ei 
jõudnud üleriiklikule tasandile. Seega, domineeriv diskursus nägi otsuste 
tegemise sfääri ja ühiskondlikku sfääri eraldatuna. 
Kaasuste kolmandad osad (Eesti: peatükk neli ning Soome: peatükk seitse) 
keskendusid küsimusele, kuidas sotsiaalsete diskursuste ning riigi ja ühiskonna 
vahelise suhte raamistikus said võimalikuks erinevad otsused Soome ja Eesti 
otsustajate jaoks 1939. aasta sügisel. Eesti kaasus näitas, kuidas domineeriv 
diskursus konstrueeris riigi ja ühiskonna vahelise suhte ühiskondliku ja otsuste 
tegemise sfääri lahususe teel. Sellest tulenevad riigi institutsionaalsed praktikad 
tekitasid olukorra, kus alternatiivsed diskursused ei olnud osa otsuste tegemise 
sfäärist ega riigi tasandi avalikust sfäärist. Seega sai tekkida olukord, kus 
otsustaja ei pidanud valima erinevate võistlevate ühiskondlike diskursuste 
vahel, vaid sai keskenduda ainult välistele piirangutele. Et uurida, kuidas 
tekkisid sotsiaalsed tingimused (social conditions), milles otsustajad 1939. aasta 
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sügisel tegutsesid, keskendus töö sellele, kuidas riigi peamine otsustaja, 
president Konstantin Päts oli ühiskondlike diskursuste suhtes sotsialiseeritud. 
Peatükk näitas, et otsustaja arusaam kollektivistlik-rahvusliku diskursuse 
raames oli, et riigi stabiilsuse jaoks on vajalik tugev täidesaatev võim, mis 
esindab rahvast otse.  Need arusaamad viisid institutsionaalsete praktikateni, 
milledes ühiskondlik ja otsustus sfäär olid eraldatud. Domineeriv riigi diskursus 
eelistas rahvuslikke kollektiivseid huve individuaalsetele huvidele. Seega, 
riiklik süsteem nägi ette tsentraliseeritud ülalt-alla poliitilise ja ühiskondliku 
organiseerituse, kus ühiskondlikud tegevused olid riigi poolt koordineeritud, et 
tagada riigi huvide fookus. Kuna alternatiivsed diskursused olid riigi tasandi 
avalikust sfäärist ning otsuste tegemise protsessist isoleeritud, siis ei olnud 
avalikus sfääris riigi tasandil diskursuste vahelisi debatte. Seetõttu ei olnud 
otsustaja piiratud ka ühiskondlike arusaamade poolt, nagu näiteks Saksa-
vastased meeleolud ühiskonnas, vaid võis rajada poliitika reaalpoliitilistele 
vajadustele. Seetõttu otsuste tegemise protsessi ajal 1939. aasta sügisel sai 
valitsus keskenduda ainult välistele piirangutele, mitte sisemistele faktoritele 
või ühiskondlikele arusaamadele nendest välistest piirangutest. Kuna alterna-
tiivsed diskursused ei olnud osa riigi tasandi avalikust sfäärist, siis ei olnud 
vajadust nende diskursuste vahel vahendada, mis võimaldas valitsusel 
keskenduda ainult välistele piirangutele ja seetõttu viia ellu otsus sõjalise 
konflikti vältimiseks.  
Soome kaasus näitas, kuidas ühiskondlikud diskursused ja nende oma-
vaheline vastastikune mõju ühiskondlike debattide kaudu viis domineerivate 
arusaamadeni olukorrast 1939. aasta sügisel. Ühiskondlikud diskursused, mille 
raames olid tekkinud ja arenenud ühiskondlikud debatid Soome riigi 
tähendusest ja suhetest Venemaaga, mõjutasid ühiskonna arusaamu Nõukogude 
Liidu nõudmistest 1939. aastal. Situatsiooni tõlgendati eelnevate ajalooliste 
Vene-Soome suhete kogemuste ning ühiskondlike diskursuste kaudu, mida 
Soome riigi püsima jäämine nende eelnevate vastuolude valguses tähendaks. 
Olukorda mõisteti põhiseadusliku diskursuse seaduste ja normide raamistikus, 
mida täiendasid valge Soome ja radikaal-rahvuslike diskursuste tugevad 
Nõukogude Liidu vastased meeleolud. Need ühiskondlikud diskursused 
moodustasid printsiipide kogumi, mille alusel ühiskond Nõukogude Liidu 
nõudmisi mõistis. Need printsiibid olid range neutraliteedi poliitika, Skandi-
naavia koostöö ja Soome territooriumi puutumatus. Diskursuste vaheliste 
debattide tulemuseks oli üksmeelsuse narratiiv, mille raamistikus kogu Soome 
ühiskond üksmeelselt valitsuse poliitikat toetas. Samas, rõhutades absoluutset 
vajadust üksmeelsuseks kriisi aegadel, sõltus see narratiiv valitsuse rangest 
poliitikast nõudmiste vastu. Seetõttu võib üksmeelsust näha ka piiranguna 
otsustajate jaoks, kuna see vähendas valitsuse manööverdamisruumi välis-
survele vastamisel. Miks aga üksmeelsuse narratiiv või ühiskondlikud 
diskursused vähendasid otsustajate võimalusi vastata välisele survele? Miks 
ühiskondlikud diskursused mõjutasid välispoliitikat tugeva välise surve 
tingimustes, kus välised piirangud oleksid võinud muutuda tähtsamaks 
siseriiklikest väärtustest ja normidest? Ühiskondlike diskursuste tähtsust võis 
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näha kasvõi sellest, et lepituse-diskursus mis eksisteeris valitsusringkondades 
ning soosis suuremate kompromissideni minemist Nõukogude Liiduga, puudus 
pea täielikult avalikust sfäärist, kuna riigitegelased ei olnud valmis neil 
teemadel avalikult sõna võtma. 
Seega, kuidas ühiskondlikud diskursused said otsustaja jaoks dominee-
rivamateks kui väline surve ja piirangud? Hopfi argumendile tuginedes võib 
väita, et kuna otsustaja ise on sotsialiseeritud samas ühiskonnas, on ta samuti 
teatud ühiskondlike väärtuste ja arusaamade kandja, mis määrab selle, kuidas ta 
olukorda mõistab. Doktoritöös väidetaksegi, et kuna otsustaja ise on sotsia-
liseeritud ühiskondlike diskursuste suhtes, mõjutab see seda, kuidas ta enda 
jaoks tõlgendab tasakaalu ühiskondlike arusaamade ja väliste piirangute vahel. 
Doktoritöö vaatles, kuidas Soome peamine välispoliitika otsustaja, välisminister 
Eljas Erkko  oli sotsialiseeritud oluliste ühiskondlike diskursuste suhtes ning 
leidis, et välisministri range neutraliteedipoliitika ja Skandinaavia orientatsioon 
põhines põhiseadusliku diskursuse arusaamadel, mida täiendas valge Soome 
Nõukogude Liidu vastane meelsus. Ühiskondlike arusaamade mõju otsustaja 
arusaamale situatsioonist näitab kasvõi Soome valitsuse vastu-ettepanek Nõu-
kogude Liidu ettepanekule. Kuna otsustaja arusaamad põhinesid põhiseadus-
likul diskursusel, keskendus vastu-ettepanek Nõukogude Liidu legitiimsetele, 
mitte poliitilistele julgeolekuvajadustele. Samuti näitas peatükk läbi üks-
meelsuse narratiivi, kuidas otsustaja osales sotsiaalsete piirangute loomisel, mis 
hiljem tema manööverdamisruumi vähendasid. Kokkuvõtvalt näitas kaasus, 
kuidas ühiskondlikud diskursused mõjutavad välispoliitika kujundamisprotsessi, 
kuna otsuse tegemise hetkel pidi otsustaja arvestama erinevaid võistlevaid 
diskursuseid ning välist survet, mida ta interpreteeris nende ühiskondlike 
diskursuste perspektiivi kaudu, milles ta ise sotsialiseeritud oli. Kokkuvõtvalt, 
empiiriliste kaasuste kaudu näitas doktoritöö, et Soome puhul põhines otsus 
pikaajalistel ühiskondlikel debattidel ning arusaamadel, mis piirasid otsustajat 
välise surve arvestamisel. Samas Eesti kaasuse puhul olid  ühiskondlik ja 
otsustamise sfäär eraldatud, mis võimaldas valitsusel keskenduda ainult välisele 
survele.  
Käesolev töö pakub alust järgnevateks uurimusteks, kuna kasutatud teoree-
tilist raamistikku on võimalik kasutada ja edasi arendada teiste kaasuste puhul, 
kus on eesmärk keskenduda riigi ja ühiskonna vaheliste suhete problema-
tiseerimisele. On võimalik edasi arendada teoreetilist raamistikku, uurides riigi, 
ühiskonna ja rahvusvahelise süsteemi suhteid, mis võimaldaks uurida, kuidas 
rahvusvahelise tasandi diskursused teatud riigi või konflikti kohta mõjutavad 
selle riigi siseriiklikke diskursusi ning nende kaudu välispoliitikat. Ühiskonna ja 
riigi suhte aspektist oleks võimalik edasi arendada ühiskondlike piirangute 
teoreetilist kontseptsiooni. Võimalik oleks vaadelda, kuidas sellised piirangud 
riigi, ühiskonna ning rahvusvahelise süsteemi vaheliste suhete mõjutusel arene-
vad ning muutuvad. 
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